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Abstract
In this thesis, we investigate the role of teachers, private schools and the family in the
formation of children’s human capital in Kenya. We focus on Kenya due to the declining
learning outcomes the country is experiencing, in the wake of increasing public spending
in the education sector. The first essay examines the effect of teacher subject knowledge,
pedagogical skill, teacher effective instruction time and teacher classroom practices on
grade 4 language and maths test scores. Our results show that a one standard deviation
increase in the teacher’s knowledge in language (maths) increases student test scores by
0.075 (0.126) of a standard deviation in language (maths). An additional hour of teacher
effective instruction time increases student achievement by 0.051 and 0.059 score standard
deviations in language and maths, respectively.
The second essay estimates the size of the effect of private school attendance on literacy
(language) and numeracy (maths) skill acquisition among children drawn from lower pri-
mary grades (grades 2-4) in Kenya. Using a household survey data, we apply different
estimation techniques (OLS, fixed effects and propensity score matching) to deal with the
potential endogeneity of school choice. We find positive and significant effects of private
school attendance on both language and maths achievements across all the estimation
techniques. For instance, the household fixed effects yield a private school premium of
0.13 to 0.21 score standard deviation in maths and language, respectively.
The third essay examines the effect of the gender and order of birth of a child on intra-
household investments in, and educational outcomes of, children in Kenya. We measure
the intra-household education investment in children by the household’s decision to enrol
a child in a private school. We define educational outcomes by two variables: completed
years of education and relative grade progression. We control for the potential endo-
geneity of child’s gender, birth order, family size and household level unobservables using
household fixed effects model. We find no female advantage in terms of private school
enrolment. However, there is a consistent female advantage in terms of completed years of
education and relative grade progression. We find significant negative birth order effects
on private school enrolment, completed years of education and relative grade progression.
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Chapter 1
Background and Motivation of the
Study
1.1 Introduction
Evidence gathered over the past 40 years demonstrates that education is important, both
at the micro and macro level. From the seminal work of Mincer (1970, 1974) on school
attainment and individual earnings, estimates of the return to schooling for a majority of
countries now exists (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Education has been associated
with increase in workers’ productivity (Mincer, 1974; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004),
higher economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008), improved health status and
reduced crime (Lochner, 2011) among other non-monetary outcomes.
As observed by Glewwe et al. (2011), policymakers in developing countries have gen-
erally been convinced that education is important for growth. As a result, efforts at
national and global levels over the past decade were devoted to ensuring that by 2015, all
children, boys and girls alike, have access to primary education that is free, compulsory
and of good quality. At the global level, the Dakar Framework for Action on Education for
All (UNESCO, 2000)1 and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals provided
overarching political commitments that guided the achievement of this goal. A number of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa responded by implementing ambitious and wide-ranging
reforms to achieve this goal. For instance, overwhelming evidence that user-fees were
a major barrier to access (Riddell, 2003; Bruns and Rakotomalala, 2003) provided the
basis for the key reform of making public primary education free (World-Bank, 2009).2
1United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
2World Bank
1
Kenya enacted the policy in 2003 while other sub-Saharan African countries did the same
between 1994-2005. These include Ethiopia and Malawi (1994), Uganda (1997), Lesotho
(2000), Mozambique (2004) and Ghana (2005) (Bold et al., 2013b; World-Bank, 2009).
Currently, across the developing world, education takes the largest proportion of pub-
lic spending. In Brazil, education accounts for 5.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) while it is 6.3 percent in Vietnam. In Kenya and Ghana, education accounts for
around 6 percent of gross domestic product (World-Bank, 2016). As shown in figure 1.1,
average expenditure on education in sub-Saharan Africa, both as percent of total gov-
ernment expenditure (continuous line) and as percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
(dotted line) has been on the rise from early 2000 when most countries enacted the free
primary education policy. Evidence further suggests that much of this increased educa-
tion spending took the form of improving school infrastructure and instructional inputs
all aimed at improving enrolments (Glewwe et al., 2011). Recent reviews show that pri-
mary school completion in developing countries is no longer limited primarily by access
as distance to the nearest school has greatly been shortened (Pritchet and Banerji, 2013;
Glewwe et al., 2011).
Figure 1.1: Trends in Average Spending on Education in sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2016)
Increased spending in the sector appears to have paid off. Although there is still
room for progress, there is evidence across the developing world that more children are
going to and staying in school (UN, 2015). Figure 1.2 shows that average gross primary
2
enrolment 3 in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 83 percent to 100 percent between 2002
and 2013 while net primary enrolment4 rose from 58 percent to 78 percent during the
same period (World-Bank, 2016). Efforts to get more girls into schools are also bearing
fruits. Figure 1.2 further shows that the gender parity index (GPI)5 in primary school
enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 0.84 in 2000 to about 0.94 in 2013.
Figure 1.2: Gross enrolment, Net enrolment and Gender Parity Index at Primary level in
sub-Saharan Africa
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2016)
Despite increased access to education opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa and the
developing world in general, evidence from national and regional student assessments
show that learning achievement remains quite low. The status of learning in developing
countries is detailed in a recent synthesis by the Center for Global Development (Pritchet
and Banerji, 2013). Drawing on evidence from different countries such as Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Bangladesh and India, this review reports that many children in developing
3Gross primary enrolment is defined as total primary enrolment within a country regardless of age,
expressed as a percent of the total population of children of official primary school age.
4Net primary enrolment is the ratio of the number of children of official primary school age who are
enrolled in primary education to the total population of children of official primary school age, expressed
as a percentage.
5Gender parity index is the ratio of females to males enrolled in a given stage of education (primary,
secondary, etc.)
3
countries who complete primary school are unable to read a simple passage, perform
simple addition, use a ruler to measure the length of a pencil or even tell the time on a
clock - skills that are supposed to be mastered at the end of the second year of primary.
The Uwezo annual literacy and numeracy assessments of school age children6 shed
light on the depth and nature of the problem in East Africa. According to this survey, a
majority of grade 3 children (81 percent in Uganda and 89 percent in Tanzania) cannot
read a grade 2 English level text (Uwezo, 2015, 2012). In Kenya, results from the Service
Delivery Indicators survey, described in detail in the next chapter, show that even after 3
years of schooling, 11 percent of the children cannot identify 3 out of 9 simple words and
84 percent cannot correctly read all the 58 words in a paragraph. In India, the Annual
Status of Education Report (ASER) of 2014 shows that 75 percent of grade 3 learners
and 25 percent of grade 8 learners cannot read a grade 2 English text fluently (ASER,
2014).7
Such low quality of learning has implication at micro and macro levels. At a micro
level, low level of skill acquisition at basic primary school level is likely to negatively affect
the individual’s knowledge acquisition in later grades. At a macro level, the opportunity
cost of time spent in school that is not adequately compensated represents potential dead
weight loss to the economy (Jones et al., 2014). According to Hanushek and Woessmann
(2012), it is what workers know, not the amount of time they spent in school that makes
them more productive and their economies more prosperous.
The weak learning outcomes, particularly in public schools, coming in the wake of
increasing public spending on education inputs raises an important research question as
to whether school inputs matter for student achievements and if they do, which inputs
matter. Recent literature suggests that the challenges of learning in developing countries
goes beyond school funding, especially infrastructure and instructional inputs financing
(Hanushek, 2008; Pritchet and Banerji, 2013; Glewwe et al., 2011). According to this lit-
erature, investments in inputs (infrastructure) in front-line service provider units (such as
hospitals and schools) in developing countries have merely led to marginal improvements
in outcomes because of deficiencies in the incentive structures in those front-line facilities
(Spence and Lewis, 2009; Swanson et al., 2012; Hanushek, 2008; Pritchet and Banerji,
2013; Glewwe et al., 2011).
6The Uwezo initiative implements large-scale household surveys that assesses literacy and numeracy
competencies of school age children across East Africa. An explanation of how the Uwezo surveys are
administered is presented in Chapter 2.
7In the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) assessment, reading fluency is based on a task that
involves asking the learner to read a grade 2 level story comprising of 8 to 10 sentences and approximately
60 words. For more details about Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) assessment please see:
http://www.asercentre.org/
4
In education, this literature stresses on the importance of teacher input and more
so, the importance of teacher competence (knowledge) and behavior in the delivery of
education services. Schools inputs (infrastructure) are crucial for student learning but
teachers, as key service providers in the production of education, need to be present, mo-
tivated and able to instruct. In other words, conditional on teachers being appropriately
skilled and exerting the necessary effort, the provision of school resources and infrastruc-
ture has important effects on student achievements. Despite this, the linkage between
teacher knowledge and effort and outcomes has not been fully explored in the context of
sub-Sahara Africa largely due to lack of data.
Education in most countries is provided by the public and private sectors.8 In a
number of sub-Saharan African countries, evidence shows that the elimination of user fees
in public primary schools was followed by dramatic increases in private schools (Dixon
and Tooley, 2012; Dixon, 2012; Tooley and Dixon, 2005; Tooley et al., 2008, 2011; Tooley,
2013; Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Oketch and Ngware, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010, 2012;
Larbi et al., 2004). The rise in private schools has mainly been associated with decline
in the quality of public schools especially after the introduction of free public primary
education (Tooley et al., 2008, 2011; Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Oketch and Ngware,
2010; Oketch et al., 2010, 2012; Larbi et al., 2004). The majority of these schools reflect
private initiatives mainly in urban informal settlements to establish schools that levy low
fees, referred in the literature as low-cost private schools. These schools are generally
lacking in terms of school infrastructure and learning facilities as well as trained teachers,
relative to their public schools.
The effectiveness of private schools in developing countries has been discussed in
the recent literature. The large majority of studies find that, relative to public schools,
private schools, including low-cost private schools operating with very limited resources,
are associated with better learning outcomes (Javaid et al., 2012; Andrabi et al., 2008;
Pal, 2010; Bold et al., 2011a, 2013a; Thapa, 2015; Azam et al., 2015; French et al., 2010;
Desai et al., 2009). Skeptics however argue that such private school premium could be
due to spurious correlations between private school attendance and unobserved factors,
mainly related to the household (Goldberger and Cain, 1982; Newhouse and Beegle, 2006;
Altonji et al., 2005, 2000). For instance, in Kenya, evidence shows that poor parents
bypass free public primary schools and send their children to otherwise fee-paying low-cost
private schools due perceived better quality in private schools (Tooley et al., 2008; Oketch
8Private schools comprise education institutions not administered by the local, state or national gov-
ernment. They have the right to select their students and are funded in whole or in part by charging their
students tuition, rather than relying on public (government) funding. We provide a detialed description
in Chapter 4.
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and Ngware, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010). Such parents, concerned with their children’s
education, despite being poor, are more likely to ensure that the home environment is
favorable for learning for their children including investing in efforts such as helping their
children with homework.
The differences in achievements between private and public students could therefore
be due to such factors not easily observable by the researcher. The effects of private
schools are likely to be over-estimated if unobservable factors such as home environment
and parental motivation are not fully taken into account. In fact, a study by Newhouse
and Beegle (2006) shows that the size of the private school effect sometimes declines or
disappears when such unobservables are controlled for. Despite this, a recent review by
Ashley et al. (2014) found that only a few studies have looked at the effectiveness of private
school in sub-Saharan Africa while paying closer attention to the role of unobservables
and the endogeneity of private school choice. The validity and magnitude of the private
school effect is therefore still subject to further research especially in developing countries
experiencing dramatic increases in private school provision.
Many schooling decisions, such as whether to enrol a child in school or not and whether
to enrol a child in a public or private school, take place within the family. There are many
ways in which the family can influence the education outcomes of a child. For instance,
when faced with resource constraints parents may discriminate between children in terms
of school investments (Basu and Van, 1998; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010) especially with
access to private schools which are generally not free of charge. While economic literature
acknowledges that the family into which a child is born matters for children outcomes
(Black et al., 2005), research on specific family characteristics that promote education
outcomes in children is still inconclusive. Some of these characteristics include sibling
gender, sibling size, birth spacing and birth order. Of these, sibling gender and birth
order have received attention in the psychology and economics literature although their
effect on children’s learning outcomes remains open to research.
This thesis examines human capital formation of children in Kenya focusing on the
three interrelated research issues that we have highlighted above. The first relates to
the importance of teacher input and more so, the importance of teacher competence
(knowledge) and teacher effort in the delivery of education services. The linkage between
these aspects of teachers and student achievement has not been fully explored especially
in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. The second relates to the effectiveness of private
schools. There are concerns that the private school advantage (effect) documented in the
literature could be a reflection of the endogenous selection of good students into private
schools. The last one relates to the literature that examines the influence of the family
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environment on children’s human capital development. While many schooling decision
take place within the family, research on specific family characteristics that promote
outcomes in children is still inconclusive (Black et al., 2005).
1.2 Research Questions
In view of the above, this thesis addresses the following three specific questions, each
forming a distinct essay:
• What is the effect of teacher knowledge, pedagogy, effective instruction time and
classroom practices on student test scores in Kenya?
• What is the effect of private schools on student achievement in Kenya?
• What is the role of gender and birth order on intra-household investments in, and
educational outcomes of children in Kenya?
To address these questions, we use two data sets, namely, the Service Delivery Indicators
survey and the Uwezo survey. The Service Delivery Indicators survey is a World Bank-
led schools survey that administered grade 3 level language and maths tests to grade 4
students, randomly selected from 306 schools. The Uwezo survey is a household survey
that administered a grade 2 level test assessment (in maths and languages) to children
aged between 6 to 16 years. The SDI and Uwezo surveys are complimentary to each
other. While the former involved assessment of learners at school, in the latter, learners
were assessed at home. Analysis based on the two sample should provide us with a robust
picture of student learning in Kenya. In chapter 2, we provide a details description these
surveys.
1.3 Overview of Kenya’s Education System
In this section, we give an overview of Kenya’s education sector, focusing mainly on
the primary sub-sector. Kenya’s population, based on the 2009 national census, was
estimated at 39 million, comprising 14 million school-going children (KNBS, 2009)9. Of
the 14 million, 17 percent were four to five years old, potentially eligible for early childhood
school programmes, 59 percent were of primary school-going age (6 to 13 years), and 24
percent were secondary school-going children (14 to 17 years).
9KNBS means Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
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The promise of quality education for all Kenyans remains a national priority. The 2010
Constitution of Kenya underscores education as a basic right of every Kenyan and the
government views education as fundamental to the success of all key national strategies.
To this end, the government is a signatory to a number of international declarations
that support children’s education and well-being, including the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG), Education for All (EFA) and United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC) alongside national policies and programs. The country follows
the 8-4-4 education system of eight years of primary education, four years of secondary
education and four years of university education. In this regard, children enter grade one
officially at the age of six and are expected to complete primary education at the age of
13.
Education is provided by a number of actors. In terms of primary education, there
were approximately 29,460 officially registered schools in 2014 (KIPPRA, 2016). Of these,
close to 75 percent were government owned while the rest, 25 percent, were owned by non-
state actors. The non-state actors that own the 25 percent of primary schools include non-
governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, community-based providers and
private-for-profit agents. In addition, there are hundreds of private non-formal schools
mainly concentrated in urban informal settlements and operating outside government
regulation (Edwards Jr. et al., 2015; Piper et al., 2014; Piper and Mugenda, 2010). In
Chapter 4, we provide a detailed overview of non-state actor education provision in Kenya.
Although education is provided by many actors, the government has overall authority in
the management and regulation of education including curriculum development and design
of education policy, among other roles.
The education sector accounts for a significant proportion of the total expenditure,
maintaining about 25 percent of the national budget and about 6 percent of Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) for the past five years (GoK, 2015; Bank, 2014). The high expenditure
on education has been partly due to government commitment to provide free primary ed-
ucation, which was launched in 2003. This was the second attempt by the government to
implement the policy (World-Bank, 2009). Following recommendations by Kenya’s first
post-independence education commission, the Ominde Commission of 1964, fees were
abolished in 1974 for grades 1 to 4 and later extended to grades 5 to 7 in 1978. This
policy led to an increase in primary gross enrolment rate (GER) level from 50 percent in
1963 to about 105.4 percent in 1989.10 The policy was, however, reversed in the 1990s
10GER exceeds 100 percent because it includes students of all ages. GER includes students whose age
exceeds the official age group (e.g. those who enrol early, those who enrol late and those who repeat
classes). Therefore, if there is late enrollment, early enrollment, or repetition, as it is the case in Kenya,
the total enrollment can exceed the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of
education – leading to ratios greater than 100 percent.
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following Kenya’s adoption of structural adjustment programs. During the period 1990-
2002, schools charged fees and children who could not afford them were not allowed to
attend school. As a result, primary gross enrolment rates began to fall, from 105.4 percent
in 1989 to 88.2 percent in 2002 (Bold et al., 2013b).
To reverse these trends, the newly elected National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) gov-
ernment, which won the landmark December 2002 elections, announced the abolition of
fees in all public schools starting from 4 January 2003 (Bold et al., 2010, 2013b; Oketch
and Somerset, 2010). Under the free public primary education policy, public schools were
prohibited from collecting revenue from parents and communities. Instead, school fees
were replaced with a capitation grant11 that is paid directly into the schools account and
managed by the School Management Committee (World-Bank, 2009).
The free primary education policy was accompanied by ambitious programs to improve
the quality of school infrastructure. Recent studies and school surveys confirm evidence
of government success in efforts to improve school infrastructure. For example, while the
average pupil-textbook ratio was 6:1 at Standard 6 and 9:1 at Standard 3 just a few years
into the free user fee policy (Hardman et al., 2009; MoEHRD, 1999), this ratio had been
reduced to the government target of 3:1 by 2013 (Martin and Pimhidzai, 2013; Piper and
Mugenda, 2010). According to the Service Delivery Indicators survey, which we discuss
in Chapter 2 and 3, 90 percent of schools have access to minimum teaching resources
(chalk, pen, blackboard) and infrastructure (toilets and sufficiency of light for reading in
the classroom). As we show later, there seems to be no statistically significant difference
between private and public schools in a wide range of these indicators.
As expected, the removal of user fees in public primary schools (accompanied by im-
provement in the quality of school infrastructure) led to dramatic increase in enrolment
in public schools (Oketch and Somerset, 2010; Wasanga et al., 2010). For example, enrol-
ment increased from about 5.9 million in December 2002 to 6.9 million in January 2003
and to 7.4 million in December 2004. Gross enrolment rates increased from 88.2 percent
in 2002 to about 108.0 percent in 2004. Similarly, net enrolment rates increased from 76.4
percent to 82.1 percent during the same period. In figure 1.3, we show official recorded en-
rolment rates mainly from registered public schools based on the Kenya National Bureau
of Statistics (KNBS) data. As can be seen from the figure, there was a jump in enrolment
rates (both gross and net enrolment rates) between 2002 and 2004 which began to slow
down from 2005 on-wards. In fact, by 2006 gross enrolment rates had reduced to 104
percent from their 108 percent levels in 2004. A large number of credible studies show
that the increase in enrolments following the removal of primary user fee was immediately
11The capitation grant is equivalent of USD 14.
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accompanied by large quality shocks in public schools (Onsomu et al., 2005; Piper and
Mugenda, 2012; Wasanga et al., 2010; Oketch and Somerset, 2010; Bold et al., 2011b;
Oketch and Ngware, 2010)12 and it did not take long before parents started transferring
their children to private schools.
Figure 1.3: Gross enrolment, Net enrolment and Completion Rates at Primary level in
Kenya.
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
This trade-off between quality and quantity after the abolition of school fees is well
explored by Bold et al. (2011b). Using two consecutive, nationally representative, cross-
sectional, household surveys collected in 1997 and 2006, the authors find that primary
school net enrolment rates increased from roughly 75 percent in 1997 to 80 percent in
2006 (in the wake of the free primary education policy). They, however, find that this
increase was almost entirely due to a tripling of the private sector, whose enrolment
share increased from 3 percent to 9 percent. They find that enrolment in the public
sector remained stagnant. Bold et al. (2011b) however find changes in the composition of
enrolment in public sector schools despite enrolment levels remaining stagnant. Analyzing
enrolment by parental background, they find a 5 percent increase in enrolment among
children from low socioeconomic status, defined as children whose parents had completed
primary education or less. On the other hand, enrolment among children whose parents
had secondary education fell by 6 percent. Bold et al. (2011b) conclude that such demand
response to a fall in price was prima facie evidence that removing school fees in public
schools led to a decline in public school education quality, leading to an exit to private
schools by children from higher economic status.
Another characteristic of Kenya’s primary education system is that a significant num-
ber of children leave school before completing primary education. According to official
12We address issues quality issues in the next Chapter.
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government statistics, as at 2015, 17 percent of learners do not complete primary educa-
tion. This figure seems to be an understatement based on other sources. For instance,
in the recent report by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), it was estimated that
34 percent of close to 1.3 million children who joined primary schools at the start of free
primary education in 2003 did not complete grade 8 (IEA, 2016).13 In the next Chapter,
we continue with this discussion on issues related to education access and quality in Kenya
based on the Uwezo and the Service Delivery Indicators surveys. Before that, we outline
the structure of the dissertation in the next sub-section.
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the topic, area of
research and key research questions. It has also provided an overview of Kenya’s education
system. In chapter 2, we provide a detailed description of the dissertation data sets, the
Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) and Uwezo surveys. We further describe some of the
key (dependent and independent) variables of interest and highlight key issues that are
followed in subsequent chapters.
In the first essay (chapter 3), we begin by providing a description of the teacher
knowledge, pedagogy, effective instruction time and classroom practices. We use the SDI
survey data to link these aspects of teachers to student scores by way of an education
production function, while controlling for attributes related to students, teachers, schools
(including whether the school is private or public) and the communities where schools
are located. Results indicate that teacher subject knowledge and pedagogical skill are
critical for student achievements. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the
teacher’s knowledge in language (mathematics) increases student test scores in language
(mathematics) by 0.075 (0.126) of a standard deviation. Teachers who spend more time on
instruction related activities and can keep students engaged (on-task) during the lesson
are associated with higher student test scores. An additional hour of teacher effective
instruction time increases the student language and maths test score by 0.051 and 0.059
of standard deviation, respectively. A number of classroom teaching practices have an
effect on student test scores although the effect differs between language and maths. For
instance, the practice of using local language to illustrate learning reduces student test
score in language by 0.161 of a standard deviation but it has no effect on maths.
One of the school related factors we control for when estimating the effect of teacher
13Find details of the report at: [http://www.nation.co.ke/news/education/Primary- schools-dropout-
rates-Kenya/2643604- 2930304-sm2nvf/index.html]
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knowledge, pedagogy, effective instruction time and classroom practices on student test
scores in the first essay is a dummy variable indicating whether a school is private or not.
Our results show that relative to public schools, private schools increase student scores
by about 0.33 and 0.69 score standard deviations in language and maths, respectively.
Following the discussion in the introduction section (section 1.1), could this private school
effect be a reflection of spurious correlations between private school attendance and un-
observed characteristics? Put differently, could it be that students who attend private
schools already have disproportionately high academic potential and access to comple-
mentary educational resources than their counterparts in public schools? These questions
form the motivation for the second essay (chapter 4). In this
In the second essay, we estimate the size of the effect of private school attendance on
literacy (language) and numeracy (maths) skill acquisition among children drawn from
lower primary grades (grades 2-4) in Kenya. We use the Uwezo survey, which, unlike the
SDI survey, allows us to apply a number of approaches (OLS, fixed effects and propensity
score matching) that deal with the endogenous nature of private school choice. Using a
methodology advanced by Altonji et al. (2005), we estimate the extent of the influence
of unobservables on our private school advantage in the OLS and fixed effects models.
Similarly, following Rosenbaum (2002), we also check the extent to which our estimates
of private school effects based on propensity score matching suffer from unobservables. We
find a private school premium in maths ranging from 0.13 to 0.20 score standard deviation,
based on the household fixed effects model and village fixed effects model, respectively.
In the case of language, the premium ranges from 0.20 to 0.29 score standard deviation,
based on the village and household fixed effects models, respectively. Household fixed
effects yield tighter estimates due to their ability to account for unobservables at the
household level
The analysis in chapter 4 shows that private schools (relative to public schools) are
associated with better learning achievements. However, private schools in Kenya are not
free of charge. If resources become scarce, it is possible that parents can decide to send
some of their children to private schools and others to public schools. What family char-
acteristics influence such decisions to take some children to private and others to public
schools? This question forms the motivation for our third essay where we investigate the
effect of the gender and order of birth of a child on intra-household investments in, and
educational outcomes of, children in Kenya. From the second essay, we know that, relative
to public schools, private schools significantly promote student scores yet they (private
schools) are not free of charge. For this reason, we measure the intra-household education
investment in children by the household’s decision to enrol a child in a private school and
define educational outcomes by two variables, namely, completed years of education and
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relative grade attainment.
We use the Uwezo survey that allows us to apply the family fixed effects models that
address the potential endogeneity of children’s gender, birth order and family size as well
as factors that are unobservable at the household level. Although we do not find an intra-
household gender preference in terms of investments in children’s education, there is a
female advantage in terms of the two measured education outcomes. For instance, relative
to their male siblings, female siblings complete 0.138 more years of education and progress
through school faster, accumulating 0.025 more years of education per year of schooling.
Our results show significant negative effects of birth order on private enrolment, completed
years of education and relative grade attainment. Our results are robust to different
robustness checks including correction of selectivity bias originating to non-enrolment of
children and further attempts to measure birth order more accurately. We find that family
wealth plays a significant role in propagating the birth order (but not gender) effects we
observe.
Chapter 6 provides a concluding remarks. Although beyond the scope of our study, we
briefly discuss what we regard as potential drivers for the high performance of students
in private schools. However, we call for further inquiry into this issue subject to data




The Study Data: The Service
Delivery Indicators (SDI) and Uwezo
Surveys
2.1 Introduction
Faced with the growing concern about the quality of education offered in schools in the
sub-Saharan region as outlined in chapter 1, careful monitoring of learning outcomes is
vital (Jones et al., 2014). The absence of reliable data on learning outcomes in develop-
ing countries has recently inspired a number of regional and national initiatives aimed
at assessing how children learn in schools. In East Africa, two initiatives stand out:
the Uwezo initiative and the Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) initiative. The Uwezo1
initiative has been implementing large-scale household surveys that assess literacy and
numeracy competencies of school age children since 2009 (Jones et al., 2014). The SDI
is a World Bank-led initiative, launched in 2009 to collect data on service delivery at
front-line primary service providers (e.g. schools and health facilities).
The Uwezo and SDI surveys are the main sources of data for this thesis. The moti-
vation for using both Uwezo and SDI data is two-fold. First, the Uwezo survey involved
assessment of students at home while in the SDI survey, students were assessed at school.
Combined analysis of SDI and Uwezo should provide a robust picture of student’s learn-
ing in Kenya. Secondly, the SDI survey involved classroom observation and assessment
of teachers, which enables us to answer the first research question related to estimating
1Uwezo which means ‘capability’ in Kiswahili, is a non-governmental organization that aims to improve
competencies in literacy and numeracy among children aged 6-16 years in Kenya. More details about
Uwezo can be found at: http://www.uwezo.net/.
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the effect of teacher knowledge, pedagogy, instruction time and classroom practices on
student learning. A drawback of the SDI survey, is that it did not collect information
regarding households or community related factors. In addition, its sample size is rela-
tively small, especially with regard to children going to private schools. It is therefore not
ideal for answering our second and third research questions which relate to estimating
the effect of private schools and estimating the effect of gender and birth order on child
education outcomes, respectively. To compensate for this, we use the household-based
Uwezo survey.
This chapter provides a general overview of the two surveys. It highlights key issues
that form the basis for our research questions that are followed in the subsequent chapters
of the dissertation. We begin by providing a detailed description of how the surveys were
undertaken including the sampling strategy. Based on selected indicators, we then provide
a general picture of the home (using Uwezo survey) and school (using SDI survey) inputs
that support student learning. Using the Uwezo micro data, we provide a brief discussion
on two education outcomes variables (net enrolment rates and relative grade progression)
since they are key variables of interest in Chapters 4 and 5. We end by providing an
analysis of how children are learning in Kenya based on the Uwezo and SDI student test
scores. In particular, we assess whether children in Kenya are acquiring and mastering
the skills and competencies outlined in the curriculum of earlier grades.
A key point to note is that the SDI survey assessed grade 4 pupils. The Uwezo survey
targeted children aged 6-16 years, both those enrolled in school and those who are out of
school. In analyzing student tests scores in section 2.2.4 (and also when examining the
effects of private schools in Chapter 4)2, we restrict the Uwezo sample to children who are
enrolled and are in grade 2 to grade 4 to make the two samples comparable.3 There are a
number of other reasons for imposing this restriction. First, there is scant information on
learning achievement in lower grades in Kenya.4 Second, in a typical developing country
like Kenya, the sample of primary school children is likely to become more self-selective as
one goes higher up due to drop-out rates. Focusing on grade 2 to 4 allows us to minimize
such potential self-selection problems. Lastly, evidence shows that cognitive ability is
most malleable at younger ages; hence the need to understand student learning at the
lower levels (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
2In Chapter 4, we motivate the reasons for imposing this restriction.
3We exclude grade 1 since the assessments were based on grade 2 syllabus.
4Only a few studies exist looking at learning achievements in lower grades in Kenya. These include
Piper et al. (2015), Piper et al. (2014), Piper and Mugenda (2012) and Piper and Mugenda (2010) which
focus on student learning at grade 1 and grade 2. These studies are a product of the on-going United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Early Grade Primary Mathematics and
Reading Initiative. They are based on a Randomized Control Experiment trails and quite limited in
terms of the sample size.
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2.1.1 The Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) Survey
Launched in 2009, the Service Delivery Indicators (SDI)5 is an initiative of the World
Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Economic Research Con-
sortium (AERC). The aim of the initiative is to collect data on how services are delivered
at front-line primary service provider facilities in health (health facilities) and education
(schools).
The SDI survey of education in Kenya conducted in 2012 is a cross-sectional sur-
vey covering 306 primary schools. A detailed description of how the SDI survey was
conducted is provided in Martin and Pimhidzai (2013). The survey used a multistage
cluster sampling strategy where counties6 were categorized as (i) rural or urban, based
on the 1999 national census data; (ii) relatively rich or poor, based on the 1999 national
census data;7 and (iii) high or low-performing based on county-level 2010 Kenya Certifi-
cate of Primary Education (PECK) pass rates. These three binary distinctions yielded 8
strata within which schools were sampled. Within each stratum, counties were randomly
selected, followed by a random selection of locations within each county, and then a ran-
dom selection of schools within the locations. The probability of selecting a county or a
location was proportional to the population within it.8 The data collection involved three
major components briefly described below.
2.1.1.1 Classroom Observation
One of the unique features of the SDI survey is the fact that it involved classroom obser-
vation. In every school, a trained surveyor9 observed a teacher delivering a 35-minutes
grade 4 lesson in either language (English)10 or mathematics but not both.11 The obser-
vations were based on an adapted version of the Stallings Classroom Snapshot instrument
5For details, please see: http://www.sdindicators.org/
6Counties are units of devolved government as envisioned in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya..
7The 1999 census was the latest data set on urbanization and poverty rates available to the researchers
at the time of the sampling process for the SDI schools survey.
8Of the 47 counties in Kenya, 3 counties of the region previously known as North Eastern province were
excluded due to security concerns at the time. North Eastern Province was one of eight administrative
regions that preceded creation of the counties.
9Before going to the field, a week-long training was held for the surveyors led by a team of specialists
from the World Bank in collaboration with Kimetrica (https://www.kimetrica.com/contacts/), an agency
that had been subcontracted to collect the data.
10Throughout this document, instead of calling this an English test, we refer to it as language test.
11In the cases where there was more than one class of grade 4 (e.g grade 4A and 4B), the surveyor
randomly selected one class using a methodology taught during the training. Schools were not informed
of their selection and were not advised of the visits in advance. Teachers did not receive advance notice
that they would be observed.
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(Stallings, 1977; Stallings and Knight, 2003). The Stallings instrument uses a standard-
ized coding grid to register minute by minute activities and materials being used by the
teacher and students over the course of a single lesson(Bruns and Luque, 2014). For every
minute, of the 35 minute lesson, the surveyor scanned the class in a 360-degree circle start-
ing with the teacher and recorded what was happening. This snapshot, took about 15
seconds and captured what was happening at that instant but not what took place during
the entire minute interval.
Classroom observation took place in 276 schools. Recall that in each of these 276
schools, one teacher was observed in either a language or mathematics lesson. In 28
schools, teachers were absent from class and in 2 schools, classroom observation took place
for creative arts and science subjects. We exclude these schools from the analysis. Of the
276 schools where classroom observation took place, language lessons were observed in 144
schools while mathematics lessons were observed in 132 schools. One might be concerned
with the presence of systematic differences between the sample of schools (276 schools)
where classroom observation took place and those where classroom observation did not
take (30 schools). In appendix A (table A2.1), we use a wide range of school characteristics
to show that there are no significant differences between these two samples.
2.1.1.2 Pupil and Teacher Assessments
After the classroom observation, approximately 10 pupils from the class that had been
observed were randomly selected and assessed in mathematics, language and non-verbal
reasoning. The tests were largely based on materials up to grade 3 and were aimed at
assessing the child’s basic reading, writing, and arithmetic skills. They were designed by
experts in international pedagogy and based on a review of primary curriculum materials
from 13 African countries, including Kenya (Martin and Pimhidzai, 2013). They were
administered as a one-on-one interaction, where the surveyor read out instructions to
pupils. Where necessary, the surveyor read the instructions to the pupil in their mother
tongue.
The student language test consisted of a number tasks ranging from alphabet and word
recognition, to more challenging tasks like sentence and paragraph reading, and eventually
tasks involving comprehension of written material. The mathematics test included tasks
ranging from number identification and sequencing, to single and double digit addition
and subtraction, to single digit multiplication and division. The non-verbal reasoning test
consisted of tasks related to pattern recognition based on Raven matrices test (see Martin
and Pimhidzai (2013) for a detailed description).
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In addition, the survey assessed the knowledge of 1,679 primary teachers in language,
mathematics and pedagogy. All current grade 4 mathematics and language teachers (in-
cluding those observed in class) and those who taught grade 4 mathematics and language
during the previous year (2011) were assessed. The language test administered to teachers
consisted of 22 items involving grammar, cloze12 and composition tasks. The mathemat-
ics test consisted of 15 items related to addition, subtraction, multiplication, division,
fractions, interpreting graphs and data. The pedagogy test was designed to capture skills
teachers would routinely be asked to apply when teaching.13 As a courtesy to teachers,
the teacher tests were designed as a marking exercise, in which teachers was asked to
mark and correct a hypothetical student’s exam (Martin and Pimhidzai, 2013).
Out of 276 teachers in 276 schools (one teacher per school) who were observed in
class, only 222 teachers took part in the teacher assessments. The rest, 54 teachers, did
not take part in the teacher assessments. We do not know why these teachers opted not
to participate in the teacher assessment exercise. We however know that participation in
classroom observation and teacher tests was voluntary. In appendix A (table A2.2), we
show that there is no systematic differences, on a range of teacher classroom practices, be-
tween the 222 teachers (who were observed and tested) and 54 teachers (who participated
in the classroom observation but not teacher tests).
This effectively means that our sample has 222 schools where one teacher was concur-
rently observed in class (either in language or mathematics) and assessed in the teacher
tests. Of these, 109 teachers were observed in language and the rest, 113 teachers, were
observed in mathematics.
2.1.1.3 Teacher Absenteeism
Besides class observation and test assessments, the SDI survey involved an assessment of
absenteeism of 2,960 teachers. During the first visit, the surveyor randomly selected a
maximum of ten teachers from the list of all teachers in the school. In schools where there
were less than 10 teachers all teachers were selected. The whereabouts of the selected
teachers were then verified during a second unannounced visit based on five mutually
exclusive options: (a) teacher was in class teaching; (b) teacher was in class but not
teaching; (c) teacher was present in school but not in class; (d) teacher was in school but
teaching outdoors and; (e) teacher was absent from school. We define absenteeism as the
12The cloze consisted of a passage with certain words removed (cloze text), where the teacher was asked
to replace the missing words.
13Details about the mathematics, language and pedagogy test items administered to teachers are
provided later in the text.
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ratio of teachers (out of ten) who were present in school but not in class (c above) and
were absent from school (e above). On average, the second unannounced visit took place
about one or two weeks after the first visit.
The final part of the survey protocol was a structured interview with the school head-
teachers (or substitute) to gather information about the school demographics including
information about the teaching staff, school infrastructure and teaching resources.
2.1.2 Uwezo Survey
We used the third round of the Uwezo survey for Kenya collected in 2012. A detailed
description of the sampling strategy is provided in Jones et al. (2014). The third round of
the Uwezo survey was based on a two-stage random sampling design. First, 30 primary
sampling units 14 from each district were selected with the probability of selection pro-
portional to population size. Second, about 20 households in each enumeration area were
selected via systematic random sampling.15 Uwezo targets children aged 6-16 years who
are regular residents of the household. Households without such children were therefore
excluded.
2.1.2.1 Household, School and Village Surveys
In each enumeration area, data collection involved three steps. First, data was collected
from one randomly selected local public primary school within the enumeration area.16
Information was gathered on school enrolment, teachers, classroom facilities as well as
school facilities among others. Close to 4,465 schools were covered. Second, a question-
naire was administered to the village head of the sampled enumeration areas (villages).
Among others, it gathered information on availability of: (i) social amenities (these in-
cluded chief’s office, shopping center and police post), (ii) infrastructure (these included
tarmacked roads, all-weather roads, protected water points and electricity), and (iii) the
number of educational and health facilities in the village.17
14Primary Sampling Units generally represent enumeration areas and/or villages
15The sample design was provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS).
16In cases where there was no public primary school in the sampled enumeration area, the nearest
public school attended by the majority of children in the sampled enumeration area was selected. When
more than one school was available in the enumeration area, the school that attended by a majority of
the students was selected.
17Information gathered included the number of primary and secondary schools (public and private) as
well as the number of village polytechnics. Data was collected on the number of health facilities run by
government and non-governmental organizations.
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Finally, households were visited. A questionnaire was then administered to the head of
the household (or representative). For children aged 6-16 years, information was gathered
about their age, gender, disability, school grade, whether they were enrolled in school and
for those enrolled, the type of school they were enrolled in (private or public) and the
time taken to arrive at school. The household questionnaire also collected information
on parental age and education as well as indicators of household socioeconomic status.
All children of school age (6-16 years) in the household, irrespective of their enrollment
status, were assessed in language and mathematics. The 2012 Uwezo survey covered
145,564 children aged 6-16 from 72,000 households residing in close to 4,000 villages.
2.1.2.2 Children (Student) Assessments
Unlike in the SDI survey, student assessments under the Uwezo initiative took place
at home. Children were assessed in language proficiency (English and Kiswahili) and
mathematics. The tests were based on the grade 2 level curriculum and only administered
to children aged 6-16 years who were regular inhabitants of the household. In this study,
we limit ourselves to English (which we call language) and mathematics tests.
The language (literacy) tests were designed to assess five principal competencies,
namely: (1) letter recognition, (2) word recognition, (3) ability to read a paragraph,
(4) ability to read a (short) story and (5) ability to comprehend information in the story
(Wakano, 2016; Uwezo, 2012, 2014; Jones et al., 2014). Each competence level was assessed
by a separate test item. However, due to the ordered nature of the competencies, not all
children are assessed on each competency item (Jones et al., 2014).18 In this regard, the
assessment adopted some form of adaptive learning. It began with level 3 competency
(reading a paragraph) and either stepped up (to comprehension) or stepped down (to
letter level) in difficulty depending on the child’s initial response. For instance, if the
child read the paragraph correctly at the start, he/she was then presented with a short
story of about 98 words and asked to read it. If the child read the story successfully,
he/she was presented with two questions based on the story he/she had read.
However, if the child was unable to read the paragraph correctly at the beginning,
he/she was presented with a list of 10 words and asked to read at least 5. If the child
could not read up to at least 5 words, he/she was presented with 10 letters and asked to
name any 5. If the child could not identify up to 5 letters, he/she was marked as knowing
18In this regard, comprehension of the paragraph (highest competence) requires ability to read story,
process it, and understand its meaning. Knowing how to read a story implies ability to read a paragraph
which in turn implies ability to recognize words. Ability recognize words implies ability to recognize
letters (lowest competence).
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nothing. Overall, children were classified into one of these five ascending categories: (1)
knows nothing; (2) can identify a letter; (3) can identify a word; (4) can read a paragraph;
(5) can read a short story and (6) can do comprehension.
The numeracy tests, structured and administered in a similar way to the literacy tests,
assessed the following competencies: (1) counting, (2) number recognition (two digits),
(3) rank ordering of two numbers, (4) addition, (5) subtraction, (6) multiplication and
(7) division (Wakano, 2016; Uwezo, 2012, 2014; Jones et al., 2014). It began with the
level 5 item (subtraction) and the level of difficulty was either stepped up (to division) or
stepped down (to counting) depending on the child’s initial response. Similarly, children
were classified into one of these ascending categories: (1) knows nothing; (2) could count;
(3) could identify a number; (4) could discriminate numbers; (5) could add (6) could
subtract; (7) could multiply and (8) could divide.19 Unlike SDI, Uwezo did not involve
teacher assessments. In table 2.1, we show the information that was gathered in both
surveys.
Table 2.1: Data gathered in SDI and Uwezo Surveys
Uwezo Survey SDI Survey
Households Characteristics
Parental demographics Y N
Durable and livestock assets Y N
Lighting, dwelling and sanitation conditions Y N
Schools Characteristics (Public and Private schools)
School demographics (location, number of teachers etc) N Y
Teaching resources (chalk, board, textbook etc) N Y
Infrastructure (lighting, toilets etc). N Y
Teachers Characteristics (Public and Private schools)
Teacher test assessments N Y
Teacher classroom practices and time use N Y
Teacher effort: absence in school and in class N Y





Breakfast, disability and tuition status N Y
Village Characteristics (socioeconomic conditions) Y N
Notes: (1) Y means Yes and N means No; (2) As noted, in the Uwezo survey, data was collected from
one public primary school within the enumeration area. No private schools were covered. We however
do not however have full access to the Uwezo schools data.
19Generally, subtraction facts are harder for children to learn than addition facts. Based on the topology
of learning, children who were able to subtract were imputed as having the ability to add. Similarly, those
who were able to add were imputed as having the ability to discriminate numbers. Lastly, those who
were able to discriminate numbers were imputed as having the ability to identify and count numbers.
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2.2 Survey Descriptives
2.2.1 Overview of Home and School Inputs
We begin by showing a general picture of home (based on the whole sample of the Uwezo
Survey) and school (based on the SDI survey) inputs that support student learning (ta-
ble 2.2). In subsequent chapters, we will show how these inputs affect student achieve-
ments. Table 2.2 (a) presents summary statistics for children’s home education inputs.
On average, there are six members per household. Majority of parents have primary
education: mothers average six years of education while fathers average nine years of edu-
cation (column 1). Children in private schools have significantly better educated parents
and live in smaller households.
The Uwezo survey does not ask about household income or expenditure, two conven-
tional measures of household living standards. However, the survey includes questions
related to household ownership of durable assets (television, radio, computer, mobile
phone, car, bicycle, motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (number of cattle, sheep,
horses/donkeys/ camels, chicken etc.), type of material used to construct the wall of the
dwelling unit, type of lighting regularly used by the household, number of meals taken per
day and household sanitation status (whether the household has a source of water and a
latrine at home). We use these household socioeconomic characteristics to construct an
index of household wealth.20
We wish to briefly explain how the household wealth index is constructed since it will
repeatedly be used in subsequent chapters. This index is constructed using the (ordi-
nary) principal components analysis (PCA).21 Details of the PCA approach are described
and defended by Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006), Filmer (2005)and Filmer and Pritchett
20The variables used for the construction of the index are (1) a set of eight dummy variables which is
equal to one if a household owns each of the following durable assets: television, radio, computer, mobile
phone, car, bicycle, motorbike and cart; (2) a set of four dummy variables which is equal to one if a
household owns each of the following livestock assets: cattle, donkey, camel and sheep/goat; (3) a set
of four dummy variables which is equal to one if the household dwelling unit is made of the following
materials: mud, iron, timber, and bricks/stone; (4) a set of two dummy variables which is equal to one if
the household’s regular source of lighting is: electricity and paraffin; (5) a set of three dummy variables
which is equal to one if the household’s number of meals consumed per day are one meal, two meals and
three meals; (6) a set of two dummy variables which is equal to one if the household has a source of water
and a toilet at home; (7) Number of years of education of the mother and father (entered as a continuous
variable).
21Principal components analysis (PCA) is a technique that summarizes information contained in a large
number of variables in a smaller number by creating a set of mutually uncorrelated components of the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(2001) among others who show that the PCA wealth index performs just as well as tradi-
tional measures of household living standards such as household-size-adjusted consump-
tion expenditures, in predicting household outcomes such as educational attainment.22
Despite this, we acknowledge and are aware that this measure of household resources has
flaws.23
Following De Haan et al. (2014), we normalize the household wealth index to the
range of 0 and 1 and classify households with a wealth index of 0.5 and above as rich
and those below this wealth index as poor. As can be seen in table 2.2 (a), the average
wealth index (0-1 range) is 0.41. This means that majority of households surveyed in the
Uwezo survey belong to the lower part of the wealth index and can therefore be classified
as poor. For instance, only 28 percent of households can be classified as rich. Most of the
households classified as poor send their children to public schools.
Table 2.2 (b) shows summary statistics of the school environment. This is based
on the Uwezo survey that covered 4,486 public schools (one school per village) and the
SDI survey that covered 306 schools (239 public and 67 private schools). In both samples,
schools are almost universally equipped with minimum teaching resources, which we define
as availability of: (a) functioning blackboard24, (b) chalk (c) writing materials (pens and
exercises books), and (d) number of students per textbook. For instance, over 90 percent
of schools in both samples have classes with a blackboard and piece of chalk and students
provided with writing materials (pencil/pen and an exercise book). Although there are
more students per textbook in public relative to private schools, the government has
nearly achieved its policy of three students per textbook at primary level, especially
in mathematics. Schools also do well in terms of minimum infrastructure, defined as
availability of: (a) functioning toilets (toilets that are clean, private, and accessible) and
(b) sufficient light to read the blackboard from the back of the classroom. Over 85 percent
of the schools have toilets.25 Access to electricity, although not defined as a minimum
functioning infrastructure requirement, is generally low, especially among public schools.
accounts for as much of the variability in the variables as possible. This first principal component can be
interpreted as a wealth index on the assumption that the underlying variable with the largest explanatory
power is a household’s long-run wealth (Filmer, 2005).
22The PCA based wealth index has been used by many studies (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Tenikue
and Verheyden, 2010) to investigate the determinants of education outcomes in the developing world and
has been found to significantly determine child education outcomes.
23A detailed exposition of these flaws are discussed in Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006) and more recently
Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2017). The centered PCA index has been criticized for giving negative scores
to assets that are mainly owned by rural households such as ownership of livestock in the case of Kenya
leading to artificial increase in the rural-urban divide (Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2017).
24The blackboard is defined as functioning if a text written on it could be read at the front and back
of the classroom.
25Furthermore, in over 90 percent of the schools, toilets were designated for boys and girls, accessible
(unlocked and not overflowing) and private (had doors or separating entryway wall).
24
Table 2.2 (c) shows selected indicators capturing selected teacher observable char-
acteristics (teacher experience), knowledge (teacher test scores in mathematics and lan-
guage) and effort (absence in class). These are based on 1,679 teachers who were assessed
in teacher test assessments as well as 2,960 teachers who were assessed in teacher ab-
sence. We provide a detailed description of these characteristics in the next chapter. The
teacher’s overall mean years of experience is 13 and private school teachers are less experi-
enced. On average a public school teacher has more than 10 years of experience compared
to his/her counterpart in a private sector. The overall mean performance was 63.52 per-
cent and 77.59 percent in language and mathematics respectively. Private school teachers
appear to have more subject knowledge than their counterparts in public schools. On
average, four out of 10 teachers were absent from the classroom. Private school teachers
are more likely to be in school and in class than their public counterparts. As shown in
the table, a private school teacher was almost 13.90 percent points less likely to be absent
in class relative to his/her counterpart in a public school.
Table 2.2 (d) summarizes children’s characteristics based on both surveys. The overall
mean age is 10.4 and 9.31 years for the SDI and Uwezo surveys, respectively. The statistics
show that 14 percent and 22 percent of students in Uwezo and SDI surveys attend private
schools. The majority of learners in the SDI survey (87 percent), reported they had
breakfast (our proxy for socioeconomic status) before coming to school. In the Uwezo
survey, about 36 percent of the children attend extra tuition classes.26 In both surveys,
private schools have relatively young students. Similarly, private school children are more
likely to have had breakfast and more likely to attend tuition classes.
Generally, table 2.2(a) to (d) shows that children who attend private schools do seem
to have disproportionately high academic potential and access to complementary educa-
tional resources relative to their counterparts who attend public schools. For instance,
their parents have more years of education and they come from households with higher
wealth index. They are also taught by more knowledgeable teachers and teachers are
also more likely to be in school and in class. As pointed out in Chapter 1, this might
raise concerns as to whether the higher performance in private schools is a reflection of
endogenous selection of students from better backgrounds. In Chapter 4, we estimate
the effect of private schools by employing different methods that deal with such potential
endogenous selection into schools.
26These are extra remedial classes offered beyond the normal official scheduled school time.
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2.2.2 Enrolment Rates
For children to learn and acquire minimum learning competencies, they need to be enrolled
in and progress effectively through the schooling system. We briefly discuss trends in
enrolment and grade progression, based on the whole sample of the Uwezo survey which
collected information on the enrolment status of children. Out of 145,564 children of
primary and secondary school going age (ages 6 to 16) covered in the Uwezo survey, 88
percent were enrolled, 11 percent were never enrolled and 1 percent had dropped out of
school. Focusing on those who are enrolled, in figure 2.1(a), we show trends in enrolment
rates by age. In figure 2.1(b), (c) and (d), we show the gender parity index, that is, the
number of girls in every 100 children enrolled in all schools, public schools and private
schools, respectively. 27
Figure 2.1(a) confirms our core message from chapter 1: Kenya has made significant
progress in getting children into schools. The enrolment rates peak at a relatively high
level - almost 95 percent of children are enrolled in school at some point in their school age
period. Efforts to get more girls into schools are also bearing fruits. Figure 2.1 (b) shows
that at all ages, the number of girls per 100 children enrolled is almost equal to the number
of boys enrolled. In fact, at age 6 and 7, there are slightly more girls than boys enrolled
in primary school. Figure 2.1(c) and figure 2.1(d) further shows there is no significant
gender preference in terms of enrolment in public and private schools, respectively. At all
ages, the number of girls per 100 children enrolled is almost equal to the number of boys
enrolled and in fact there are slightly more girls enrolled than boys. For instance, at age
13, there are slightly more girls enrolled in private schools than boys.
As also noted in Jones et al. (2014), there are two concerns that arise from Fig-
ure 2.1(a). First, children are relatively older than expected when they begin school. As
can be seen in Figure 2.1(a), close to 40 percent of 6 year olds are not enrolled in school
despite this being the official age for starting school in Kenya. Second, enrolment rates
start to decrease at age 11 although this is not the official primary school completing age,
meaning that a significant number of children do not complete their primary education.
These two concerns conform to findings by Jones et al. (2014) who report that an average
Kenyan child of primary school age level receives fewer years of education than expected.
27 It is not surprising that the trends are quite similar to those presented in Jones et al. (2014) who
pooled the Uwezo survey of 2011 and 2012.
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Figure 2.1: enrolment Rates and the Gender Parity Index by Age
Source: Own calculation based on Uwezo 2012. Notes: enrolment rates and the Gender Parity Index are
calculated as a percent of the age cohort.
There are also regional disparities in enrolment within Kenya. To show this, we
calculate the average net enrolment rates (at primary level) and the proportion of girls per
100 pupils enrolled at the location level.28 The Uwezo survey has about 1,845 locations.
In figure 2.2, we show the spatial distribution of the primary net enrolment rates (NER)
for each location.29 Each of the symbol, the dot ( ) and delta (N), corresponds to the
net enrolment rate level for a particular location. In locations with the dot symbol ( ),
the net enrolment rates are equal to or more than 50 percent. In locations with the delta
symbol (N), the rate of net enrolment rates are less than 50 percent. As it can seen from
the figure, the majority of locations are characterized by high enrolment rates, falling
within the range of 66-99 percent. Nevertheless, there are a number of locations (albeit
being few) where more than half (50 percent) of primary school-going children are out of
school. In fact, there are locations where less 20 percent of the primary age school going
children are enrolled.
28Based on the 2009 census, Kenya is administratively divided into seven levels: Province, District, Di-
vision, Location, Sub-location and village (enumeration area). In the hierarchy of geographic boundaries
in Kenya, the smallest unit is the enumeration area (village). A group of villages comprise a Sub-location.
A group of Sub-locations comprise a Location. The Location is therefore the third administrative tier.
29We are grateful to Laban Maiyo, a Geospatial consultant based in Nairobi, for helping us with
denoting data to specific locations.
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Figure 2.2: Net Enrolment Rates (NER) by Uwezo Survey sampled Locations
Source: Own calculation based on Uwezo 2012. In locations with the dot symbol ( ), the net
enrollment rates are equal to or more than 50 percent. In locations with the delta symbol (N), the rate
of net enrollment rates are less than 50 percent.
In figure 2.3, we show the spatial distribution of the proportion of girls per 100 pupils
enrolled (gender parity index), calculated at the location level. In locations with the dot
symbol ( ), the proportion of girls per 100 pupils enrolled is equal or greater than 50
percent, meaning that there are equal or more girls than boys enrolled per 100 pupils.
In locations with the delta symbol (N), the proportion of girls per 100 pupils enrolled is
less than 50 percent. As it can be seen from the figure, in nearly half of the locations,
28
the proportion of girls enrolled is less than boys. There are locations where proportion
of girls per 100 pupils enrolled is as low as 20 percent. This shows evidence of regional
disparities in terms of girl’s access to education opportunities in Kenya. We pick up this
discussion in chapter 5 where we examine whether the gender and order of birth of a child
in a household affects his/her enrolment (in private schools).
Figure 2.3: Gender Parity Index (GPI) by Uwezo Survey sampled Locations
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012. In locations with the dot symbol ( ), the proportion
of girls per 100 pupils enrolled is equal or greater than 50 percent, meaning that there are more girls
than boys enrolled per 100 pupils. In locations with the delta symbol (N), the proportion of girls per
100 pupils enrolled is less than 50 percent.
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2.2.3 Relative Grade Progression
As we noted based on figure 2.1(a), a number of children start school when they are
relatively older than expected and a good proportion leave before completing primary
education. In other words, there seems to be a relatively high level of late entry and
drop out rates (early exit). Researchers such as Mani et al. (2013) have advocated for an
education outcome measure that accounts for such late entry and early exit. This measure
is called the relative grade progression and is defined as completed years of schooling
divided by potential years of schooling.30 The potential years of schooling are the total
number of schooling years a child accumulates if he/she starts schooling on time31 and
adds one more in each subsequent year (Mani et al., 2013).
Ideally, if a child starts grade 1 at age 6 and does not repeat any class, he/she records
a relative grade progression of 1, the most desired and maximum level and denotes high
efficiency levels of the schooling system. Lower levels of relative grade progression de-
note high rates of late entry and/or grade repetition, which in turn show high levels of
inefficiency in the schooling system. The overall relative grade progression for the whole
country is 0.65 meaning that, on average, children accumulate 0.65 years of education per
year of schooling.
In figure 2.4, we show the average relative grade progression per location. Each of the
symbol ( ) and (N) corresponds to the average relative grade progression per location. In
locations with the dot symbol ( ), the average relative grade progression are equal to or
more than 0.5 percent. In locations with the delta symbol (N), the average relative grade
progression are less than 0.50 percent. The figure shows that there is a good proportion
of regions (locations) where children progress quite slowly through the schooling system
due to late entry and/or early drop outs. In Chapter 5, we analyze whether the gender
and order of birth of a child in a household affects his/her relative grade progression.
30Relative grade progression is calculated as [Completed years of education(Age−6) ] where 6 in the denominator
denotes the official age of starting school in Kenya.
31That is age 6 in the case of Kenya.
30
Figure 2.4: Relative Grade Progression (RGP) by Uwezo Survey sampled Locations
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012. In locations with the dot symbol ( ), the average
relative grade progression are equal to or more than 0.50 percent. In locations with the delta symbol
(N), the average relative grade progression are less than 0.50 percent.
2.2.4 Student Performance in Test Scores
When children enrol in school and progress through specific grades, they are expected
to master specific competencies in each grade. Children are expected to master skills
and competencies outlined in the curriculum from the earliest grades. As we have al-
31
ready noted, the child tests in SDI and Uwezo surveys were set at grade 3 and grade 2,
respectively. These tests provide an effective way of assessing whether children at each
grade, thus, grade 4 and above for SDI and grade 3 and above for Uwezo, have mastered
competencies necessary for further learning.32
There are two ways we can proceed with assessing learning competencies based on
Uwezo and SDI surveys. We can calculate the overall mean score for each tested com-
petency or calculate the share of children achieving a specific competency level. Since
Uwezo and SDI assessments are anchored in the content of the national curriculum, the
second metric is more meaningful because it helps to assess whether children meet the
expected numeracy and literacy competency requirements.
In table 2.3 and table 2.4, we show the proportion of children who meet specific
competence levels in the SDI and Uwezo surveys for language and maths. We restrict
the Uwezo sample to children who are enrolled and are in grade 2 to grade 4 in order
to make the samples more comparable. Restricting the sample to grade 2 to 4 learners
in Uwezo leaves us with about 52,196 students. In both surveys, slightly more than half
of the sample are female students. Looking at the language scores in columns 1 and 4,
students generally do well in simple literacy tasks such as letter and word identification.
Nevertheless, about 10 percent of grade 4 students in the SDI and 25 percent of students
(grade 2 to 4) in Uwezo could not identify or read correctly simple words presented to
them. Oral reading fluency, which we measure by the ability to read connected text
accurately, is still low among learners.33 Although 72 percent of students in the SDI
could read all the 10 words in a basic sentence, only 16 percent managed to read correctly
and accurately all the 58 words in a paragraph even after three years of primary schooling.
In the same vein, only 48 percent of students in Uwezo could correctly read all the 18
words in the paragraph and further only 28 percent could read all the 98 words in a story.
32The idea is not to directly compare student performance between Uwezo and SDI surveys. They
are based on different test content and grade composition and grades. Rather, we provide a snapshot
of learning in lower primary in the surveys, which we consider robust since its based on two surveys
undertaken at school and home respectively.
33Oral reading fluency is the ability to read a connected text accurately, quickly, and with expression.
Oral reading fluency therefore assesses three aspects: speed, accuracy, and proper expression. The test
in the SDI and Uwezo largely assessed student’s ability to read correctly (accurately) every word in the
text. Aspects of speed and expression were not assessed. We therefore proxy for oral reading fluency by









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We find weak literacy skills when it comes to comprehension, that is the ability to im-
plicitly and explicitly understand simple information that is stated in the text. As shown
in columns 1 and 4, less than half of the students (39 percent in the SDI and 25 percent in
Uwezo) could answer a question testing their ability to identify directly stated facts in the
passage (factual comprehension). Equally, less than half of the students in both surveys
could answer questions that required them to infer or draw conclusions from opinions or
ideas implied or suggested by the author of the text (analytical comprehension). Surpris-
ingly, as column 1 in table 2.3 shows, more students in the SDI could answer questions
about a text (e.g. 39 percent answered correctly a factual comprehension question) than
could read correctly all the words in the same text (e.g 16 percent could read all words in
a paragraph). Furthermore, more students did better in analytical comprehension than
in factual comprehension.
Table 2.4 shows student scores in maths. More than 70 percent of the learners in both
surveys generally do well in items that require procedural fluency. They can comfortably
count and match numbers, identify numbers, discriminate quantities and add. Learn-
ers however faced difficulty dealing with relatively complex tasks involving subtraction,
multiplication and division. For instance, in column 1 and 4, we see that 37 percent of
students in the SDI could not solve two subtraction problems, one involving single digits
and another involving double digits. The trend is similar in Uwezo where almost half of
the students could not solve two out of three simple double digit subtraction problems.
When presented with three multiplication problems involving single, double and triple
digits, only 54 percent of grade 4 students in the SDI managed to solve at least two
problems. Only 43 percent could answer two out of the three single digit multiplication
problems in the Uwezo survey. Basic numeracy skills in division are particularly low
among students; less than 30 percent of the students in both surveys were able to answer
at least two out of three division problems involving mixed single and double digits. The
SDI further shows that learners are generally weak at solving problems that require some
level of analytical reasoning, especially arithmetic word problems; only 16 percent could
solve a simple single digit multiplication problem presented in word format and only 26
percent could solve a simple division problem involving completing a series, both problems
requiring some level of reasoning.
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Figure 2.5: Numeracy Skill Competences by Grade of Attendance
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012.
Figure 2.6: Literacy Skill Competences by Grade of Attendance
+
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012.
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Lastly, in figure 2.5 and figure 2.6, we show the proportion of children at grades 2,
3 and 4 in the Uwezo survey that met specific numeracy and literacy competence levels
respectively. This gives a clear picture of the extent to which the children have mastered
skills and competencies outlined in the curriculum from earlier grades. The results show
that children are acquiring basic skills more slowly and later than expected. Further, the
level of skill acquisition reduces with the rise in the difficulty of the competence. Using
the case of grade 3 learners (the middle bar), we can see that nearly 40 percent of them
cannot do a grade 2 level subtraction problem. The figure increases to 58 percent for
those who cannot do a grade 2 level multiplication and 75 percent for those who cannot
do a grade 2 level division. Overall, only 69 percent of grade 3 learners are able to pass
the Uwezo grade 2 level literacy tests. Similarly, as shown in figure 2.6, 53 percent, 76
percent and 78 percent of grade 3 learners cannot read a grade 2 level paragraph, story
and comprehension, respectively. Overall, only 43 percent of grade 3 learners are able to
pass the Uwezo grade 2 level literacy tests.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide a general overview of the SDI and Uwezo surveys, our key dis-
sertation data sets. We highlight key issues that form the basis for our research questions
that are followed in subsequent chapters. We also define key dependent and independent
variables for subsequent chapters. We find that the majority of the children come from
households that can generally be classified as poor (based on household wealth index)
and have parents with low education levels. Schools do well in terms of the availability of
minimum teaching resources and infrastructure and there are no statistically significant
differences in a wide range of these indicators between private and public schools. How-
ever, children who attend private schools are more likely to come from rich households.
Their teachers are also more likely to be more knowledgeable and more likely to be in
school and in class. We raise the concern that this is likely to reflect endogenous selection
into private schools. In chapter 4 (essay 2), we estimate the effect of private schools while
attempting to deal with such selection issue.
We report estimated enrolment rates and grade progression using the Uwezo survey.
Generally, almost 95 percent of the children attend school at some point during their school
age years. Besides, there is a gender balance in enrolment. However, a significant number
of children start school late and a fairly good proportion drop out before completing
primary education. There are also regional disparities in enrolment within Kenya. There
is a good proportion of regions (locations) where children progress quite slowly through
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the schooling system due to late entry and/or early drop outs. In chapter 5 (essay 3), we
examine how the gender and order of birth of a child affects his or her enrolment (private
enrolment) and relative grade progression.
Finally, we analyze how children are learning in Kenya based on the Uwezo and SDI
student test scores. In particular, we assess whether children in Kenya are acquiring and
mastering the skills and competencies outlined in the curriculum of earlier grades. The
results show that children are acquiring basic skills slowly and later than expected and
the level of skill acquisition reduces with rise in the complexity of the competence. In the
next chapter, we pick up in detail the teacher characteristics presented in table 2.2 (c).
38
Chapter 3
Teacher Human Capital, Teacher
Effort and Student Achievements in
Kenya
3.1 Background and Motivation
In chapter 2, we provide an overview of how children are learning in Kenya based on the
Uwezo and SDI surveys. In table 2.2, several indicators are selected to provide a general
picture of inputs that support student learning. Investment in schools is evident. We see
that schools offer a relatively enriching environment for learning in terms of minimum
functional infrastructure and teaching resources. For example, while close to nine stu-
dents shared a textbook in grade 3 a few years into the free primary education policy
(Hardman et al., 2009; MoEHRD, 1999), the SDI survey show that the government has
nearly achieved its policy of three students per text book at primary level in English and
maths. In general, however, children in Kenya have not mastered important areas of the
curriculum they are supposed to have covered. The Uwezo survey shows that a good
proportion of grade 3 learners cannot do grade 2 level numeracy and literacy tasks. For
instance, almost three quarters of grade 3 learners cannot read a grade 2 level story.
Such poor learning outcomes, particularly in public schools, coming in the wake of
increasing public spending on education inputs raises an important research question as
to whether school inputs (e.g. school infrastructure and instructional inputs including
teacher input) matter for student achievement and if they do, which inputs matter. A
consistent finding in the literature, in the context of developed (Hanushek, 2006) and de-
veloping countries (Pritchet and Banerji, 2013; Glewwe et al., 2011), is that school inputs
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explain very little of the variation in student learning. Despite this, studies show that one
school input, namely, the teacher input, matters for student achievement. Nevertheless,
research is not clear on what makes an effective teacher (Aaronson et al., 2007). Most
of the studies in developed (Boyd et al., 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005;
Rockoff et al., 2010) and developing (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994; Aslam and Kingdon,
2011; Glewwe, 2002) countries have looked at the effect of characteristics of teachers that
can easily be measured (observed) on student achievement. The majority of these studies
find that these common observable characteristics such as certification, education, expe-
rience (as well as gender and age) often used for teacher remuneration and promotion,
explain little of the variation in student performance(Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005;
Clotfelter et al., 2007; Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Dee, 2005).
Motivated by the lack of results on observable teacher characteristics, the literature
has begun to emphasize the importance of two aspects of teacher input: teacher com-
petence (knowledge) and teacher effort. According to this literature, when teachers, as
key education service providers, exert the necessary effort and are appropriately skilled,
then increased resource flows in schools can lead to better student outcomes (Spence and
Lewis, 2009; Swanson et al., 2012; Hanushek, 2008; Pritchet and Banerji, 2013; Glewwe
et al., 2011). An increasing number of studies have taken an empirical look at the effect
of teacher knowledge (such as Shepherd et al. 2015; Shepherd 2013) and teacher effort,
measured by what teachers do in class (such as Kane et al. 2011; Zakharov et al. 2014;
Lavy 2011, 2012; Bietenbeck 2011; Hidalgo Cabrillana and Lopez-Mayan 2015; Jacob and
Lefgren 2005; Kingdon 2006) on student achievements.1
These studies generally find that teacher knowledge and teacher classroom practices
matter for student achievement. However, the findings are also not conclusive. For in-
stance, Schwerdt and Wuppermann (2011) along with Van Klaveren (2011) study the
effect of the percentage of time spent in lecture-style teaching using the Trends in In-
ternational Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) wave of 2003 for the United States
and the Netherlands, respectively. While Schwerdt and Wuppermann (2011) find that
shifting time from problem solving to lecturing results in an increase in student achieve-
ment, Van Klaveren (2011) finds no relationship. In addition, these studies are based on
data from developed countries. Therefore, the linkage between teacher knowledge, teacher
effort and learning outcomes has not been fully explored in the context of sub-Saharan
Africa countries, largely due to lack of data.
This paper contributes to this body of literature by examining the effect of teacher hu-
man capital and teacher effort on student achievement in maths and language in Kenya.
1The terms student test scores and student achievements will be used interchangeably throughout this
thesis.
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We define teacher human capital by two measures: what teachers know (teacher sub-
ject knowledge) and whether the teachers know how to teach (teacher pedagogical skill).
Teacher effort is measured by three indicators, namely; (i) how teachers spend their time
in class (effective instruction time), (ii) teacher’s ability to keep students engaged during
the teaching lesson and (iii) a number of teacher classroom practices. We use the SDI
survey that allows us to directly link student test scores to the human capital and effort
of their specific teachers while controlling for child, school, class and other teacher charac-
teristics. This allows us to look at the education production function with greater depth
than has been done before in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular Kenya.
Here is a summary of the results. We find that student test scores in maths and lan-
guage are partially influenced by these measures of teacher human capital and teacher ef-
fort. A one standard deviation increase in the teacher’s knowledge in language (maths) in-
creases student test scores by 0.075 (0.126) score standard deviations in language (maths).
An additional hour of teacher effective instruction time increases student achievement by
0.051 and 0.059 score standard deviations in language and maths, respectively. There is
evidence that a number of classroom teaching practices, including the practice of chal-
lenging students by asking questions during the lesson, have an effect on student test
scores although the effect differs between language and maths.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, we review the related literature
followed by a presentation of theoretical and empirical strategy in section 3.3. Section 3.4
provides a detailed description of our measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort.
Section 3.5 discusses our main results including robustness checks and finally section 3.6
provides the conclusion.
3.2 What teacher attributes matter for students achieve-
ments?
Teachers matter for student achievement. This consensus from various studies that ex-
amine the effect of teachers on student achievement is however, inconclusive on what
attributes make a teacher more successful at enhancing student performance (Aaronson
et al., 2007). Much of what exists in the literature are studies that link student outcomes
to characteristics of teachers that can easily be measured (such as certification, education,
experience, gender and age). Studies that use cross-sectional data have investigated this
link by way of an educational production function in which student scores are related to
the teacher characteristics. Evidence from these studies, mostly based in the USA, gen-
erally point to a positive effect of teacher certification on student test scores (Boyd et al.,
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2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007). However, a consistent puzzle is the absence of any signifi-
cant effect on student scores of variables that are mostly used to inform teacher hiring and
teacher salary decisions such as experience (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005) and educa-
tion (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Kukla-Acevedo, 2009; Monk, 1994) and other characteristics
such as age and gender (Dee, 2005).
Evidence based on literature from developing countries is mixed. In Ghana, Glewwe
and Jacoby (1994) find that teacher experience and teacher training has a significant
positive effect on student achievement. Fehrler et al. (2009) focuses on primary education
in 21 sub-Saharan African countries and finds that teachers’ educational attainment and
professional training alongside a number of instructional resources (textbooks and wall-
charts) have a significant positive effect on student cognitive achievement. Glewwe et al.
(2011) reviews 9,000 studies on student learning in developing countries between 1990
and 2010 and finds that in a number of countries, teacher experience and training have a
positive effect on student achievement However, in India, studies by Aslam and Kingdon
(2011) and Azam and Kingdon (2015) find that standard teacher characteristics (such as
teacher gender, experience, level of education and certification) do not have a significant
effect on student achievement.
Teacher subject knowledge is one characteristic that has been found to be positively as-
sociated with student achievement. Metzler and Woessmann (2012) use data from maths
and language tests of grade 6 students and their teachers in Peru. To deal with possi-
ble omitted-variable and selection biases, they explore the within-teacher within-student
variation2 and find that teacher subject specific knowledge increases student achievement
by 0.09 standard deviations in maths while it has zero effect on language student test
scores. Shepherd (2013) explores the within-pupil between-subject, a method similar to
that of Metzler and Woessmann (2012), to estimate the effect of teacher subject knowl-
edge content on grade 6 combined language and maths test scores in South Africa. The
author finds that teacher subject knowledge raises student scores by about 0.38 standard
deviations although the effect disappears after controlling for student fixed effects.
Given the lack of consistent results on the effect of observable teacher characteristics
on student test scores coupled with availability of richer data, a number of studies (such
as Lavy 2011, 2010; Kane et al. 2011; Aslam and Kingdon 2011; Zakharov et al. 2014;
Bietenbeck 2011; Hidalgo Cabrillana and Lopez-Mayan 2015) have shifted attention to
look at the effect of classroom teaching practices (what teachers do in class) on student
scores. Bietenbeck (2011) uses the 2007 Trends in International Mathematics and Sci-
ence Study (TIMSS) data for the United States to contrast the effect of two teaching
2We provide the meaning of this estimation strategy later in the text.
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practices - modern and traditional, based on student rating of their mathematics and
science teachers. He classifies teaching that emphasizes group work, learning through ex-
periment and student explanation of answers as modern while teaching that emphasizes
rote and lecture style learning and use of textbooks as traditional. Estimating a student
fixed effect model, he finds that traditional teaching has a positive effect on overall test
scores while modern teaching has a statistically insignificant effect. Hidalgo Cabrillana
and Lopez-Mayan (2015) adopt a similar definition of teaching practices as that of Bieten-
beck (2011) to examine the effect of teacher classroom practices based on data from the
Spanish assessment program of 4th grade pupils. Their identification strategy relies on
between-class within-school variation in teaching styles. Unlike Bietenbeck (2011), they
find that modern teaching practices have a positive and significant effect on achievement
especially in language. They further find that traditional practices are detrimental to
learning for both maths and reading.
Closely related to our paper in terms of teaching practices analyzed is the study by
Aslam and Kingdon (2011) who examine the effect of teacher classroom practices on stu-
dent test scores based on school data from Pakistan. The teacher classroom practices
analyzed include amount of time teachers spend quizzing students and reviewing home-
work as well as indicators of whether teachers plan for lessons, explain in-class questions
while lecturing and ask a lot of random questions while teaching. Relying on the within-
pupil-across-subject (rather than across time) variation, they find that the practice of
asking learners questions raises scores (language and mathematics pooled together) by
about 0.03 score standard deviations while the practice of planning for a lesson raises
scores by 0.23 standard deviations.
Another teaching practice that has received some attention in the literature is teacher
instruction time or length of instruction. Using data from the 2006 wave of the Pro-
gramme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Lavy (2010) estimates the effect
of instructional time on maths, science and language scores in over 50 countries. He
uses within-student variation to control for possible self-selection and sorting of students
across schools. He finds that an additional hour of effective teaching per week raises stu-
dents test score achievements by 0.07 standard deviations. Another study by Dobbie and
Fryer Jr (2011), based on a sample of schools that operates independently but receives
government funding (charter schools) in New York City finds that increased instruction
time is associated with higher student achievement. Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2011) finds that
a 25 percent increase in instruction time leads to a rise in student test scores in maths by
0.05 score standard deviations.
Our work adds to this body of literature in a number of ways. First, there seems to
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be limited empirical evidence of teacher classroom practices in sub-Saharan Africa and
in Kenya in particular. A number of qualitative classroom observational studies exist for
Kenya (such as Ackers and Hardman 2001; Hardman et al. 2009; MoEHRD 1999; Piper
and Mugenda 2010) but none of them has empirically estimated the relationship between
teacher classroom practices and student scores. Second, in contrast to existing literature,
we estimate the effect of teacher knowledge and effort based on actual assessment and
classroom observation of teachers. Most of the studies we have reviewed estimate teaching
practices based on information reported by teachers and/or students. A study by Goe
et al. (2008) discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of using information
reported by students and teachers. He argues that student responses are subject to
bias in a number of ways. Students do not know all the aspects of classroom teaching
and some of their responses about classroom teaching can be influenced by personality
characteristics of the teacher. Similarly, teacher responses are also subject to potential
biases. For instance, teachers may unintentionally misreport their practices because they
believe that they are applying a certain practice when actually they are not. Our study
tries to address these challenges by using data based on the direct observation of teachers.3
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Theoretical Framework
Our work is based on the production function framework, specified by among others,
Glewwe (2002), Glewwe and Kremer (2006) and Orazem and King (2007). In this frame-
work, learning outputs are as a result of a combination of various inputs. Here, a school
is viewed as a production firm where inputs interact to produce outputs (Glewwe and
Kremer, 2006; Todd and Wolpin, 2003; Glewwe, 2002). The output of this education
production process can be measured by, for instance, student test scores.
The framework assumes that each household (in particular, the parents of the child)
maximizes a utility function subject to constraints such as budget and credit constraints.
The main arguments of this utility function are: (i) the consumption of goods and services
including leisure and (ii) each child’s learning (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Glewwe, 2002).
Formally, utility is expressed as:
3We are also aware of the disadvantages of using direct classroom observation to construct teaching
practices. For instance, teaching might modify or improve their teaching in response to their awareness
of being observed (Bruns and Luque, 2014).
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Ui = u(Ai, Gi) (3.1)
where Ai is child’s academic achievement and Gi is the household consumption possi-
ble after sending a child to school including leisure. In its general form, child i’s academic
achievement, Ai, is hypothesized to depend on: the child’s characteristics (e.g. age, gen-
der, child’s motivation and innate ability); family background characteristics and home
inputs into education (e.g parent’s education, preferences for their children education,
books at home, time spent helping with homework); school characteristics (such as school
infrastructure and instructional inputs including teacher input); and community back-
ground characteristics. This can be formally expressed as:
Ai = f (Xi, Fi, Qi, Vi) (3.2)
where: Xi, Fi, Qi and Vi represent child, family, school and community background
characteristics, respectively. Theoretically, teachers are part of the school based inputs as
specified in equation (3.2). Because of market failure, a child’s academic achievement, Ai
cannot be purchased, it has to be produced. Since equation equation (3.2) is a production
function, its arguments must be proper inputs. By proper inputs we mean those inputs
that define the frontier of production function but not shift it. In the case of equation (3.2),
proper inputs into the child’s education production function are contained in Qi and as
we clarify in equation (3.4) (in the next sub-section), they include inputs as teacher’s
subject knowledge and pedagogical skills. Other inputs, such as those captured by Xi, Fi
and Vi in are not proper inputs, rather shift parameters of the production function.
3.3.2 Estimation Strategy
Following Glewwe (2002); Todd and Wolpin (2003); Glewwe and Kremer (2006); Orazem
and King (2007) and many other empirical studies, we estimate the linear functional form
of equation (3.2), formally expressed as:
Aijkd = α + δXijkd + ξijkd+γT jkd+Dd + µijkd. (3.3)
where: Aijkd is the test score (in language or maths) of student i taught by teacher j
in school k located in region (division) d; Xijkd is a vector representing observable student,
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teacher, school and village characteristics; ξijkd is a measure of unobserved student ability
captured by the non-verbal reasoning scores;4 Tjkd is our variable of interest and is a
vector representing teacher j’s human capital and effort; Dd is the division fixed effects
5
and µijkd is the idiosyncratic unobservable factors affecting achievements.
6
Naturally, the full elements of a teacher’s true human capital and effort (Tjkd) are not
easy to collect and some are not easy to observe. In our case, teacher human capital is
measured by teacher’s subject knowledge and pedagogical skill which were collected through
the SDI survey teacher assessments. Similarly, we measure teacher effort by effective
instructional time, percent of student off-task during the lesson and a vector of classroom
practices obtained through the SDI survey classroom observations. We therefore replace
the vector Tjkd with information about teacher j’s subject knowledge denoted as TKjkd,
pedagogical skill denoted as TPjkd, effective instructional time denoted as TIjkd, percent
of student off-task denoted as TTjkd and classroom practices denoted by the vector CPjkd.
We add the term ηjkd to capture the error in using TKjkd, TPjkd, TIjkd, TTjkd and CPjkd
as measures of Tjkd. As a result, we estimate the empirical model shown in Equation (3.4):
Aijkd = α + δXijkd + ξijkd+γ1TKjkd + γ2TPjkd + γ3TIjkd + γ4TTjkd + γ5CPjkd +Dd + ηjkd + µijkd.
(3.4)
Equation (3.4) remedies the lack of clarity in equation (3.2) with regards to proper
and improper inputs into the child’s education production function. The variables TKjkd,
TPjkd, TIjkd and TTjkd are proper inputs from free from distraction. They are the inputs
into a child’s human capital production and in our case they are our treatment variables,
i.e., the factors of policy interest. As mentioned, these inputs define the frontier of the
function but do not shift it. Observe that CPjkd, measuring teacher classroom practices,
4Recall that part of the SDI survey student tests involved a non-verbal reasoning test that consisted of
four items related to pattern recognition based on Raven matrices test. Aslam and Kingdon (2011) and
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) are among studies that measured unobserved student ability using non-verbal
reasoning scores.
5A division is a forth tier administrative unit in Kenya after a location. A group of villages constitute
a sub- location, which in turn constitute a location and then a division. Ideally, we should control for
unobservables at the lower tiers than the division such as village, sub-location and location level. However,
in the SDI survey, there is only one school per village (as well as per sub-location and location) and as
a result, we can not also estimate a village (and/or sub-location or location) fixed effects model. We
provide a more detailed explanation of this issue in details shortly.
6Among others, µijkd accounts for variables in equation (3.2) that are not in the data. For instance,
the general form of the production function as specified in equation (3.2) contains family characteristics.
However, the SDI survey did not collect information related to home environments apart from a question
asking whether the child had breakfast at home or not. Such omitted variables are absorbed in µijkd.
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is an innovations that shifts the production function although is of policy interest.
We estimate equation (3.4) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and correct for
the correlation of students within class/school level by clustering standard errors at the
class/school level (Wooldridge, 2003).7 We also assume a contemporaneous production
function when estimating equation (3.4). In this context, we assume that it is current
inputs that mainly determine the observed learning achievements (see Todd and Wolpin
(2003) for details about contemporaneous education production function).
As observed by previous studies (Glewwe (2002); Todd and Wolpin (2003); Glewwe
and Kremer (2006); Orazem and King (2007); Case and Deaton (1999)), empirical esti-
mation of equation equation (3.4) is extremely challenging due to a number of challenges:
omitted variable bias, sample selection bias, and measurement error. Shortly, we discuss
how we deal with these challenges in the light of the limitations of our data. Before that,
in the section that follows, we present a detailed description of the measures of teacher
human capital and teacher effort, our independent variables of interest.
3.4 Teacher Human Capital and Effort
For schools to properly function, they need teachers who are knowledgeable and skilled.
First, teachers need to know the subject they teach (teacher subject knowledge) and second,
they need to know how to teach (teacher pedagogy). We refer teacher subject knowledge
and teacher pedagogy to as teacher human capital. Second, schools need teachers who
exert the necessary effort in applying their knowledge and skills (teacher effort). In this
section, we provide a quantitative description of the teacher human capital and teacher
effort based on the SDI survey before empirically linking them to the student test scores.
7Recall that clustering standard errors at the school level in our case is similar to clustering at the class
level since for each school, we are only interested in the subject teacher who was observed and assessed
in the teacher tests.
47
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of 2,960 Teachers Assessed for Absence from School and
Class
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Schools Public Schools Private Schools Public-Private
Mean Mean Mean Difference
Female 0.54 0.53 0.59 -0.06***
Age (in years) 38.11 40.53 29.13 11.40***
Experience ( in years) 13.90 16.13 5.65 10.48***
Highest Level of Education Completed
Secondary Complete 0.30 0.28 0.35 -0.06***
Diploma/Certificate 0.63 0.62 0.50 -0.01
University degree 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.07***
Highest Teacher Training Completed
None 0.13 0.10 0.24 -0.14***
Certificate in Early Childhood Education 0.10 0.07 0.23 -0.16***
Primary 1 and 2 certificate 0.59 0.62 0.47 0.15***
Degree 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.15***
Number of observations 2,960 2,331 627
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. Notes: (1) These descriptive statistics are based on 2,960 teachers who were
assessed for school and class absence; and (2) ***significance<1 percent, **significance<5 percent, *significance<10
percent
Before that, we present summary statistics on observable teacher characteristics based
on 2,960 teachers who were assessed for teacher absence (table 3.1). As seen in the table,
54 percent of the teachers in the sample are female. The teacher’s overall mean age is 38
years while the mean yeas of experience is 13. The majority of the teachers have a diploma
or certificate as their highest level of education. When it comes to teacher training,
most of the teachers, 59 percent, hold primary 1 and 2 certificate in teacher training.
Interestingly, public schools teachers are more experienced, have higher education and
teacher qualification than their counterparts in private schools.
3.4.1 Teacher Subject and Pedagogical Knowledge
We begin by discussing the aspect of teacher human capital based on the test score results
for the 1,679 teachers who were assessed in language, maths and pedagogy.8 In table 3.2,
we show the teacher test scores by subject. The language test comprised of two sets
of tasks. The first task, spelling and simple grammar exercises, involved tasks that were
similar to student language tasks and largely covered lower primary curriculum materials.9
To effectively teach a grade four student, the teacher needs to have knowledge that goes
beyond the lower primary curriculum. As a result, the next two tasks, cloze passage10 and
8As mentioned, teacher tests were administered to teachers as a marking exercise.
9The purpose of the spelling and simple grammar exercises was to assess if the teacher had knowledge
equivalent to a grade 4 learner.
10The cloze consisted of a passage with certain words removed (cloze text), where the teacher was asked
to replace the missing words.
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composition,11 covered materials that were slightly beyond the lower primary curriculum
and hence a grade 4 child would have found these tasks relatively difficult.
In line with Martin and Pimhidzai (2013), we show an indicator, the share of teachers
with minimum knowledge, defined as the proportion of teachers who marked 80 percent
or more of all the language tasks correctly. Two main observations stand out from the
language scores (table 3.2). First, content knowledge among Kenyan teachers is relatively
low; only 13.16 percent of teachers can be classified as having minimum knowledge in lan-
guage (column 1). Second, an increasing number of teachers struggle with tasks requiring
some level of knowledge beyond lower primary curriculum. For instance, while nine out of
ten teachers marked tasks involving spelling and simple grammar exercises correctly, al-
most half of them could not mark the composition sub-task, involving correcting spelling,
grammar as well as punctuation mistakes in a child’s letter.
Similarly, the maths tests contained tasks that were common across the student and
teacher tests (such as addition and subtraction) as well as tasks that were slightly beyond
the lower primary curriculum. In table 3.2, we dis-aggregate the scores by selected sub-
tasks. Slightly more than half of the teachers, 56.34 percent, can be classified as having
minimum knowledge in maths. Nevertheless, a high proportion of teachers also faced
difficulties in relatively advanced tasks. For instance, nearly 32 percent of the teachers
could not solve a problem involving division of fractions and close to 38 percent could not
solve a problem involving interpreting information in a graph.
11In this sub-task, the teacher was given a sample letter written by a grade 4 child and asked to correct
the letter for grammar, punctuation (between sentences and within sentences), spelling, syntax, and
salutation.
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Table 3.2: Teacher Test Scores by Subject
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Public Private Public-Private
Mean Mean Mean Difference
Language Test
Minimum knowledge in Language: 80 % correct 13.16 11.97 18.60 -6.63***
English Section mean score (% correct) 64.97 64.55 66.87 -2.26***
% correct in spelling and grammar exercises 92.00 91.81 92.89 -1.01
% correct in cloze 67.25 66.70 69.77 -3.06***
% correct in composition 45.95 49.52 51.91 -2.39***
Maths Test
Minimum knowledge in Maths: 80 % correct 56.34 54.14 66.45 -12.31***
Maths Section mean score (% correct) 77.59 76.79 81.24 -4.44***
% correct in double digit addition 97.50 97.39 98.01 -0.62
% correct in double digit subtraction 87.19 87.01 88.04 -1.03
% correct computing a perimeter of a rectangle 80.05 78.59 86.71 -8.12***
% correct in one variable algebra 72.66 71.48 78.07 -6.59***
% correct in division involving fractions 68.43 66.40 77.74 -11.34***
% correct in interpreting data on a graph 62.48 61.39 67.44 -6.05***
Pedagogy Test
Minimum knowledge in Pedagogy: 80 % correct 0 0 0 0
Pedagogy mean score (% correct) 32.85 32.24 35.65 -3.41***
% correct in lesson plan formulation 43.60 43.19 45.46 -2.27*
% correct in assessing child ability 34.27 33.47 37.96 -4.49***
% correct in assessing child progress 29.91 28.78 35.08 -6.30***
Sample 1,679 1,378 301
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. ***significance<1 %, **significance<5 %, *significance<10 %
The pedagogy test consisted of three sub-tasks and was designed to capture skills
teachers would normally use when teaching. In the first sub-task, teachers were asked to
come up with a lesson plan based on a topic that was given to them on the spot allowing
no time for prior preparation. In this sub-task, teachers were supposed to formulate (a)
aims and objectives of the lesson, (b) questions to check student understanding and (c)
questions to check student’s to application of what they have learned to other contexts.
In the second sub-task, teachers were given samples of writing from two grade 4 level
students and asked to mark and comment on the strength and weakness of each student.
Lastly, teachers were given raw scores for 10 students and asked to calculate the averages
and comment on the performance.
As table 3.2 shows, teacher’s pedagogical knowledge is exceptionally low. From col-
umn 1, we can see that no teacher could be considered as having minimum knowledge in
pedagogy (none managed to mark correctly 80 percent of the pedagogy tasks). Further-
more, less than half of them (43.60 percent) could adequately prepare the lesson plan. On
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the other hand, only 34.27 percent of teachers could contrast between sample writing of
two students and only 29.91 percent could turn raw scores into averages and comment on
student performance. Private teachers performed better than public teachers in almost
all subject categories although the general lack of pedagogical skills appear to be similar
in public and private schools. Figure 3.1 shows the distributions of the test scores.
Figure 3.1: Teacher Test Scores in Pedagogy, Language and maths.
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
3.4.2 Teacher Effort
Education delivery in most parts of the world requires the physical presence of teachers
in school and in class. Put differently, for students to learn, teachers need to exert
the necessary effort in applying their knowledge and skills. They need to turn up to
school and to class and once in class, spend time on instruction. Teacher’s presence in
school (or absence from school) has dominated literature as a measure of teacher effort
(Chaudhury et al., 2006; Alcazar et al., 2006). However, even when in school, teachers are
not necessarily in class. As such, teacher effort has also been measured by the presence
of teachers not just in school but in class. Most recently, studies have begun to measure
teacher effort by the amount of time teachers spend on instructional activities while in
class (Bruns and Luque, 2014). Next, we discuss these three aspects of teacher effort
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(absence from school, absence from class and time-on-task) and show how they correlate
with student achievements.
3.4.2.1 Teacher Absence from School and Class
As mentioned in Chapter 2, up to 10 teachers in each school were randomly selected
from the teacher roster. A total of 2,960 teachers were selected. After 1-2 weeks, an
unannounced visit was conducted during which surveyors identified whether the sampled
teachers were in the school, and if they were, whether they were in class teaching. We
derive two indicators of teacher effort based on this information. The first is absence
from school, defined as the share (out of 10) of teachers who could not be found on the
school premises during the second unannounced visit. The second indicator is absence
from class, defined as a combined share (out of 10) of teachers who were absent from
school and absent from class but present on the school premises.12
In addition, during the second visit, the surveyor physically counted the number of
classrooms with students and noted whether a teacher was inside the classroom or not.
We divide the number of classrooms that had students but no teacher by the total number
of classrooms that contained students to obtain another complimentary measure of teacher
effort, which we call orphaned classrooms.
Table 3.3: Teacher Effort Indicators: Teacher Absence from School and Class.
All Public Private Public.-Private
Mean Mean Mean Mean Difference
Absence from class (percent) 44.93 47.97 34.07 13.90***
of which
Absence from school (percent) 16.68 17.51 13.74 3.79
Absent in class but present in school (percent) 28.25 30.46 20.33 10.13***
Orphaned classes (percent) 34.88 38.46 22.10 16.36***
Sample 306 239 67
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. Notes: (1) Results collapsed at school level; (2) We calculate absence from
class as the sum of the indicators (a) absence from school and (b) present in school but absent in class; and (3)
***significance<1 %, **significance<5 %, *significance<10 %
12It is possible that some teachers could have been on the school premises and not in class because it
was not their teaching time. As a result, the surveyor used the official school timetable to verify that
the teachers who were present on school premises and not in class were indeed supposed to be in class
teaching at that time.
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As table 3.3 shows, on average, 16.68 percent of teachers were absent from school.
Although absence from school is slightly higher among teachers in public schools, we do
not find any significant differences between public and private school teachers on this
indicator. The table further shows that a larger proportion of teacher’s lost time is
actually lost in schools. We see that 28.25 percent of teachers were present in school but
absent from the classroom and there are significant differences in this indicator between
public and private schools. Recall that the indicator absence from class is defined as a
combined share (out of 10) of teachers who were absent from school and absent from class
but present on the school premises. In relation to table 3.3, it means that 44.93 percent
of the teachers were absent from class and a large proportion of these teachers are from
public schools. On the orphaned classrooms indicator, we find that about 35 percent of
classes had pupils with no teacher. The mean differences between public and private is
quite significant for this indicator.13
In figure 3.2a and figure 3.2b, we plot student test scores (in language and maths)
against teacher absence in class indicator and percent of orphaned classes indicator, re-
spectively. Both are calculated at the school level. The results consistently show that
students perform worse in test scores in schools where teachers are more likely to be ab-
sent from class and in schools with high proportion of orphaned classes. The correlation
is particularly stronger for language scores.
13The percent of orphaned classes in table 3.3 is not an average of (i) absence from school and (ii)
absent in class but present in school. This is because the indicators (i) absence from school and (ii)
absent in class but present in school are only based on 10 teachers who were sampled for teacher absence.
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Figure 3.2: Correlations between Teacher Effort Indicators and Student Test Scores
(a) Correlation between Absence from Class and Student Scores
(b) Correlation between Percent of Orphaned Classes and Student Test Scores
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
Figure 3.3: Correlation between Percent of Orphaned Classes and Absence from Class
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
In calculating absence from school and class, we do not account for the fact that some
teachers could have been absent from school and/or class for legitimate reasons. This
is likely to over-estimate teacher absence rate, in school and in class. The absence of
a teacher from class, is nevertheless a missed learning opportunity for children in most
Kenyan schools given evidence of lack of substitute teachers generally in sub-Saharan
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Africa and the developing world (Alcazar et al., 2006). The possibility of lack of substi-
tute teachers is evident in figure 3.3 where we find that when a large share of teachers
were absent from class, unsurprisingly, a large share of classrooms were only occupied by
students.
3.4.2.2 Teacher Effort Inside the Classroom
Even when teachers show up in class, a certain percentage of teaching time is likely
to be lost to non-instruction activities (Bruns and Luque, 2014). We use the classroom
observation snapshots to quantify how much time is spent inside the classroom between
instruction and non-instruction related activities. This section is based on observation of
276 teachers who participated in the classroom observation.14 In taking the snapshots,
the surveyor coded two key aspects of the classroom dynamics: (i) how the teacher was
using the class time between two mutually exclusive activities: instruction activities15
and non-instruction activities16 (off-task activities) and (ii) the number of students who
were visibly not following the teacher, taken after every 5 minutes. Table 3.4 shows our
approximation of how teachers spent their time in class.
On average, the lessons lasted 35 minutes. When calculating how teachers spent their
time in class, we however, consider the first 30 minutes.17 On average, teachers spent
about 86.01 percent of the teaching time on instructional/teaching activities. Application
of Stallings instrument in U.S schools over several decades led Stallings and Knight (2003)
to observe that high-performing schools achieve an average of 85 percent of class time spent
on instruction (Bruns and Luque, 2014). Private school teachers spent slightly more time
on instruction related activities although there is no significant difference between public
and private schools. In the previous section, we found that public school teachers are
about 16 percent points more likely to be absent from class relative to their counterparts
in private schools. This means that the challenge in Kenya is getting public school teachers
14As reported in Chapter 2, of the 306 schools, classroom observation for maths and language took
place in 276 schools. That is, 276 teachers (144 language and 132 maths teachers) were observed. In 28
schools teachers were absent from class and in two schools classroom observation took place for creative
arts and science subjects, which we exclude from the analysis. Using the t-test, we do not find systematic
differences in terms of schools and teacher characteristics between schools where classroom observations
took place and where it did not take place (see details in the last Chapter).
15If the time was being used for instruction, what instructional activities were happening and how was
the teacher-pupil interaction (whole group; small group or one-on-one).
16If the time was being used for off-task activities, what activities was the teacher involved in.
17There are few instances (in about 4 schools) where the surveyor arrived relatively late when the
lesson had started. This does not affect our estimates of how teachers spent their time in class since we


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































into classrooms. Once in class, there seems to be no discernible difference in performance
between public and private teachers.
Following Stallings and Knight (2003), we break down the expenditure of instructional
time into active and passive related activities as shown in table 3.4. The most common
instructional activities are those related to active instruction (taking 61.13 percent of
total instructional time) involving the teacher directly engaging students, mainly as a
whole class, through lecture and explanation.18 Correspondingly, 38.87 percent of total
instructional time is spent on passive instruction methods, which according to (Bruns
and Luque, 2014) can be characterized by students doing assignments at their seats with
teachers moving around the classroom monitoring progress as they wait for students to
finish the tasks.
Table 3.4 further shows that at least 13.99 percent of the lesson time is lost to off-
task activities or non-instructional activities.19 A major part of the time here, 65.75
percent, is tied up in classroom management activities involving teachers doing paper
work, arranging seating positions and maintaining discipline among other tasks. The rest
of the off-task activities are absorbed by teachers arriving late to class and/or leaving
early.
As table 3.4 shows, about 12 percent of students were not engaged over the 35 minutes
lesson. The percentage is higher in public schools relative to private schools probably due
to large classes in public schools. There are significant variations across schools in terms of
the percentage of students not engaged. Outcomes range from all students fully engaged
to as much as over 60 percent of students not engaged. Research based on schools in
the USA shows that highly effective teachers keep the share of students off-task below
6 percent (Stallings and Knight, 2003). Figure 3.4 shows that students perform worse,
especially in classes where a higher proportion of students are not following the teacher.
18This is often punctuated by pupil copying from the board, teacher asking pupils questions, learners
solving problems on the board and choral answer responses. This kind of classroom interaction is similar
to what has been reported by others in the context of Kenya (Ackers and Hardman, 2001; Hardman et al.,
2009; Pontefract and Hardman, 2005; MoEHRD, 1999; Ngware et al., 2014; Trudell and Piper, 2013).
19Our estimate of off-task activities is quite conservative and in fact on the lower bound. We do not
include teachers who were totally absent. Including them will definitely shift the estimated value of
off-task activities upwards.
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Figure 3.4: Correlations between Student Test Scores and Percent of Students Off-task
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
Following Martin and Pimhidzai (2013), we adjust for the time teachers are absent
from the classroom at the school level, and for the time the teachers teach while in
the classrooms to derive a measure of the amount of time teachers spend teaching in a
school during a normal day, known as teacher effective instruction time or time-on-task.
Table 3.5 shows how this indicator is computed. First, the reported average length of the
school day devoted to teaching excluding all the breaks (short breaks and lunch breaks)
as provided by the school head during the structured interview with the surveyor is 5
hours and 38 minutes. However, on average four out of 10 teachers were either absent
from school or from class at any given time (see table 3.3). This reduces the school level
scheduled teaching time to 3 hours and 23 minutes. Based on the case of grade 4, we have
shown that roughly 86 percent of any typical lesson is devoted to teaching while the rest is
lost to non-instructional related activities. This further reduces teaching time to 2 hours
54 minutes, which we call teacher effective instruction time or time-on-task. Figure 3.5
shows that students perform better in tests in schools with higher effective instruction
time.
Table 3.5: Effective Instruction Time or Time-on-Task
Item Final Time
Reported school level teaching time
excluding breaks per class (hrs) 5hrs 38min
of which
Lost due to absence from class (hrs) 0.4*(5 hours 38 minutes) 2hrs 15min
Remaining school level teaching time (hrs) 0.6*(5 hours 38 minutes) 3hrs 23min
of which
Lost to off-task activities (hrs) 0.14*(3hrs 23min) 28min
Effective instruction time (hrs) 0.86*(3hrs 23min) 2hrs 54min
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
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Figure 3.5: Effective Instructional Time and Student Test Scores
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012.
In addition to the minute to minute classroom recording, the surveyor answered a set
of questions designed to capture various aspects of classroom teaching practices based on
their own observations, except for questions that required teacher answers. These included
teacher demeanor, interaction and feedback to students, use of teaching aid, introducing
and summarizing the lesson, assigning and review of homework as well as instructional
language usage. The questions required a yes or no answer and they were filled out just
after the classroom observation. Danielson (1996) has developed a framework that iden-
tifies aspects of an effective teacher, which she calls domains, that are known to promote
improved student learning.20 We end this section by classifying the classroom teaching
practices based on Danielson (1996) Framework for Teaching, as shown in table 3.6.
With regards to domain 1, preparation and planning, it is interesting that most teach-
ers (over 80 percent) had a lesson plan and scheme of work (judged by the surveyors to be
well prepared) yet a majority of them performed poorly in the pedagogy test that literally
tested lesson planning and preparation, raising questions as to whether having a lesson
plan or scheme of work translates to better student scores. Domain 2, which generally
measures the teacher-student classroom interactions, shows that the classroom environ-
ment seems to be generally conducive for learning. For instance, a majority of teachers,
over 80 percent, instilled some level of trust in students by calling them by their names
and giving them feedback, praise and moral encouragement. Some teacher feedback to
students was scolding at a mistake and a small percent hit or slapped students.
In terms of domain 3, which constitutes the core of teaching, less than half of the
teachers surveyed (43 percent) challenged students intellectually by asking questions that
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































required learners to demonstrate their understanding of what they had learned during
the lesson. We also find that 33 percent of teachers used local language (mother tongue)
and local information to illustrate learning. More teachers assigned than reviewed home-
work. Private school teachers were significantly less likely to use local language and local
information to illustrate learning and more likely to assign homework.
3.5 Education Production Function Estimates
Next, we link measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort to student literacy
and numeracy test scores by way of an education production function as outlined in
equation (3.4). The estimates we present are based on the sample of 222 schools where
in each school, one grade 4 teacher was (concurrently) observed in class and assessed in
the teacher tests. In 109 schools covering a total of 1,034 students, a language lesson was
observed and in the rest, 113 schools covering a total of 1,077 students, a maths lesson
was observed. 21
For our teacher effects γ in equation (3.4) to be causal, the measure of teacher human
capital and teacher effort need to be uncorrelated with unobserved student (µijkd) and
teacher (ηjkd) traits. The challenge of using cross-sectional data is how to deal with the
non-random sorting of students and teachers into schools. True random-assignment of
teachers and students in schools and in classes within schools is rare in any education
context and more so, in the developing country context (Lavy, 2010). Due to this, we
make no claim that our teacher estimates represent causal effects. Nevertheless, in what
follows, we offer some discussion as to why we think our teacher estimates will not be
completely driven by within and between-school sorting and suggest strategies to deal with
these challenges.
3.5.1 Within-School Sorting
One natural concern is the possible non-random allocation of students into classes based
on observed and unobserved factors such as student motivation or ability (within-school
sorting). This results from the influence of teachers, school administrators or parents
(Dieterle et al., 2015; West and Wobmann, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2006; Aaronson et al.,
2007; Todd and Wolpin, 2003). This problem rises if, for instance, a school has more than
one stream of grade 4 (say grade 4A and 4B) and brighter or highly motivated students
are assigned to a certain stream and matched to better or highly motivated teachers, who
21 See Chapter 2, section 2.1.1
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in turn adopt certain teaching practices based on their student ability.22 Within-school
sorting also arises if there are unobserved teacher attributes that have a direct impact
on student performance, while they are correlated with the teaching style23 (Aslam and
Kingdon, 2011; Hidalgo Cabrillana and Lopez-Mayan, 2015).
We think that our estimates will not be so much influenced by within-school sort-
ing because of the following reasons. First, our sample is restricted to one stream of
grade 4 and all the students in the sampled stream are taught by the same language
or maths teacher within the school.24 Second, in determining student achievements in
Equation (3.4), we include teaching process variables (how teachers spend their time in
the classroom and what teachers do in class), collected during the classroom observation,
alongside observable teacher characteristics (such as education, experience or training).
In most studies, these teaching process variables are generally considered to be part of the
teacher unobservables, ηjkd (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). Their inclusion therefore helps
to reduce some of the bias associated with the possible correlation of unobserved teaching
traits with observed teacher and student characteristics (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011).
The next reasons are largely institutional and contextual. First, there is evidence
to show that parents in Kenya, especially those in rural areas, have little influence on
choices made in schools, including those related to teacher allocation (Spernes, 2011;
Echaune et al., 2015; Makori et al., 2015). Bold et al. (2011b) observe that the free public
primary education in Kenya created the notion that schools belong to the government and
not the local communities, thereby eroding parental involvement in what goes on inside
schools.25 Second, in our sample, 85 percent of the schools can be classified as public and
private-not-for-profit while the rest, 15 percent, are private-for-profit and mostly located
in urban areas.26 In Kenya, within-school sorting is likely to be more prevalent in private-
for-profit schools than in public or private-not-for profit schools for a number of reasons.
22In this case our measures of teacher knowledge and effort in Equation (3.4) will be biased because
they are correlated with student unobservables (µijkd) (Hidalgo Cabrillana and Lopez-Mayan, 2015).
23This would happen if unobserved teacher ability or motivation affect the choice of the teaching style,
while they have a direct effect on student test scores, aside from the effect through the teaching style. In
this case the measures of teacher knowledge and effort in Equation (3.4) will be biased because they are
correlated with teacher unobservables (ηjkd).
24As observed by Aslam and Kingdon (2011), within-school sorting would have been a serious problem
if data was collected from more than one section (stream) of grade 4 within a school. In each school, we
are only looking at students from one stream of grade 4.
25We come back on this point in Chapter 6.
26Private-for-profit entities are educational institutions operated by private agents and are primarily
profit-seeking businesses mainly located in middle-and high-income urban areas as well as in peri-urban
areas (Piper and Mugenda, 2010). Private-not-for-profit entities are educational institutions mainly
operated by non-governmental organizations, majority of whom are faith-based organizations and are
primarily not for profit-seeking businesses, targeting children from poor households in urban informal
settlements (Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Tooley et al., 2011; Dixon and
Tooley, 2012; Larbi et al., 2004; Oketch and Somerset, 2010; Oketch et al., 2012; Dixon, 2012).
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For public schools, the Basic Education Act No. 14 of 201327 calls for equal treatment of
students in all public schools and forbids public schools from admitting students based on
previous academic records and tracking children in class by ability. Actually, one of the
well documented reasons for the declining quality of education in public schools especially
following the free public primary education is the unrestricted and unlimited entry into
public schools of low aptitude students (Onsomu et al., 2005; Piper and Mugenda, 2012;
Wasanga et al., 2010).
For private-not-for profit schools, their operational environment makes it difficult for
them to track students by ability or even require entry exams, an issue we treat in detail in
the next chapter. Generally, most private-not-for profit schools in Kenya are concentrated
in informal settlements whose populations are largely poor and comprise labor migrants
leading to a high teacher and student turn-over (Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Tooley and
Longfield, 2015; Tooley et al., 2011; Dixon and Tooley, 2012; Larbi et al., 2004; Oketch
and Somerset, 2010; Oketch et al., 2012; Dixon, 2012). Evidence shows that admission
to these schools is granted at the discretion of the head teacher and not mainly based
on previous academic record and once in school, children are less likely to be tracked by
ability(Edwards Jr. et al., 2015).
Lastly, the fact that we are focusing on grade 4 also alleviates much of the concern
regarding within-school sorting. We noted from our conversation with staff at the Ministry
of Education, Science and Technology that the incentive to track students in class by
ability is likely to happen as children advance to higher grades such as grade 7 or 8
when schools are preparing learners for the end of primary cycle examinations, often
viewed as a strategy to improve the schools performance. Also, in a typical developing
country like Kenya, the sample of children in schools is likely to become more and more
self-selective with the rise in grades due to high drop-out rates.28 Focusing on grade 4
learners minimizes such selection biases that arise due to high dropouts in later grades.
3.5.2 Between-School Sorting
The second concern is between-school sorting, which is the endogenous selection of teachers
and students across schools, mainly based on factors that are unobservable to us (Todd and
Wolpin, 2003; Aaronson et al., 2007). An example of between-sorting in Kenya is parental
or teacher preference of certain regions given their socioeconomic conditions such as better
schools. Related to this, some parents may prefer certain schools, for instance, private
27More details about the Act can be found at: http://www.kenyalaw.org.
28For instance, enrolment rates we presented in the previous Chapter, based on the Uwezo survey show
that a significant proportion of children do not complete their primary education.
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schools, based on characteristics such as past student performance or teaching philosophy.
Table 3.2 and table 3.3 show that private school teachers are more knowledgeable and
invest more effort than public school counterparts. Since private schools are not free in
Kenya, fee paying parents in private schools may take greater interest in the school and
be involved in monitoring the quality of education in schools (Bold et al., 2011b).
There exists a number of estimation strategies in a cross-sectional data setup to deal
with such selection biases. Some of these include school fixed effects (Aslam and Kingdon,
2011; Altinok and Kingdon, 2012), within-teacher within-student variation (Metzler and
Woessmann, 2012) and within-pupil across-subject approach (Shepherd, 2013; Shepherd
et al., 2015). The application of any of these methods depends on the nature of the data
at the researcher’s disposal. For our case, we cannot estimate a school fixed effects model
since there is no within school variation in the variables capturing teacher human capital
and effort as only one teacher was concurrently observed and assessed in the teacher tests
in every school.29 To estimate a within-teacher within-student variation or a within-pupil
across-subject approach in our context, data would have to be gathered from schools
where: (i) students are taught by the same teacher in both subjects (math and language)
and (ii) that this teacher was concurrently assessed in the teacher tests and observed in both
subjects (see Shepherd (2013); Shepherd et al. (2015); Metzler and Woessmann (2012)).30
Estimating a school fixed effects model and/or within-teacher within-student variation is
therefore not possible with the data we have.
To minimize between-school sorting, we include division fixed effects, Dd, within the
OLS estimation as shown in Equation (3.4). Through the division-level fixed effects, we are
able to remove all sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the division level.31
29Recall that we are directly linking student test scores to the human capital and effort of their teachers
who were observed and observed. However, in each school, only one teacher was concurrently observed
and tested. In other words, there is only one single observation for indicators of teacher human capital
and effort per school. Such lack of within school variations hampers estimation of a school fixed effects
model. A school fixed effects model in our context would have been possible if: (i) two or more teachers
from different streams (e.g 4A and 4B) and/or from different grades (e.g grade 3 and grade 4) were
observed and assessed in the teacher tests. Recall that in our case, only one teacher was concurrently
observed and tested in every school. So our measures of teacher effort do not vary within a school to
allow estimation of a school fixed effects model.
30The idea behind the within-student variation approach and/or a within-pupil across-subject approach
is that by testing and observing the same teacher taking the students in both subjects, we are able to
estimate whether the same student taught by the same teacher in two different academic subjects (e.g.
maths and language) performs better in one of the subjects (e.g. maths) if the teacher’s knowledge and
efforts are relatively better in this subject (e.g. maths) thus allowing us to infer causality. The within-
teacher within-student variation and within-pupil across-subject approaches can identify the effect based
on within-teacher within-student variation by controlling for student fixed effects, teacher fixed effects,
and subject fixed effects (see Shepherd (2013); Shepherd et al. (2015); Metzler and Woessmann (2012)
for a detailed exposition about these approaches).
31Ideally, we should control for unobservables at the lower tiers than the division such as village, sub-
location and location level. However, in the SDI survey, there is only one school per village (as well as
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Including division fixed effects does not, however, effectively deal with the endogenous
selection of students in public and private schools as there are private and public schools
within a division. Since we cannot run a school fixed effects, we undertake separate
estimation for public schools and see how our estimates compare with those in the main
regression.32
While teachers and students are likely to sort across schools mainly on the basis of
unobservable characteristics (Todd and Wolpin, 2003; Aaronson et al., 2007), we are of
the opinion that such teacher and student across school sorting is in fact more likely to be
on the basis of observed factors such as education, training, experience and gender among
others. With this in mind, we follow a method employed by Aaronson et al. (2007) to
provide an idea of the extent of between-school teacher and student sorting in our data
on the basis of observable characteristics. We use the 1,679 teachers who were assessed
in teacher tests and all the 2,954 students in our sample.
In this method, we begin by computing the within-school standard deviation for
selected observable characteristics of teachers based on the actual data as it is. Low
values of within-school standard deviation means that there is a lot of sorting, hence
similar teachers are in the same schools. Second, using a simulation33, we compute the
average within-school standard deviation assuming that teachers were randomly sorted
into schools. Basically, we sort teachers using a random variable which is essentially a
white noise and based on this random variable compute the average within-school standard
deviation (see Aaronson et al. (2007) for more details). Thirdly, we compute the average
within-school standard deviation assuming that teachers were perfectly sorted into schools.
Here, instead of sorting teachers using a random variable (white noise), teachers are sorted
based on actual data (the respective variable) (see Aaronson et al. (2007) for more details).
We perform a similar operation for selected observable characteristics of children. We do
this for all schools and then separately for public and private schools.
For each variable, we compare the average within-school standard deviation for ac-
tual distribution, random distribution and perfect/non-random distribution. The results
reported in table 3.7 to table 3.9 show that the actual distribution is closer to the random
than non-random distribution. There is some level of evidence to show that teachers in
our data, in all schools combined and in public and private schools, are not perfectly
per sub-location and location) and as a result, there are no variations in the variables measuring teacher
human capital and effort at the village, sub-location and location level.
32The sample comprising only private schools (both for-profit and not-for-profit schools) is quite small.
As a result, we do not undertake a separate estimation for private schools.
33We are greatly indebted to Deon Filmer and Stacy Brian of the World Bank for the assistance and
inputs regarding the STATA routine for running the simulations based on methodology proposed by
Aaronson et al. (2007).
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sorted across schools on the basis of teacher knowledge, experience and age.
Table 3.7: Sorting of Teachers and Students Across Schools (Public and Private)
Teacher sorting Students sorting
Non- Non-
Actual Random random Actual Random random
Math Score 0.738 0.899 0.008 NVR* score 0.898 0.970 0.006
Language Score 0.850 0.909 0.010 Maths Score 0.797 0.964 0.009
Pedagogy Score 0.802 0.947 0.006 Language Score 0.681 0.909 0.005
Experience 0.789 0.975 0.006 Age 0.840 0.967 0.008
Teacher Age 0.777 0.978 0.007 Breakfast status 0.221 0.289 0.001
No. of Teachers 1,679 No. of Students 2,954
No. of Schools 306 No. of Schools 306
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. * Non-Verbal reasoning
Table 3.8: Sorting of Teachers and Students Across Schools (Public)
Teacher sorting Students sorting
Non- Non-
Actual Random random Actual Random random
Math Score 0.746 0.903 0.009 NVR* score 0.924 0.968 0.008
Language Score 0.866 0.942 0.012 Maths Score 0.850 0.971 0.012
Pedagogy Score 0.824 0.962 0.008 Language Score 0.740 0.933 0.006
Experience 0.888 0.976 0.008 Age 0.879 0.967 0.013
Teacher Age 0.876 0.963 0.008 Breakfast status 0.684 0.871 0.006
No. of Teachers 1378 No. of Students 2378
No. of Schools 239 No. of Schools 239
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. * Non-Verbal reasoning
Table 3.9: Sorting of Teachers and Students Across Schools (Private)
Teacher sorting Students sorting
Non- Non-
Actual Random random Actual Random random
Math Score 0.722 0.867 0.048 NVR* score 0.879 0.956 0.032
Language Score 0.787 0.907 0.050 Maths Score 0.844 0.979 0.028
Pedagogy Score 0.716 0.963 0.320 Language Score 0.571 0.722 0.033
Experience 0.658 0.793 0.045 Age 0.798 0.971 0.040
Teacher Age 0.727 0.777 0.042 Breakfast status 0.565 0.639 0.038
No. of Teachers 301 No. of Students 575
No. of Schools 67 No. of Schools 67
Source: Own calculations based on SDI 2012. Notes. (1) This include for-profit and not-for-profit private schools, (2) *
Non-Verbal reasoning
Similarly, students are also not perfectly sorted on the basis of subject knowledge, age
and socioeconomic status (measured by an indicator for whether a student had breakfast
before attending school).
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Of particular interest is the fact that students are not sorted across schools based
on the unobserved student ability (ξi) in equation (3.4) which is captured by non verbal
reasoning scores. As noted by Filmer et al. (2015), if one is to take the non-verbal
reasoning scores of students as a measure of innate intelligence quotient (IQ) that is
not immutable directly by schooling, then there is no evidence that more innately gifted
students are concentrated in certain schools. To conclude, we do not in any way claim
that our estimates of teacher human capital and efforts that we present next are causal.
These estimates should be interpreted in the context of the limitations we have raised.
There is however good reason to think that selection bias is fairly small. That said, our
results shed some light on important teacher factors that influence student achievements
and provides an opportunity to take this work further especially after considering the SDI
data limitations we have raised.
3.5.3 Model Estimation Results
3.5.3.1 Effect of Teacher Human Capital and Effort
In table 3.10 and table 3.11, we present the estimated effects of our measures of the human
capital and effort of teachers on student achievements for language and maths respectively.
The dependent variable is the student score, which is standardized to the mean of zero
and standard deviation of one. We run separate regressions for maths and language. For
language, we have 109 schools covering a total of 1,034 students. These are schools where a
teacher was observed (teaching a language class) and assessed (in teacher tests) thereafter.
For maths, we have 113 schools covering a total of 1,077 students. Similarly, these are
schools where a teacher was observed (teaching a maths class) and assessed. We control
for a comprehensive set of teacher, school, classroom and pupil related variables. This is
one credible way to deal with endogeneity when exclusion restrictions are impossible to
find (Stock, 2010).
We also control for the village socioeconomic conditions measured by village wealth
index based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census. Unlike the Uwezo survey,
the SDI survey does not contain a village level module. However, with the support of
staff at the National Bureau of Statistics in Kenya, we mapped the schools to the 2009
Kenya Population and Housing Census enabling us to extract village level information
corresponding to the respective schools.34 The census data includes questions related to
34The extensive matching process was made possible by the use of the school GPS coordinates. Staff at
the the National Bureau of Statistics in Kenya helped us to link every school to its respective enumeration
area/village. The SDI and the Kenya Population and Housing Census data are only two years apart.
Unlike Uwezo, here we are mainly controlling for village level conditions for which schools are located. To
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the household ownership of durable and livestock assets, type of material used to con-
struct the wall of the dwelling unit, type of lighting regularly used by the household and
household sanitation status among others. We construct a village wealth index, using the
principal components analysis (PCA), based on these individual and household charac-
teristics aggregated at the village level.35 The index has 21 continuous variables based on
indicators shown in table B3.1 in appendix B.
In model 1, we enter our measures of teacher human capital, effective instruction
time and teacher’s ability to keep students engaged. In model 2, we add our indicators of
teacher classroom practices. These indicators are based on the SDI classroom observations
and closely match measures of classroom practice explored in other studies (such as Ackers
and Hardman (2001); Hardman et al. (2009); Ngware et al. (2014); MoEHRD (1999); Piper
and Mugenda (2010); Aslam and Kingdon (2011)). Each practice is a binary indicator
of whether or not the teacher engaged in it. In model 3, we control for other teacher
observable characteristics. In model 4, school and classroom related variables are entered
while model 5 includes student attributes. In table 3.10 and table 3.11, we only show
the coefficients for the measures of the human capital and effort of teachers as well as
teachers’ observable characteristics. The full set of results, including the coefficients for
schools, students and village controls are shown in table B3.2 and table B3.3 in appendix
B.
Although they are not causal, what do these results tell us? First, even though we
have not controlled for family background information, all models exhibit a relatively
strong goodness-of-fit, as shown by the value of R-squared statistics. Moreover, much of
the variations in the student test scores is explained by our measures of teacher human
capital and effort. Jones et al. (2014) observe that R-squared statistics from estimated
education production functions in most developed countries are often in the bracket of 10
percent and 30 percent while those from developing countries range around 30 percent.
Second, addition of extra controls, including those related to teacher observables, does not
dramatically change the direction of the effect and magnitude of the measures of teacher
human capital and effort.
large extent, this also captures socioeconomic condition of villages (communities) where children come
from especially in rural areas where children are likely to attend schools within their villages. This might
not necessarily be the case for children in urban areas who are more likely to attend schools outside their
villages. This survey does not allow us to know whether the child attends a school in the village or not.
35The practice of aggregating individual and household socioeconomic characteristics to construct mea-
sures of welfare (wealth/poverty) at the higher levels (e.g village, district etc) is quite common in the
literature. For instance, in Costa Rica, Cavatassi et al. (2004) uses individual and household socioeco-
nomic characteristics from the census to construct district level poverty index using principal components
analysis (PCA).
68
Table 3.10: Teacher Human Capital, Teacher Effort and Student Language Test Scores
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Teacher subject knowledge 0.053* 0.079** 0.103*** 0.080** 0.075**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Teacher pedagogical knowledge 0.001 -0.038 -0.033 -0.011 -0.007
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048) (0.053)
Effective instruction time (in hours) 0.051* 0.045* 0.071*** 0.056** 0.051**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Percent of student off-task (average) -0.005 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Teacher Classroom Practices
Teacher reviews and assigns homework 0.181* 0.353*** 0.451*** 0.383***
(0.097) (0.094) (0.113) (0.135)
Teacher uses local language to illustrate learning -0.243*** -0.177** -0.171* -0.161**
(0.089) (0.084) (0.094) (0.081)
Teacher challenges students by asking questions -0.121 -0.189*** -0.225*** -0.190**
(0.079) (0.062) (0.073) (0.074)
Teacher keeps a lesson plan and scheme of work -0.251* -0.296** -0.242* -0.263*
(0.139) (0.126) (0.132) (0.112)
Teacher instills discipline in students -0.392*** -0.329*** -0.365*** -0.298***
(0.113) (0.108) (0.100) (0.101)
Teacher Controls
Teacher is female 0.201** 0.136 0.078
(0.084) (0.099) (0.097)
Teacher experience (in years) 0.035** 0.035** 0.035**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Teacher experience squared (in years) -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Teacher is on contract (Ref: government) -0.457*** -0.220 -0.250
(0.137) (0.162) (0.172)
Teacher’s highest education level is a
diploma or a degree (Ref: Secondary) 0.054 0.055 0.105
(0.094) (0.093) (0.088)
Teacher has ECD or primary certificate
in teaching (Ref: Diploma or degree) -0.075 -0.183 -0.175
(0.087) (0.121) (0.137)
Controls
School and Classroom Controls N N N Y Y
Student Controls N N N N Y
Village Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Division fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
R-squared 0.376 0.396 0.407 0.413 0.495
Notes: (1) The estimates are based on 113 schools; (2) The measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort are
based on the single teacher who was observed (teaching a language class) and assessed in the teacher tests; (3) School
controls include: a set of dummies which indicate whether the school is public, rural and located near a tarmack. Other
school characteristics are classroom size, number of pupils per teacher, an index of school infrastructure (based on the
following items, given equal weight: (a) presence of toilets that were judged as designated for boys and girls, accessible,
private and clean, (b) availability of electricity and (c) sufficient light for reading from the back of the class) and an index
of classroom equipment (based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) proportion of students with pens and
exercise books, (b) number of students per text book (in language), (c) whether the classroom had the following: piece of
chalk, a black board, a corner library, children’s work displayed on the walls of the classroom); (4) Student controls
include: student age, age squared, whether the student is female, student score in maths, student non-verbal reasoning
ability and whether the student ate breakfast; (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the class (school)
level and (6) ***1 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level and *10 percent significance level.
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Table 3.11: Teacher Human Capital, Teacher Effort and Student Maths Test Scores
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Teacher subject knowledge 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.166*** 0.126***
(0.055) (0.051) (0.057) (0.046) (0.045)
Teacher pedagogical knowledge 0.039 0.005 -0.023 0.111*** 0.112***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.045) (0.038) (0.035)
Effective instruction time (in hours) 0.150*** 0.137*** 0.199*** 0.087** 0.059*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.030)
Percent of student off-task (average) -0.018** -0.020*** -0.010 -0.005 -0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Teacher Classroom Practices
Teacher reviews and assigns homework -0.208* -0.217* -0.463*** -0.377***
(0.113) (0.114) (0.087) (0.084)
Teacher uses local language to illustrate learning -0.262** -0.162 -0.106 -0.073
(0.129) (0.135) (0.089) (0.096)
Teacher challenges students by asking questions 0.211 0.219 0.348*** 0.273***
(0.150) (0.134) (0.114) (0.102)
Teacher keeps a lesson plan and scheme of work 0.012 -0.038 -0.243* -0.248*
(0.152) (0.163) (0.120) (0.115)
Teacher instills discipline in students 0.037 0.111 0.338** 0.217
(0.178) (0.174) (0.156) (0.156)
Teacher Controls
Teacher is female -0.267** -0.091 -0.165*
(0.134) (0.091) (0.085)
Teacher experience (in years) -0.065*** -0.078*** -0.082***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Teacher experience squared (in years) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Teacher is on contract (Ref: government) 0.019 0.243* 0.247*
(0.185) (0.133) (0.131)
Teacher’s highest education level is a
diploma or a degree (Ref: Secondary) 0.284* -0.041 -0.008
(0.155) (0.132) (0.129)
Teacher has ECD or primary certificate in
teaching (Ref: Diploma or degree) -0.096 0.080 0.090
(0.160) (0.118) (0.103)
Controls
School and Classroom Controls N N N Y Y
Student Controls N N N N Y
Village Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Division fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034
R-squared 0.302 0.313 0.332 0.370 0.430
Notes: (1) The estimates are based on 109 schools; (2) The measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort are
based on the single teacher who was observed (teaching a maths class) and assessed in the teacher tests; (3) School
controls include: a set of dummies which indicate whether the school is public, rural and located near a tarmack. Other
school characteristics are classroom size, number of pupils per teacher, an index of school infrastructure (based on the
following items, given equal weight: (a) presence of toilets that were judged as designated for boys and girls, accessible,
private and clean, (b) availability of electricity and (c) sufficient light for reading from the back of the class) and an index
of classroom equipment (based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) proportion of students with pens and
exercise books, (b) number of students per text book (in maths), (c) whether the classroom had the following: piece of
chalk, a black board, a corner library, children’s work displayed on the walls of the classroom); (4) Student controls
include: student age, age squared, whether the student is female, student score in maths, student non-verbal reasoning
ability and whether the student ate breakfast; (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the class (school)
level and (6) ***1 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level and *10 percent significance level.
We begin by interpreting results for language in table 3.10. Consistent with findings
of Metzler and Woessmann (2012), Shepherd (2013) and others, our results show that
teacher’s subject specific knowledge has a positive and statistically significant effect on
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student language scores. For instance, model 5 shows that a one standard deviation
increase in teacher’s language knowledge increases student test score in language by 0.075
of a standard deviation.36 The estimated effect of teacher pedagogical skill on student
language test scores is effectively zero.
The estimated coefficient of the first measure of teacher effort, that is, teacher ef-
fective instruction time, is 0.051 and is statistically significant. This result means that
an additional hour of effective instruction increases the test score in the language exam
by 0.051 of a standard deviation. The variable percent of students off-task is negatively
related to student scores in language meaning that teachers who keep students engaged
(on-task) are likely to produce students with higher language test scores. Results show
that a one percent increase in the number of students off-task reduces the language test
score by 0.030 of a standard deviation.
Turning to teacher classroom practices, we find that the practice of reviewing and
assigning homework increases the language test score by 0.383 of a standard deviation.
However, the use of local language and local information reduces it by 0.161 of a standard
deviation. There is vast literature on how local language influences learning concepts in
second (foreign) language. One branch of this literature argues that illustrating concepts
to students in local language and testing them in foreign language can be detrimental.
Corder (1982) argues that students make errors when applying rules learned in the first
language (local language) to the second language (English). He defines errors as deviations
from correct usage of the second language since the student does not know its correct
rules.37
The estimated effects of some classroom teaching practices are however puzzling. For
instance, the practice of challenging students intellectually by asking them questions re-
duces reduces the test score in the language exam by 0.190 of a standard deviation.
Unfortunately, our measures of classroom practices are binary indicators and simply indi-
cate whether or not the teacher observed in the classroom engaged in the specific practice
or not. In this regard, we do not know the nature of questions that teachers posed to
learners and the type of learners that the questions were directed to. However, a number
of qualitative studies (Ackers and Hardman, 2001; Hardman et al., 2009; Ngware et al.,
2014; MoEHRD, 1999) report that classroom interaction in Kenyan schools is mainly
characterized by teacher-initiated questions often calling for choral responses. Studies
36Unless otherwise, we concentrate on model 5, which we consider as our headline/preferred regression
since our variables of interest do not change substantially, in sign and level of coefficient, with the
progressive addition of controls.
37McLaughlin (2013) further observes that errors due to second language problem should not be con-
fused with mistakes, arguing that the latter can be corrected by the student him/herself while the former
can only be corrected by the teacher, a person well conversant with the second language.
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by MoEHRD (1999) and Hardman et al. (2009) report that open-ended questions and
questions initiated by pupils are rare, estimated at less than 1 percent of the question-
ing exchanges. Furthermore, boys are nearly twice as likely to be asked a question by
teachers than girls (Hardman et al., 2009; MoEHRD, 1999). It is therefore likely that
such environment of teacher-student classroom question interface is unlikely to facilitate
student performance, more so, for girls.
Strangely, we also find that having a lesson plan and scheme of work does not translate
to better student scores. This result is contrary to Aslam and Kingdon (2011) who found
that being taught by a teacher who plans for the lesson raises scores (language and maths
pooled together) by 0.23 standard deviations in Pakistan. Again, this is a binary indicator
as to whether the teacher had a lesson plan and scheme of work, simply judged by the
surveyors to be well prepared. We do not have a way to further ascertain the quality of
these teaching tools. Nevertheless, as shown in table 3.2, teachers performed poorly in
the pedagogy sub-task that asked them to prepare a lesson plan.38 With such low levels
of knowledge in lesson planning among teachers, it is unsurprising that merely having a
lesson plan and/or scheme of work is unlikely to promote student learning. In fact, a recent
study by Piper and Mugenda (2010) based on 220 schools randomly selected from three
regions (Nairobi, Thika and Nakuru) of found that regions where teachers were judged to
have well prepared lesson plans were associated with lower student achievements in both
maths and language.
It is not surprising that the practice of instilling discipline in students by hitting
and/or scolding them while giving feedback during a lesson leads to low student perfor-
mance. We find that teachers who engage in this practice reduce the test score in the
language exam by 0.298 of a standard deviation.
Turning on the estimates for the maths regression as shown in table 3.11, we find
a significant and positive effect of teacher’s subject knowledge on student maths scores
(model 5). Unlike in language regression, there is evidence that teacher’s pedagogical skill
has a significant effect on student maths test scores. A one standard deviation increase
in teacher’s pedagogical knowledge increases the test score in the maths exam by 0.112 of
a standard deviation. Similarly, teacher’s effective instruction time positively and signifi-
cantly affects student test scores in maths. Teacher’s effort, measured by teacher’s ability
to keep students engaged becomes insignificant once we control for teacher observables.
The results on classroom teaching practices seem to suggest that students learn differ-
ently between language and maths. Unlike the case of language, the practice of assigning
38A lesson plan is a teacher’s detailed description of the course of instruction, or ’learning trajectory’
for a lesson. It is therefore a tool through which teachers demonstrate how they can translate their
subject knowledge into meaningful teaching (pedagogical skills).
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and reviewing homework is associated with lower student maths test scores. Aslam and
Kingdon (2011) finds similar results in Pakistan and explains that homework could be tak-
ing away time that could be spent learning new materials. The use of local language has
a negative effect which turns insignificant when we control for teacher observables. The
practice of challenging students intellectually by asking questions, which had a negative
and significant effect on language regression, now has a positive and significant effect on
maths test scores. Similarly, classes where a teacher had a lesson plan are associated with
lower student maths test scores. Finally, the practice of instilling discipline in students
by hitting and/or scolding them while giving feedback during a lesson does not seem to
have any effect on student test scores.
In table 3.12, we show the direction of the effect of each measure of the teacher human
capital and effort based on model 5 of table 3.10 and table 3.11. The effect of teacher
subject specific knowledge and effective instruction time go in the same direction for the
two subjects. The estimates for the classroom teaching practices seem to suggest that
students learn differently between language and maths.
Table 3.12: Teacher Human Capital, Teacher Effort and Student Language and Maths Test
Scores
Variable Language Maths
Teacher subject specific knowledge + +
Teacher pedagogical knowledge Insignificant +
Effective instruction time (in hours) + +
Percent of student off-task (average) – Insignificant
Teacher Classroom Practices
Teacher reviews and assigns homework + –
Teacher uses local language to illustrate learning – Insignificant
Teacher challenges students by asking questions – +
Teacher keeps a lesson plan and scheme of work – –
Teacher instills discipline in students – Insignificant
Notes: Columns for language and math that these are effects. That is, the results refer to effects of the
variables listed – not to the variables themselves.
3.5.3.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, we implement a number of robustness tests to check the validity
of our results. The first robustness check is methodological. Some authors argue that
OLS produces statistically unbiased estimates of the relationships among variables but
its standard errors are biased downward because it does not take account of the nesting


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































result, hierarchical linear modeling has become a popular way to analyze data with such
statistical dependency.39 We therefore estimate all the models in table 3.10 and table 3.11
using hierarchical linear modeling estimation strategy.
Models 1 in table 3.13 show results based on HLM for language and maths (based
on model 5 of table 3.10 and table 3.11). As can be seen from the tables, the patterns
of estimates based on hierarchical linear modeling are similar to those based on OLS.
We still find that teacher subject knowledge and effective instruction time are positively
related to student achievement in maths and language. As before, teacher pedagogical
skill promotes student test scores in maths and not language. Similarly, we find that an
increase in the percent of students off-task is negatively related to student test scores
in maths and language. We also do not see dramatic changes in the effect of teacher
classroom practices.
The next robustness checks attempt to address whether the estimates in our main
regressions (in table 3.10 and table 3.11) reflect some level of endogenous selection into
schools. Next, we test whether our estimates are driven by possible endogenous selection
into private schools. We proceed as follows. First, we undertake separate estimation for a
sample comprising pure public schools. Second, we undertake another separate regression
for a sample comprising of pure public schools and private-not-for-profit schools. As noted,
private-not-for-profit schools are similar to pure public schools in many ways. Like public
schools, these schools are not driven by the profit motive. They also do not admit learners
based on previous academic record and once in school, children are less likely to be tracked
by ability (Edwards Jr. et al., 2015).40
If our estimates are driven by between-school sorting, we expect the estimates based
on these two restricted samples to be dramatically different from the estimates in our main
regressions in table 3.10 and table 3.11. Models 2 of table 3.13 report estimates based on
the sample of pure public schools for language and maths. In model 3 of the same table,
we report estimates based on the sample of combined pure public and private-not-for-profit
schools for language and maths.
Looking at the results based on both pure public schools (models 2) and the combined
pure public and private-not-for-profit schools (models 3), the estimates of the indicators
of teacher human capital and teacher effort for the two restricted samples are not dra-
matically different from those in our regressions in model 5 of table 3.10 and table 3.11.
39Hierarchical linear modeling does not correct bias in the regression coefficient estimates compared with
an OLS model but it produces unbiased estimates of the standard errors associated with the regression
coefficients when the data are nested (Gelman and Hill, 2006; Fielding, 2010; Bryk and Raudenbush,
1992; Hox, 2010).
40We do not undertake a separate regression for pure private schools since the sample is too small.
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However, the variables teacher’s subject knowlegde and effective instruction time, which
were positively and significantly related to student language scores in the main regression,
now have zero effects in the combined sample of pure public schools and private-not-for-
profit schools (models 3). The results in the maths regression are practically similar to
those in the main regressions in table 3.11 (model 5).
Another way to check if our estimates in table 3.10 and table 3.11 reflect some level of
endogenous selection into schools is to undertake a separate estimation for rural schools.
As we discuss in the next chapter, the prevalence of private schools is quite low in rural
areas. Unlike urban areas, parents in rural do not have a wide variety of private school
choices and are less likely to influence school choice for their children. Besides, parents
in rural areas are less likely to influence choices made in schools (Spernes, 2011; Echaune
et al., 2015; Makori et al., 2015). Models 4 of table 3.13 reports the estimates based on
the rural schools for language and maths (based on model 5 of table 3.10 and table 3.11).
Again, the results are closely comparable to those in the main regressions.
In chapter 2, we noted that classroom observations took place in 276 schools. In each
of these schools, one grade 4 teacher was observed in either language or maths lesson.
Of the 276 teachers who were observed, 222 teachers (in 222 schools) took the teacher
assessment tests. The rest, 54 teachers (in 54 schools), did not take the teacher tests for
reasons we are not aware. Since our interest has been to estimate the effect of teacher
human capital and effort, the estimates we have presented so far are based on a sample
of 222 schools where a teacher was observed and tested.
One might be be concerned about the presence of a systematic pattern with respect to
the teachers who did not write the test. In table A2.2 in appendix A, we show that there
are no significant differences between the 222 teachers who were observed and tested and
the 54 teachers who were only observed. We further account for the 54 teachers to see if
our estimates change. To proceed, we estimate the regressions in table 3.10 and table 3.11
for the 276 teachers but account only for the measures of teacher effort since we do not
have data on teacher test scores for 54 teachers. Results are shown in table 3.14. The
estimated coefficients of our measures of effective instruction time, teacher ability to keep
students engaged and teacher classroom practices are similar to those we present in the
main regressions in table 3.10 and table 3.11. This means that our headline results do
not reflect a systematic pattern with respect to the teachers who did not write the test.
Lastly, we calculated our measure of effective instruction time by accounting for
teacher absence from class and how teachers spend their time while teaching. In or-
der to address potential reservations of how this variable is defined, especially the aspect




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from class on student test scores. In this case, we estimate our models in table 3.10 and
table 3.11 by replacing the variable teacher effective instruction time with the variable
teacher absence.
Results are shown in table 3.15. First, the results show that schools with higher
teacher class absence rate are associated with lower student test scores in both subjects.
For instance, we find that after accounting for teacher, school, class and student controls, a
one percent increase in teacher absence in class reduces the test score in the language and
maths by 0.004 and 0.002 of a standard deviation, respectively. Second, the estimates of
our measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort for the two restricted samples are
not dramatically different from those in our main regressions in table 3.10 and table 3.11.
The estimated effect of teacher subject knowledge on student language test scores however
losses its significance level but retains its sign as before.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effect of teacher human capital and teacher effort on student
achievement in maths and language among grade 4 students in Kenya. We let teacher
subject knowledge and teacher pedagogical skill to represent teacher human capital. We
measure teacher effort by effective instruction time, teacher’s ability to keep students
engaged during the lesson and by a number of teacher classroom practices. These measures
of teacher effort were collected through teacher classroom observation. We control for a
detailed set of variables related to teachers, schools and children as well as information
capturing the socioeconomic conditions of the regions where schools are located. Our
estimates are based on the OLS model with division-level fixed effects to control for
potential sources of common unobservables at the divisional level.
We find that student test scores in maths and language are partially influenced by
our measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort. We find that a one standard
deviation increase in teacher knowledge in language increases the student language test
score by 0.075 of a standard deviation. The effect for maths is 0.126 of a standard
deviation. Teacher’s pedagogical skills matter only for maths test scores. A one standard
deviation increase in teacher pedagogical skill increases the maths test score by 0.112 of a
standard deviation. Our results further show that an additional hour of effective teaching
is associated with an increase in the language and maths test score by 0.051 and 0.059 of
a standard deviation, respectively. Teachers ability to engage students during the lesson
also matters for language and maths achievement.
The effects of classroom teaching practices on student tests scores are not uniform








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































student achievement. It reduces maths and language scores by 0.161 and 0.073 standard
deviations, although the effect is insignificant for maths. The practice of challenging stu-
dents by asking them questions has a statistically significant positive effect on maths but
a statistically significant negative effect on language. Reviewing and assigning homework
has a statistically significant positive effect on language but a significant negative effect
on mathematics.
We do not in any way interpret our estimates as causal due to the potential selection
of students and teachers into schools. Our results shed some light on important teacher
factors that influence student achievements, in particular aspects of teachers that have
not been widely investigated in the sub-Sahara Africa literature. These findings suggest




Private Schools and Student
Learning Achievement
4.1 Introduction
To estimate the effect of teacher human capital and teacher effort in chapter 3, we con-
trolled for characteristics related to: teachers, schools (including a variable capturing
whether a school is private or public), classes, students and communities (villages) where
schools are located. One of the results in that emerge from main regression (see full regres-
sion results in appendix B, table B3.2 and table B3.3), which we did not discuss is that
private schools are consistently associated with better student test scores. Specifically,
the results in these tables show that attending a private school is likely to increase student
scores by 0.334 and 0.696 of a standard deviation in language and maths, respectively.
A number of recent studies (such as Javaid et al. (2012); Andrabi et al. (2008); French
(2008); Desai et al. (2008); Pal (2010); Bold et al. (2011a, 2013a)) focusing on developing
countries also find that private schools are associated with better student attainments.
Despite this, the validity and magnitude of the private school premium is still debated
and, in fact, questioned. Researchers such as Goldberger and Cain (1982), Newhouse and
Beegle (2006) and Altonji et al. (2000, 2005) urge that such private school advantage
may be due to spurious correlations between private school attendance and unobserved
student and family characteristics. Households that choose private schools differ from
those that choose public schools and therefore, the differences in achievements between
private and public students could be due to factors not easily observable by the researcher
(Goldberger and Cain, 1982; Newhouse and Beegle, 2006; Altonji et al., 2000, 2005)
That students who attend private schools differ from those that choose public schools
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can be seen in table 2.2 in chapter 2. As discussed earlier, Table 2.2 (a) shows that
children who attend private schools are more likely to come from rich households. As
discussed earlier, table 2.2 (c) shows that private school students are also more likely
to be taught by more knowledgeable teachers and teachers who are more likely to be in
school and in class. The effect of private schools is likely to be over-estimated if such
observable and more importantly unobservable factors1 are not fully taken into account.
In fact, evidence elsewhere shows that accounting for unobservable factors and selection
bias can wash away or dramatically reduce such private school advantage. In Indonesia,
Newhouse and Beegle (2006) account for selection effects and finds that private schooling
has, in fact, a significant negative effects on test scores.
Private schooling in Kenya has expanded dramatically over the past decade (Tooley
et al., 2008; Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Edwards Jr. et al.,
2015; Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010, 2012; Piper et al., 2015). However,
there is a dearth of studies that look at the effectiveness of these schools. Research
has mostly focused on understanding why households, mainly poor households, choose
to enrol their children in low-fee paying private schools and not in free public schools.
The reasons are varied. Tooley et al. (2008) and Oketch and Somerset (2010) find that
perceived better quality of private schools is a key driver of parents’ choice of private
schools. Oketch et al. (2012) focusing in urban areas and Nishimura and Yamano (2013)
focusing in rural areas both find that an increase in household wealth is likely to lead to
the household enrolling a child in a private school.
In this chapter, we use the Uwezo survey to estimate the effect of private schools
on literacy (language) and numeracy (maths) skill acquisition among children mainly
drawn from lower primary grades in Kenya. Private schools are defined as independent,
non-governmental, and/or nonstate schools, not administered by local, state or national
governments. Our main contribution lies in accounting for the endogeneity of private
school choice while estimating the effect of private schools. We do so by using different
econometric techniques. We begin with the OLS as a baseline model. We then estimate
the village and family fixed effects2 models that control for unobservables at the village and
household levels, respectively. Using a methodology advanced by Altonji et al. (2005), we
estimate the potential size of any bias on the estimated coefficient of the private school
variable due to unobservable selectivity in the OLS and the fixed effects models. We
1Even for children who attend private schools from poor households, the fact that poor parents bypass
public schools and send their children to otherwise fee-paying low-cost private schools means that they
are more concerned about the education of their children. Such parents, despite being poor, are more
likely to ensure that the home environment is favorable for learning. Such aspects of parental motivation
are unobservable to the researcher.
2 The term family and household are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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supplement the OLS and fixed effects models with a non-parametric estimation technique,
that is, propensity score matching (PSM). Similar to Altonji et al. (2005)’s approach in
the case of OLS and fixed effects model, we follow a method by Rosenbaum (2002) to check
the extent to which our estimates based on PSM suffer from hidden bias (unobservables).
As pointed out by French et al. (2010), each of the above estimation (method) strate-
gies has its own strengths and weaknesses and no strategy on its own can yield convincing
estimates of the private school premium. It is for this reason that we apply different
methods to see if they lead to similar conclusions about the effect of private schools on
children literacy and numeracy skill acquisition. This comparative analysis also provides
us with a sense of the range (upper and lower bound) of the size of the private school
effects in Kenya.
To our knowledge, only one study in Kenya by Bold et al. (2013a) has estimated the
effect of private schools on student scores while addressing the endogeneity of school choice
in Kenya. The authors find a large private school premium, equivalent to one standard
deviation based on grade 8 tests scores (end of primary cycle examinations). Their study
however suffers from two shortcomings. First, in a typical country like Kenya, the sample
of children in school becomes more and more self-selective as one advances to higher
grades due to relatively high drop-out rates. As we discussed in chapter 2, a significant
proportion of primary school age children in Kenya drop out of school before completing
primary cycle (see figure 2.1(a). The estimates based on Bold et al. (2013a) are, therefore,
likely to suffer from sample selection bias.
Second, the fact that a pupil sits for end of primary cycle examinations (grade 8
tests) at a private school does not mean that he or she has been in that school from grade
1. Evidence in Kenya shows that since the majority of private schools are not formally
registered (Tooley et al., 2008; Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Tooley and Longfield, 2015;
Edwards Jr. et al., 2015; Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010, 2012; Piper et al.,
2015), most parents send their children to these schools but transfer them to public schools
for their end of primary cycle exams in grade 8 (Edwards Jr. et al., 2015). Therefore mis-
attribution may occur by assessing private school effectiveness based on end of primary
cycle examinations (grade 8 tests). To deal with these challenges, we restrict our sample
to children in lower primary grade 2 to grade 4. We are not aware of any study that
focuses on the importance of private schools on cognitive development of children from
lower primary grades in Kenya.
Here is a preview of our results. We find a positive and significant private school
advantage across all the estimated methods. Our results however seem to suggest that
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the OLS, village fixed effects and propensity score matching regressions overestimate
the true primary school effect while the household fixed effects model underestimates
the private school effect. From this, we have a sense of the range of the private school
premium. In maths, the premium ranges from 0.13 to 0.20 of a standard deviation, based
on the household and village fixed effects model, respectively. In the case of language,
it ranges from 0.20 to 0.29 score standard deviation, based on the household and village
fixed effects model, respectively. Otherwise the chapter unfolds as follows. Section 4.2
provides the context of private sector education provision in Kenya while in section 4.3, we
review literature on private school effectiveness. In section 4.4, we detail the estimation
techniques and in section 4.5, we provide the empirical results. Section 4.6 offers our
concluding remarks.
4.2 The Context: Private School Provision in Kenya
Kenya has a long history of private sector education provision. Private sector education
providers include non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, community-
based providers and private-for-profit agents (Tooley et al., 2008; Heyneman and Stern,
2014; Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Edwards Jr. et al., 2015). Faith-based organizations
and community-based providers have supported education provision since the early 1960s.
Through the 1980s and 1990s, private education provision expanded owing to struc-
tural adjustment programs (SAPs) that led to the reduction in public education funding
(Nishimura and Yamano, 2013). This period saw the entry of private-for-profit agents.
Despite these developments, access to private schools by children from poor and rural
households was limited due to poor financing of community school projects (Olembo,
1985).
Currently, Kenya’s primary education provision is characterized by free public provi-
sion of education and a huge market for private fee-charging schools. As noted in Chapter
1, the fall in the quality of education offered in public schools mainly following the in-
troduction of free primary education led to an increase in private school provision (Bold
et al., 2013b; Oketch and Somerset, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010). Private school provision ac-
counts for about 25 percent of the total primary school sector in Kenya (KIPPRA, 2016).
This does not, however, account for the highly unregulated and unregistered non-formal
private sector schools in urban informal settlements, which we briefly describe below.
As noted, private schools in Kenya comprise independent, non-governmental, and/or
nonstate schools, not administered by local, state or national governments. These schools
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have the right to select their students and are funded in whole or in part by charging
their students tuition, rather than relying on public (government) funding. In Kenya,
these schools currently reflect a diverse range of institutions, ranging from: (a) highly
unregulated and sometimes unregistered non-formal schools mainly located in informal
settlements3; (b) formal private academies in middle and high-income urban areas and (c)
very few old traditionally exclusive private schools (Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Piper et al.,
2014). The main development in the sector during the post-free public primary school era
has been the mushrooming of non-formal schools located in urban informal settlements
whose goal has been to meet the high demand for school places in those urban informal
settlements (Tooley et al., 2008; Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Edwards Jr. et al., 2015;
Tooley and Longfield, 2015; Piper et al., 2014, 2015). These schools levy low fees to make
them affordable for children from poor urban informal settlements. Parents with children
in these institutions pay tuition fees that average less than USD 10 per month (Piper and
Mugenda, 2010; Piper et al., 2014). They are the main source of education for children
in urban informal settlements. As pointed out by Piper et al. (2014), for some families
in urban informal settlements, the choice may be between the non-formal school and no
school at all.
The majority of these low-cost private schools are generally lacking in terms school
infrastructure and facilities. Others operate with similar level of school resources as public
schools. For instance, table 2.2 (b) in chapter 2 shows that the private schools in the SDI
survey sample, a characteristic of low-cost private schools, operate with the same school
resources like public schools. Low-cost private schools (and generally private schools in
general) in Kenya are however lacking in terms of qualified teachers, relative to their public
counterparts. Table 2.2 (c) in chapter 2 shows that private school teachers, in the SDI
survey sample, are less experienced and have lower education and teacher qualifications
compared to counterparts in public schools. Not only are public school teachers more
qualified (in terms of experience and level of training), they are also paid better than
those in low-cost private primary schools (Bold et al., 2012; Tooley and Dixon, 2005).
As noted in the last chapter, admission to these low cost private schools is sometimes
quite informal and only a few schools conduct interviews for new students as part of the
selection process. Although some are registered and receive some form of support from
the government4, the majority run with limited engagement with the government. In fact,
3Our conversation with staff at the Ministry of Education shows that most of these schools are mainly
in urban areas of big municipalities like Mombasa, Eldoret, Nairobi, Thika, Nakuru, Kisumu and Kitale.
4Starting in 2005, the government, through the Ministry of Education has been supporting low-fee
paying private schools in informal settlements. Through the Instructional Materials initiative, schools
have been receiving funding to pay for learning materials, such as books, pens and chalk. In order to
qualify for this government support, the school should: (i) be registered, (ii) be assessed by Ministry
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as discussed in Edwards Jr. et al. (2015), low cost private schools operate within the same
constraints as households living in their catchment area. According to Edwards Jr. et al.
(2015) low cost private schools in urban informal settlements have little or no security of
tenancy, are highly unregulated, lack space or sanitation facilities and are vulnerable to
the challenges that characterize densely populated and volatile urban informal settlements
in Kenya (see also Tooley et al. (2008); Heyneman and Stern (2014); Piper et al. (2014);
Tooley and Longfield (2015); Piper et al. (2015); Piper and Mugenda (2010)).5 They are
characterized by high student and teacher turnover.
It is puzzling that students from these low-cost private schools perform better than
counterparts in public schools with almost similar school inputs (infrastructure) and less
qualified teachers. In table 2.3 and table 2.4, we show that private schools in Uwezo and
SDI survey data perform better than those in public schools. Tooley and Dixon (2005)
compared student achievement between students attending low-cost private schools and
those attending public schools in Kibera - Kenya’s largest informal settlement in maths,
language and Kiswahili. Pupils in private schools were reported to have performed signif-
icantly better in both math and English when the researchers controlled for background
variables. Our interest in this chapter is to account for possible endogeneity of school
choice and see if such private-public score gap persists.
4.3 Do Private School Children achieve better Learn-
ing Outcomes than counterparts in Public Schools?
To estimate the effect of private schools, the earliest studies estimated the effect of private
schools using a dummy variable indicating whether a child is attending a private school
or not alongside other characteristics related to students and their families. Some of these
include; Hammersley et al. (1981) for the United Kingdom, Psacharopoulos (1987) for
of education officials in terms of location, sanitation, safety etc and (iii) have a School Management
Committee comprising of teachers and two representatives of the parents Edwards Jr. et al. (2015). The
number of schools under government support had increased from 59 in 2004 to 410 in 2009.
5While a lot has been documented with regard to low cost non-formal private schools in urban informal
settlements, there is little information regarding private schools in rural areas as well as private academies
in middle and high-income urban areas. There are indications of remarkable penetration of such schools in
rural areas. We are only aware of a study by Nishimura and Yamano (2013) which looked at determinants
of school choice in rural Kenya. This study is based on a panel survey of 76 randomly selected rural
sub-locations from Western and Central provinces. The authors found that between 2003 and 2007, 35
(out of 119) new private schools were established in these regions relative to only six (out of 318) public
schools, reflecting a clear increasing demand for private schools in rural Kenya.
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Colombia and Tanzania, Govinda and Varghese (1993) for India, McEwan and Carnoy
(2000) for Chile and McEwan (2002) for Argentina and Chile, among others. Using OLS
estimation, these studies generally find that attending private schools is associated with
an increase in the student test scores. The main challenge with all these studies is that
they treat private school choice as exogenous which is not likely to be the case.
Most recent studies have dealt with the endogeneity of school choice through different
approaches. One such approach is the use of experimental data where students are ran-
domly assigned to schools, mainly through school vouchers. Angrist et al. (2002) examines
the impact of a program that used a lottery to distribute vouchers that covered the cost
of private secondary school education in Colombia. Students were randomly awarded or
denied private school vouchers and as such, vouchers provided a convenient method of
randomly assigning students to private schools. The study finds that after three years,
voucher winners attending private schools, scored 0.2 score standard deviations higher
than their public school counterparts in achievement tests comprising tasks in maths,
reading and writing.
Despite its attractiveness, the use of experimental data has weaknesses. It depends
on the accuracy of the randomization process and secondly, it is quite expensive to roll
out randomization programs. As a result, most studies are based on non-experimental
data and have employed a number of approaches in an attempt to estimate the true effect
of private schools on learner test scores. The instrumental variable (IV) approach is an
example. In this approach, certain variables (instruments) which affect private school
attendance but not student achievement are used to estimate the casual effect of private
schooling (Goldhaber and Eide, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010).
Different instruments have been explored in the literature. Angrist et al. (2002) uses
receipt of a voucher as an instrument for attending private school to determine the effect
of private schools in Colombia. The argument is that those who obtain a voucher actually
attend private school, but receiving the voucher in itself does not guarantee that one
excels in school. The study finds that attending a private school increases the probability
of finishing eighth grade by 13 to 15 percentage points, and increases test scores by 0.29
score standard deviations in combined tasks involving maths, reading and writing. In
Pakistan, Andrabi et al. (2008) use distance to the private school as an instrument for
private school enrolment. They find that attending a private school is associated with
increase in student test scores by 0.8 to 1 standard deviations (depending on the subject).
Evans and Schwab (1995) use religious affiliation as an exogenous source of variation in
Catholic school (private school) attendance. They find that attending Catholic schools
increases high school graduation by 12 percentage points and college attendance by 14
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percentage points6.
Although the use of instruments is appealing, finding a credible instrument is challeng-
ing. As a result, other studies adjust for selection bias using propensity score matching
to estimate the causal effect of private schools. Using the data from a nationwide survey
of 452 schools and 22,500 secondary level students in Nepal, Thapa (2015) adjusts for
selection bias using propensity score matching and still finds that attending a private
school increases student scores by about 8 percentage points in school leaving certificate
exams. In India, Azam et al. (2015) use propensity score matching to examine the effect
of attending private secondary schools on student test scores in standardized maths test
in two Indian states, Orissa and Rajasthan. They find a private school advantage of 0.4
and 1.3 score standard deviations in rural and urban areas of Rajasthan. The results in
Orissa depend on the location where the household is located. For instance, they find a
private school advantage of 0.3 score standard deviations in rural Orissa and no evidence
of private school advantage in urban Orissa.
Most recently, studies have used other estimation approaches such as the family/household
fixed effects models, which control for household level observable and unobservable factors,
in estimating the causal impact of private schools. In India, French et al. (2010) estimate
a household fixed effects model and finds a private school premium of 0.17 score stan-
dard deviations in combined student maths and language test scores. Similarly, Javaid
et al. (2012) estimates a household fixed effects model using household survey data from
Pakistan and reports a private school premium of 0.04 score standard deviations in com-
bined student maths and language test scores. Besides family fixed effects models, both
studies estimate cluster fixed effects at different levels (province, district and village). In
comparison, the household fixed effects models produce the lowest estimates; showing it
is effective in reducing the unobservables associated with private school choice.
In summary, there is evidence of a private school advantage documented in the litera-
ture and studies have adopted different methods to find the true effect of private schools.
As noted by Ashley et al. (2014), much of this literature in developing countries is based
on South Asian countries, India and Pakistan in particular. We add to this literature
by estimating the effect of private schools using the case study of Kenya, a country from
Sub-Sahara Africa.
6Availability of private school in the child’s residential area has also been used as an instrument.
Studies measure this instrument differently. In Nepal, Shama (1999) cited in French (2008) instruments
private school attendance using the number of private schools in the child’s residential area. In India,
Desai et al. (2008) uses a dummy variable on whether a child’s region has a private school or not as an
instrument for private school attendance.
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4.4 The Theoretical and Empirical Framework
4.4.1 Theoretical Framework
In estimating the private school premium, we specify an education production function
as shown in equation (4.1) where the child’s achievement is a function of characteris-
tics related to himself/herself, the school which the child attends, his/her family and the
community where the child’s family is located. Equation (4.1) is a linear form of equa-
tion (3.2) (specified in chapter 3). The theoretical framework in this chapter is therefore
still grounded in the production function framework where learning outputs (outcomes)
are as a result of a combination of various inputs (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Todd and
Wolpin, 2003; Glewwe, 2002; Orazem and King, 2007). Our input of interest in this case
is the type of school the student attends. We provided the theoretical foundation of this
production function in chapter 3 and in the interest of brevity, we do not elaborate it
once more here.
4.4.2 Estimation Strategies
Our intention is to triangulate the effects of private schools on student achievement using
methods that try to control for endogeneity of school choice by households. These include
OLS, fixed effects model and propensity score matching. As mentioned, each of this
method has its strengths and weakness. It is for this reason that we try multiple methods
to get a sense of the range of the private school premium in Kenya. In this section, we
lay out these methods.
4.4.2.1 Parametric Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares Method
We begin with the basic ordinary least squares technique. Here, the educational outcome
of student i in household j located in village k, denoted as Aijk, depends on the type of
school attended, (where PRIVijk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the child attends
a private and 0 if a child attends a public school) and the vector of: (a) individual
characteristics, Xijk, (b) family characteristics, ψijk, (c) village characteristics, φijk. εijk
is a random error with the mean 0 and variance σ2. Formally,






ijk + εijk (4.1)
The main concern of this paper is the endogeneity of PRIVijk. A major assumption
of OLS is that PRIVijk is uncorrelated with εijk conditional on X, ψ and φ. However,
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even after controlling for a comprehensive set of individual, family, village controls in the
Uwezo survey data, it is possible that in equation (4.1), there are factors that determine
student achievement but have been omitted, mis-measured or unobserved. As we discuss
shortly, some of these factors include within-household child-varying factors such as child
ability and/or motivation. Such factors are not easy to observe or gather in a typical
survey like Uwezo. If such factors are correlated with private school attendance, then the
estimates of PRIVijk will be biased either upwards or downwards. In what follows, we
explore how to deal with this potential endogeneity of PRIVijk.
4.4.2.2 Village Fixed Effects Approach
The first step towards refining the estimates of PRIVijk is controlling for any sources
of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the village level. In this regard, following
Dostie and Jayaraman (2006), Javaid et al. (2012), Andrabi et al. (2008), French et al.
(2010) and Mani et al. (2013), we estimate a village fixed effects model as outlined in
equation (4.2):
Aijk = β0 + β1PRIVijk + β2X
′
ijk + β3ψijk + φk + εijk (4.2)
φk is the village fixed effects. Through the village fixed effects, we are able to (a)
remove all sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the village-level and (b)
address cluster-related issues in the standard errors since common village-level unobserv-
ables are also cluster effects (Wooldridge, 2003; Mani et al., 2013).
4.4.2.3 Household Fixed Effects Approach
Equation (4.2) does not address the potential observed and unobserved heterogeneity at
the household level. To address this identification challenge, we follow Desai et al. (2008),
Vegas and Devercelli (ND), De Haan et al. (2014) and French et al. (2010) by estimating
a household/family fixed effects model shown in equation (4.3):
Aij = β0 + β1PRIVij + β2X
′
ij + ψj + εij (4.3)
ψj is the household fixed effects. Similarly, through the household fixed effects, we
are able to remove all sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the household
level. Each household in our data is considered as a cluster since there are individual
children within the household who are genetically linked. We cluster standard errors at
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the household level (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007; Vegas and Devercelli, ND; Maitra et al.,
2016).
4.4.2.4 Assessing the Potential Bias from Unobservables
The OLS, village fixed effects and family fixed effects methods cannot deal with all
sources of endogeneity. For instance, even after using the household fixed effects, within-
household child-varying factors7 which play a role in influencing parental education deci-
sions (Behrman et al., 1994; Andrabi et al., 2008; Maitra et al., 2016) are likely to remain
in the error term, and may be correlated with attendance to private schools. Put differ-
ently, when estimating a household fixed effects model, the estimates might be free from
within-household child-specific factors and household unobserved heterogeneity. However,
the possible presence of omitted variables mainly originating from within-household child-
varying factors that are likely to be correlated with both private school attendance and
student achievement means that we should be careful with interpreting our private school
effects as being causal.
Acknowledging this limitation, we turn to a methodology proposed by Altonji et al.
(2005) to assess the potential size of any bias on the estimated coefficient of the private
school variable due to unobservable selectivity.8 In their paper, Altonji et al. (2005)
propose the idea that selection on observables is the same as selection on unobservables9,
which is equivalent to the condition that:
Cov(ε , PRIV )
V ar(ε)
=
Cov(β2X , PRIV )
V ar(β2X)
(4.4)
where X is a vector of all observable (child, household and village) characteristics, and ε is
the error term potentially correlated with PRIV . Intuitively, we can assess the strength
of the evidence of private school effect by checking how plausibly large the quantity on
the left must be relative to the quantity on the right to explain the whole β1 estimate in
7Within-household child-varying factors include factors such as child ability and/or motivation. These
factor influence parental decision to send a child to either private or public schools. However, they are
not easy to observe or gather in a typical survey like Uwezo.
8This approach has been widely used in the context of problems similar to ours. Altonji et al. (2005)
uses the procedure to study the effectiveness of Catholic schools in the USA. Others include Kingdon and
Teal (2010) whose study examines the impact of teacher unionization on student achievement in India,
Cavalcanti et al. (2010) who study the effect of private school attendance on public university entrance
examinations in Brazil and most recently Simumba (2013) who investigates the effect of child labour on
children’s school attendance in rural Zambia.
9This expression entails that the relationship between private attendance and the normalized mean
distribution of the index of unobserved variables is the same as the one between private school attandance
and observed explanatory variables
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the OLS and fixed effects models under the null hypothesis that there is no private school
effect (e.g. β1 = 0).
The bias from OLS and the fixed effects models is Cov(ε, P̃RIV )
V ar(P̃RIV )
and this is equivalent
to Cov(ε, PRIV )
V ar(P̃RIV )
if ε and X are orthogonal. The tildes denote the residuals from a regression




Cov(ε , PRIV )
Cov(β2X , PRIV )
V ar(β2X)
V ar(ε)













where the first equality follows if ε and X are orthogonal and the second equality
follows from the fact that Cov(ε,PRIV )
V ar(ε)
= Cov(β2X ,PRIV )
V ar(β2X)
. When reporting our regression
results for OLS and fixed effects models, we will also show the results from applying this
method based on equation (4.6).11
4.4.2.5 Non-Parametric Estimation: Propensity Score Matching Approach
We further address the endogeneity of PRIVijk in equation (4.1) by use of a non-parametric
matching approach (propensity score matching). We are interested in estimating the ef-
fect of private schools on student achievement. This is a clear example of a treatment
evaluation study whose main pillars are individuals (students), treatment (going to private
school) and outcomes (the tests scores). In the case of a binary treatment like ours, the
treatment indicator T can be defined as T = 1 if a student attends a private school and
T = 0 if a student attends a public school. If we define Yi as the outcome of the inter-
vention, then Yi(Ti) is the potential outcome for student i where i = 1, ......N . Following
Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974), the treatment effect for a student i can be written as:
γi = Yi(1)− Yi(0) (4.7)
10The bias is given by plimβ1 = β1 +
Cov(ε,P̃RIV )
V ar(P̃RIV )
and it is positive as long as the variable PRIV is
not orthogonal to the error term ε.
11We are grateful to Prof. Todd Elder of Michigan State University for sharing the Stata routines for
estimating the potential size of any bias on the estimated coefficient of the private school variable due to
unobservable selectivity.
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However, we cannot simultaneously observe Yi when Yi = 1 and Yi = 0. Since we
are interested in estimating the effect of private schools, we can only observe Yi(1) and
not Yi(0). The latter is called a counterfactual. Propensity score matching overcomes the
problem of lack of counterfactual by matching participants (students in private schools)
to non-participants (students in public schools) who are observationally similar based on
pre-treatment observable characteristics, which we denote as X. The assumption here
is that conditional on observables, students in private and public schools do not differ
systematically along unobservables.
Propensity score matching is founded on two key assumptions: conditional indepen-
dence and common support (or overlap condition). Conditional independence means that
given a set of observable characteristics of X which are not affected by treatment, po-
tential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Formally:
Yi(0), Yi(1) ⊥ Ti|(Xi) (4.8)
The common support ensures that for each value of observable characteristics X, there
is a positive probability of being both in the treated and untreated groups:
0 < Pr(Ti = 1|(Xi)) < 1 (4.9)
Given that conditional independence assumption holds and assuming that there is
overlap between both groups, the PSM estimator for the treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) can be written in general as:
γPSMATT = E(4|p(X), T = 1) = E[(Y (1)|p(X), T = 1)]− E[(Y (0)|p(X), T = 0)] (4.10)
To put this in words, the propensity score matching estimator is simply the mean
difference in outcomes over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity
score distribution of participants.
For estimation, we first estimate a model of school choice (private versus public) using
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a probit model12. We then use the propensity score13 from the probit model to match
the treated (private school students) and non-treated (public school students) who are
observationally similar.
4.4.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis using Rosenbaum Bounds
As we have mentioned, students in private schools (treated group) are matched with those
in public schools (control group) on the basis of observables. The underlying assumption
is that conditional on observables, private and public school students do not differ sys-
tematically along unobservables. While our matching process is based on a rich set of
observable child, family and community characteristics collected by Uwezo survey (see
table C4.2 in appendix C), we cannot rule out the presence of selection bias resulting
from unobservables. There could be a possibility of selection bias into private schools
due to unobserved factors and this could happen even in cases where students in the
treated group have been well matched to those in the control group. Rosenbaum (2002)
has developed a procedure, known as the Rosenbaum bounds, that allows us to assess the
sensitivity of our results to the selection on unobservables.14
We briefly explain the Rosenbaum bounds procedure drawing on a number of stud-
ies (Aakvik, 2001; Bharath et al., 2011; Azam et al., 2015; Becker and Caliendo, 2007)
that have applied it. First, assume that student’s i probability of receiving treatment
(attending a private school) is given by equation (4.11):
Pi = P (Xi , ui) = P (Di = 1|Xi , ui) = F (βXi + γui) (4.11)
where Xi are studenti’s observed characteristics, ui is the unobserved variable, and
γ is the effect of ui on private school enrolment. If our treatment estimates are free
12When estimating the propensity score, two choices have to be made. The first one concerns the model
to be used for the estimation (which we use probit), and the second one the variables to be included in this
model. We control for a comprehensive list of individual, household and village variables that influence
household school choice discussed in Chapter 2.
13Matching pupils directly can be computationally demanding especially when there are a large number
of characteristics of X to control (curse of dimensionality). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate
that matching can be done on a single-index variable, the propensity score, which in our case is the
probability of attending a private school given the observed characteristics X estimated through the
probit model. The propensity score considerably reduces the dimensionality problem, as conditioning is
on the basis of a scalar rather than a vector. The propensity score, however, must verify the balancing
property. That is, the function used to compute the propensity score should be such that individuals with
a similar propensity to attend a private school display, on average, similar values of Xi (Vandenberghe
and Robin, 2004; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Azam et al., 2015)
14This strategy is similar to the one used by Altonji et al. (2005) in the case of OLS and fixed effects
models.
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from hidden bias, γ will be zero and the private school participation probability will be
determined solely by Xi. However, if there is hidden bias, then it is possible that two
students with the same observed characteristics X, have different chances of receiving
treatment (attending private school).
Suppose we have a matched pair of students i and j, and suppose F in equation (4.11)
follows a logistic distribution. If both students have identical observed characteristics—as
implied by the matching procedure, the odds ratio that the two students receive treatment












As can be seen in equation (4.12), both students differ in their odds of receiving
treatment by a factor that involves the parameter γ and the difference in their unobserved
characteristics u. So, if there are either no differences in unobserved variables (ui−uj) or
if unobserved variables have no influence on the probability of participating (γ = 0), the
odds ratio is one, implying the absence of hidden or unobserved selection bias. Sensitivity
analysis now evaluates how changing the values of γ and (ui − uj) alters inference about
the effect of private schools.
Following Rosenbaum (2002), Aakvik (2001) and Becker and Caliendo (2007), we
assume for simplicity that the unobserved covariate is a dummy variable with ui ∈ 0, 1.
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that equation (4.12) implies the following bounds on the odds






Γ = eγ is a measure of the degree of departure from the case that is free of hidden
bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). Both matched students i and j have the same probability of
participating only if Γ = eγ = 1 and in this case the model will be free of hidden bias.
Otherwise, if for example Γ = eγ = 2, students who appear to be similar (in terms of X)
could differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by as much as a factor of 2.
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4.5 Estimation Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
We have two dependent variables, that is student scores in language and maths. As
we discussed in Chapter 2, the Uwezo literacy (language) tests assessed five principal
competencies, ranging from letter recognition to comprehension of the paragraph. The
numeracy (maths) tests assessed seven principal competencies, ranging from counting and
matching numbers to simple division tasks.
To define the dependent variables based on these competencies, we closely follow two
recent studies by French et al. (2010) and Wakano (2016). French et al. (2010) estimated
the effect of private schools in rural India based on the Annual Status of Education
Report (ASER) survey. The Uwezo survey is modeled on the ASER survey. Just like
Uwezo survey, the ASER survey collects data at three levels: households, school (one
public schools per village) and village levels. Children in both surveys (Uwezo and ASER
surveys) are assessed in similar literacy and numeracy competencies. Wakano (2016) used
the Uwezo survey to estimate the effects of locally hired teachers on student achievements
in Kenya.
In the footsteps of French et al. (2010) and Wakano (2016), we allow scores in language
to range from 0 (student could not manage any of the tasks) to 5 (student could manage
all tasks up to comprehension level). In other words, if a student did not manage any
task, he/she receives a zero and if he/she managed all the tasks (up to comprehension),
he/she gets five marks. In the same vein, maths scores range from 0 (student could not
manage any of the tasks) to 7 (student could manage all tasks up to division level) (see
table 4.1). In the regression analysis, we again follow French et al. (2010) by standardizing
the scores described in table 4.1 to the mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 to make
interpretation easy. We do so separately for language and maths scores.
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Table 4.1: Student Test Score Outcomes in Language and Maths
Language Mark Maths Mark
Could do nothing 0 Could do nothing 0
Could read letters 1 Could count and match numbers 1
Could read words 2 Could identify numbers 2
Could read a paragraph 3 Could discriminate quantities 3
Could read a story 4 Could do addition 4
Could do comprehension 5 Could do subtraction 5
Could to multiplication 6
Could to division 7
Source: Own calculation based on Uwezo 2012. Notes: Based on Uwezo (2012), Uwezo (2014) following French et al.
(2010) and Wakano (2016).
Before turning to regression results, we show some descriptive statistics. In Chapter
2, we described student learning by analyzing the share of children achieving a specific
competency level (see table 2.3 and table 2.4). In table 4.2, we show the overall mean score
for language and maths based on score allocations as described in table 4.1. The mean
score for language is 2.72. Looking at table 4.1, this means that the majority of students
assessed could manage tasks ranging between reading words and reading a paragraph.
Similarly, the mean score for maths is 4.75 meaning that the majority of students could
manage tasks ranging between addition and subtraction. In both subjects, private school
students do better and are able to handle higher level tasks relative to their counterparts
in public schools.
Table 4.2: Student Learning Outcome by School Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Public sample Private sample Public-Private
Mean Mean Mean Mean Dif.
Language 2.72 2.62 3.47 -0.84***
Maths 4.75 4.67 5.39 -0.71***
Sample 52,196 44,373 6,256
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012. Notes: ***1% significance level, **5% significance level and *10%
significance level.
In table 4.3, we report the means for child, family and village related variables used
in the estimation.15 We report results for the whole sample, for the public sample and
15Some, although not all, of the variables in this table were partly discussed in Chapter 2 (table 2.2).
The summaries might differ because the summaries in table 2.2 are based on the whole sample but those
in table 4.3 are based the restricted sample of children in grades 2 to 4.
97
the private sample. In column 4, we show the mean differences between public and
private samples. Since we are interested in the effect of private schools relative to public
counterparts, our interest here lies mainly in column 2, 3 and 4. As can be seen from these
columns, relative to their counterparts from public schools, private school students are
more likely to be young, female and with no disability. Similarly, private school students
are also more likely to attend tuition classes.
As it can be seen in table 4.3, 15 percent of grade 2 to grade 4 children in the Uwezo
survey attend private schools. We know that these students attend private schools based
on the response to the question that asked about the type of school a child attends.
Table 4.3 further shows that the mean for measured family and village background char-
acteristics are substantially higher for students who attend private schools. For instance,
private school learners are more likely to be born of young parents, with higher educa-
tional attainments relative to their counterparts in public schools. They also come from
homes with a higher index of asset ownership16 as well as homes that are more likely to
have their own water source and toilet facility. In addition, they come from households
that are more likely to use electricity as a source of lighting (as opposed to sources such as
paraffin) and whose dwelling place is made of bricks and stones (as opposed to materials
such as mud and polythene).
16 We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets.
The index is based on household ownership of the following assets: durables (TV, radio, car, computer,
mobile phone, bicycle, motorbike and cart) and livestock (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat).
98
Table 4.3: Mean Statistics for Children, Households and Villages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Public Private Public-Private
Sample School School diff
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Age of student 9.31 9.41 8.55 0.86***
Student is female 0.48 0.48 0.49 -0.01**
Student has some disability 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01**
Student goes for paid tuition 0.36 0.33 0.69 -0.36***
Student attends private school 0.15 0.00 1.00 –
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Age of the mother 35.34 35.57 34.09 1.48***
Education level of the mother
None 0.24 0.26 0.09 0.17***
Has primary education level 0.54 0.56 0.47 0.09***
Has secondary education level 0.20 0.17 0.38 -0.22***
Has post-secondary education level 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.05***
Education level of the father
None 0.20 0.22 0.06 0.15***
Has primary education level 0.47 0.50 0.37 0.13***
Has secondary education level 0.29 0.27 0.47 -0.20***
Has post-secondary education level 0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.08***
Number of household members 5.87 5.95 5.32 0.63***
Household has source of water at home 0.21 0.17 0.39 -0.22***
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.77 0.75 0.91 -0.15***
Index of household assets 0.13 -0.01 1.07 -1.09***
Meals taken per day
Less than three meals 0.25 0.27 0.14 0.25***
Three meals 0.75 0.73 0.86 -0.12***
Wall material for dwelling place
Mud 0.57 0.61 0.30 0.31***
Polythene and iron 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.01***
Timber 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.02***
Bricks and/or Stone 0.24 0.20 0.49 -0.28***
Regular source of lighting
Paraffin 0.74 0.79 0.50 0.29***
Electricity 0.19 0.13 0.47 -0.34***
Other 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.05***
Time taken to reach at school 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.11***
Panel C: Village Characteristics
Village has electricity 0.47 0.43 0.75 -0.32***
Village has tarmac road 0.21 0.18 0.41 -0.23***
Village has all-weather road 0.81 0.81 0.88 -0.07**
Village has a protected water point 0.43 0.42 0.49 -0.07
Village has chief’s office 0.64 0.62 0.75 -0.13***
Village has police post 0.28 0.26 0.45 -0.19***
Village has an education committee 0.31 0.32 0.31 -0.01
Number of children 52,709 44,754 6,343
Number of households 20,180 16,659 2,993
Number of villages 1,296 1,098 164
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012. Notes: (1) We do not include father’s age because of large missing values;
(2) We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets. The index is
based on household ownership of the following assets: durable assets (TV, radio, car, computer, mobile phone, bicycle,
motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat); and (3) ***1 percent significance level, **5
percent significance level and *10 percent significance level.
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It therefore appears that pupils who attend private schools already have dispropor-
tionately higher academic potential and access to complementary educational resources
relative to their counterparts attending public schools. As noted by Altonji et al. (2005)
and Goldberger and Cain (1982), this raises the possibility that part or even all of the
gap in student test scores between private and public students as observed in table 4.2
column 2 and 3 may be a reflection of who attends private schools, thus indicating some
level of selection. In other words private schools could be attracting students who are
already advantaged given their home environments. This provides the motivation for this
paper: to estimate the private school premium while addressing such potential selection
into private schools based on the methods we have presented in the last section. We
report the results in the section that follows.
4.5.2 OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Private Schools Ef-
fects
To put our results into perspective, we first present the OLS regression (equation (4.1)),
as a baseline model, followed by the fixed effects regression. Model 1 of table 4.4 and
table 4.5 presents estimated OLS results for maths and language respectively. We can
see that after accounting for students, household and village characteristics, the results
from OLS show that attending a private school relative to a public school is associated,
on average, with an increase in maths and language scores of 0.18 and 0.27 score standard
deviations respectively.17
17In the interest of brevity, we do not interpret the coefficients for the child, household and village
controls in the three models of table 4.4 and table 4.5. However, as can be seen from the two tables,
these characteristics exert a significant influence on student achievement as hypothesized.
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Table 4.4: Effect of Private Schools on Student Test Scores in Maths
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
No Fixed Effects (OLS) Village Fixed Effects Household Fixed Effects
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Student attends private school 0.18*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.03)
Student Characteristics
Age of student 0.09*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.16*** (0.02)
Age of student squared -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00)
Student is female 0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Student has some disability -0.15*** (0.03) -0.12*** (0.03) -0.15*** (0.04)
Student goes for paid tuition 0.10*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.02)
Student’s current grade 0.41*** (0.01) 0.41*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.01)
Household Characteristics
Age of the mother 0.01** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Age of the mother squared -0.00* (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Education level of the mother (ref: None)
Has primary education level 0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
Has secondary education level 0.10*** (0.02) 0.10*** (0.02)
Has post-secondary education level 0.15*** (0.05) 0.10** (0.05)
Education level of the father (ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Has secondary education level 0.03* (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
Has post-secondary education level 0.08** (0.03) 0.13*** (0.03)
Number of household members -0.01*** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00)
Household has source of water at home 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02)
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.02 (0.01) 0.03* (0.02)
Index of household assets 0.001 (0.00) 0.02* (0.01)
Meals taken per day(ref: less than three)
Three meals 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Wall material for dwelling place (ref: Mud )
Polythene and iron 0.06*** (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Timber 0.11*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Bricks and/or Stone 0.12*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
Regular source of lighting (ref: Paraffin)
Electricity 0.07*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.02)
Other 0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03)
Time taken to reach at school -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Village Characteristics
Village has electricity -0.01 (0.01)
Village has tarmac road 0.00 (0.01)
Village has all-weather road -0.05*** (0.01)
Village has a protected water point 0.01 (0.01)
Village has chief’s office 0.01 (0.01)
Village has police post -0.03*** (0.01)
Village has an education committee 0.01 (0.01)
Constant -2.08*** (0.10) -1.99*** (0.10) -2.06*** (0.09)
Observations (number of students) 32,689 32,689 32,689
R Squared 0.23 0.26 0.42
Number of villages 3,876 3,876 3,876
Number of households 27,970 27,970 27,970
Estimated bias based on equation (4.6) 0.48 0.32 -0.10
Ratio 0.38 0.63 –
Notes: (1) Student goes for paid tuition means student attends classes offered beyond the normal scheduled school time;
(2) Student’s current grade is entered as a continuous variable. Results do not change even when we enter student’s
current grade as a categorical variable; (3) We do not control for father’s age because of large number of missing values;
(4) We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets. The index is
based on household ownership of the following assets: durable assets (TV, radio, car, computer, mobile phone, bicycle,
motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat); (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis; (6) In
the OLS and household fixed effects models, standard errors are clustered at household level. In the village fixed effects
model, standard errors are clustered at the village level; (7) Ratio (on the last row) is defined as the ratio of the coefficient
on private school and the estimated bias based on equation (4.6). (8) ***1% significance level, **5% significance level and
*10% significance level.
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Table 4.5: Effect of Private Schools on Student Test Scores in Language
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
No Fixed Effects (OLS) Village Fixed Effects Household Fixed Effects
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Student attends private school 0.27*** (0.02) 0.29*** (0.02) 0.21*** (0.04)
Student Characteristics
Age of student 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
Age of student squared 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Student is female 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Student has some disability -0.14*** (0.03) -0.09*** (0.03) -0.12*** (0.03)
Student goes for paid tuition 0.13*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.02)
Student’s current grade 0.43*** (0.01) 0.42*** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.01)
Household Characteristics
Age of the mother 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Age of the mother squared -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Education level of the mother (ref: None)
Has primary education level 0.00 (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02)
Has secondary education level 0.10*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.02)
Has post-secondary education level 0.18*** (0.05) 0.20*** (0.05)
Education level of the father (ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.08*** (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Has secondary education level 0.01 (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02)
Has post-secondary education level 0.05 (0.03) 0.12*** (0.03)
Number of household members -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Household has source of water at home 0.07*** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.01 (0.01) 0.04** (0.02)
Index of household assets 0.02 (0.01) 0.03* (0.02)
Meals taken per day(ref: less than three)
Three meals 0.02* (0.01) 0.04** (0.01)
Wall material for dwelling place (ref: Mud )
Polythene and iron 0.13*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Timber 0.16*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bricks and/or Stone 0.13*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02)
Regular source of lighting (ref: Paraffin)
Electricity 0.13*** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02)
Other 0.09*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.03)
Time taken to reach at school 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Village Characteristics
Village has electricity 0.04*** (0.01)
Village has tarmac road 0.05*** (0.01)
Village has all-weather road -0.03** (0.01)
Village has a protected water point 0.02** (0.01)
Village has chief’s office 0.00 (0.01)
Village has police post 0.02 (0.01)
Village has an education committee 0.02 (0.01)
Constant -1.92*** (0.10) -2.01*** (0.10) -1.92*** (0.08)
Observations (number of students) 32,689 32,689 32,689
R Squared 0.27 0.28 0.47
Number of villages 3,876 3,876 3,876
Number of households 27,970 27,970 27,970
Estimated bias based on equation (4.6) 0.74 0.48 -0.01
Ratio 0.36 0.60 –
Notes: (1) Student goes for paid tuition means student attends classes offered beyond the normal scheduled school time;
(2) Student’s current grade is entered as a continuous variable. Results do not change even when we enter student’s
current grade as a categorical variable; (3) We do not control for father’s age because of large number of missing values;
(4) We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets. The index is
based on household ownership of the following assets: durable assets (TV, radio, car, computer, mobile phone, bicycle,
motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat); (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis; (6) In
the OLS and household fixed effects models, standard errors are clustered at household level. In the village fixed effects
model, standard errors are clustered at the village level; (7) Ratio (on the last row) is defined as the ratio of the coefficient
on private school and the estimated bias based on equation (4.6). (8) ***1% significance level, **5% significance level and
*10% significance level.
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We are careful not to give the OLS estimates a causal interpretation due to possible
endogeneity of private school choice. We begin to address this challenge by estimating a
village fixed effects model. The village fixed effects model helps us to remove all sources
of village level unobserved and observed heterogeneity common to all children in the
village. Through the village fixed effects, we are also able to address cluster-related issues
in the standard errors since common village-level unobservables are also cluster effects
(Wooldridge, 2003; Mani et al., 2013). Results are shown in model 2 of table 4.4 and
table 4.5. We still find a relatively large private school effect, in fact slightly higher than
estimates based on OLS. The estimated private school coefficient means that attending
a private school relative to a public school is associated, on average, with an increase in
maths and language scores of 0.20 and 0.29 standard deviations respectively, an indication
that OLS estimates are perhaps biased downwards.
The village fixed effects do not however control for the observed and unobserved
heterogeneity at the household level. We explore this through the household fixed effects
model which controls for household-level observed and unobserved factors, allowing us to
focus on within-household child-specific factors such as gender, age and grade. Model 3
of table 4.4 and table 4.5 presents the results of the family fixed effects model. As can be
seen from the tables, after controlling for family-level observed and unobserved factors,
we observe a reduction in the size of the private school effects. Nevertheless, there is still
a sizable and significant positive effect of private schools on student language and maths
test scores. Specifically, we find a private school advantage of 0.13 and 0.21 score standard
deviations in maths and language respectively.
As we noted, the household fixed effects are unlikely to control for the within-household
child-varying factors which are likely to remain in the error term and may be corrected
with attendance to private schools. In the last two rows of table 4.4 and table 4.5, we
report the estimated bias using Altonji et al. (2005)’s procedure based on equation (4.6).18
This procedure estimates the potential size of any bias on the estimated coefficient of the
private school variable due to unobservable selectivity (see also Cavalcanti et al. (2010)
and Kingdon and Teal (2010)).
Like Kingdon and Teal (2010), where the sign of the private school effect and the bias
are identical, it means that we have overestimated the true effect. Looking at table 4.4
18In an attempt to address the potential omitted-variable bias resulting from within-household child-
varying factors, we follow Maitra et al. (2016) by estimating an extended version of equation (4.3)
given as Aij = β0 + β1PRIVij + β2X
′
ij + ψj + (θi ∗ ψj) + εij where θi denoted individual fixed effects.
This specification includes unobserved traits varying across different children (in ascending birth order)
within the same household. As noted by Maitra et al. (2016), this specification is an improvement of
equation (4.3) because it accounts for the unobserved child-invariant and child-varying factors within the
household. The results from this improved version of equation ss are practically smilar to those based on
the household fixed effects. We do not report these results.
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and table 4.5, the estimated coefficient in the OLS regression is 0.18 and 0.27 for maths
and language respectively. The estimated bias is positive and its 0.48 and 0.74 for maths
and language respectively, which suggests that the OLS regression overestimates the true
effect of private schooling on test score. We find similar evidence in the village fixed
effects model too. Since the true effect has been over-estimated in the OLS and village
fixed effects, we can find the size of the unobservables necessary to explain away the implied
effect from private school attendance. Following Altonji et al. (2005), we calculate this by
dividing the estimated coefficient by the bias (that is the ratio of the estimated coefficient
to the bias). For instance, in the case of the OLS results for maths (table 4.4), the ratio
of the estimated private school effect coefficient to the bias is 0.38. This implies that the
role of unobservables that determine student maths test scores would have to be more
than 0.38 times the role of observables for the entire private school effect to be explained
away by the unobservables.
On the other hand, where the sign of the private school effect and the bias are not iden-
tical, it means that we have underestimated the true effect. For instance, the estimated
coefficient in the household fixed effects is 0.13 and 0.21 for maths and language respec-
tively. The estimated bias is however negative. It is equal to −0.10 and −0.01 for maths
and language respectively, suggesting that the household fixed effects regression underes-
timates the true effect of private schooling on test score. Since we have under-estimated
the true private school effect, there is no need to calculate the size of the unobservables
necessary to explain away the implied effect from private school attendance.
In summary, we learn the following from the application of Altonji et al. (2005)’s pro-
cedure. First, there is evidence of a bias on the estimated coefficient of the private school
variable due to unobservable selectivity. This bias however reduces, substantially, as we
move from OLS to village fixed effects and to household fixed effects. In the OLS and
village fixed effects, the magnitude of bias, as compared to the coefficient, is quite large,
suggesting that the OLS and the village fixed effects models may suffer from the problem
of selection due to unobservables and hence they are not reliable for obtaining the true
effect of private schools on test score. Since the private schooling decision is made at the
household level, it is likely that a substantial part of the unobservable component is per-
taining to the household. Consistent with this view, when we estimate a household fixed
effects model, we find that the estimated coefficient is smaller in magnitude. Moreover,
the estimated bias in household fixed effects model is negative and also smaller in magni-
tude. This in fact indicates that unlike the previous models, household fixed effects model
yields a coefficient that is an underestimate of the true effect of private school. Therefore
from this analysis we find that household fixed effects regression is a more reliable model
that closely captures the true effect of private schooling on test scores.
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We can also see that there is a substantial reduction in the size of the bias as we move
from OLS to the fixed effects models.
4.5.3 Propensity Score Matching Estimates of Private Schools
Effects
We now turn our attention to the estimates based on the propensity score matching
approach. In the appendix of this chapter, we show different indicators characterizing
the level of success of the matching process. Table C4.1 in appendix C shows results
for the probit model19 that produced the propensity scores which were in turn used for
matching the treated and non-treated participants. Figure C4.1 in appendix C shows
considerable overlap between treated (private school students) group and control (public
school students) group.
Table C4.2 in appendix C shows that matching balanced quite well among all the
variables affecting household school choice. In column 9 and column 10 of table C4.2, we
report the t-tests and p-values of equality between treated (private school students) group
and control (public school student) group after matching for each variable. Looking at
the t-tests and the p-values, we find that almost all the values are insignificant showing
a very successful level of matching. The table further shows that the matching process
significantly reduces the standardized bias (SB). A standardized bias of below 5 percent
after matching is widely acceptable in most empirical studies (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008). In our case, the standardized bias, shown in column 8, for all the variables, is
below 5 percent. A physical inspection of figure C4.2 and C4.3 further confirms that
indeed matching significantly reduces standardized bias (SB).
Since a number of matching algorithms are considered (nearest neighbor matching,
kernel matching, radius matching and caliper matching),20 the match quality across these
algorithms deserves attention. In this regard, table 4.6 provides information related to
the quality of matching for the different matching algorithms based on the following
indicators: pseudo R2, LR chi2 values, p-value, mean bias and variance among others.
Generally, all the algorithms perform exceptionally well in terms of matching as shown
by zero level of pseudo R2 and very high levels of p-values, which in most cases equal to
19The probit model of school choice (private versus public) is specified as follows: Prob(Pi = 1) =
F (Z′b).
20For a detailed exposition of these matching algorithms, we refer readers to Caliendo and Kopeinig





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.7 shows comparable private school effects from the different matching algo-
rithms.22 Estimates from different matching algorithms are within the same range. In
maths, we find a private school advantage ranging from 0.14 score standard deviations
based on nearest neighbor matching (with replacement) to 0.17 score standard deviations
based on Kernel matching. In language, we find a private school advantage between
0.26 score standard deviations based on almost all matching algorithms to 0.27 based on
neighbor matching (with replacement) and caliper matching.
Lastly, we assess the extent to which estimates from propensity score matching are
influenced by hidden (unobserved) bias. As discussed in section 4.4.1.6, if there are
unobservables that influence both student assignment into private schools and student test
score performance, then a bias might arise and this is likely to undermine the robustness of
the estimates we present in table 4.7. Similar to the procedure by Altonji et al. (2005), our
interest here is to determine how strongly an unmeasured bias must influence the selection
process to undermine the implications of the estimates (Azam et al., 2015; Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002). If there is a positive selection on unobservables,
our estimated private school effects overestimate the true effects (Azam et al., 2015;
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) because students who perform better are likely to sort into
private schools.
In table 4.8, we show the upper bound on the p-value of the null hypothesis of no
private school effect for different levels of Γ (gamma). Recall that our estimates in table 4.7
show that private schools are positively correlated with both language and maths student
test scores. In this case, the assumption that we have under-estimated the true private
school effects (e.g lower bound sig-) does not apply and therefore, as shown in table 4.8,
21Nevertheless, the nearest neighbor and caliper matching algorithms are characterized by relatively
low levels of p-value.
22In each matching algorithm, we impose a caliper width of 0.00001 which is much lower than what
most studies use. Imposing caliper widths helps avoid bad matches and hence helps to further deal with
selection issues (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). While there is no empirical evidence on the optimal
caliper width (Austin, 2008), the choice of caliper width depends on the extent of variance-bias trade off
the researcher wants to achieve (Heckman et al., 1997; Faries et al., 2010) and the sample size (Smith,
2000). Low levels of caliper width result in the matching of more similar subjects, leading to improved
comparability of groups which translates to less biased estimates. However, it may also result in the
formation of fewer matched pairs, thus decreasing the precision, due to high variance, of the estimated
treatment effects. In many studies, including those in education, researchers use calipers of pre-determined
width (ad hoc) that are generally independent of the distribution of the propensity score. In medical
literature, caliper width of 0.6 and 0.2 of the logit of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































we only consider the upper bound sig+ (p-value). If the p-values remain significant (for
instance, less than 0.1) for reasonably large values of gamma, then our private school
effects are robust to hidden unobservables (Azam et al., 2015).
The results in table 4.8 show that the positive effect of private schools on maths test
scores withstands even at relatively high values of selection on unobservables. In other
words, we can reject the null hypothesis of zero private school effect on maths test scores
even in the presence of relatively high values of selection on unobservables. In the case
of language, the effect of private schools disappears even under low levels of unobserved
selectivity. For instance, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero private school effect on
language test scores even with observationally similar students who differ in their relative
odds of attending private school by a factor of 1.2 (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for
a detailed theoretical discussion and Azam et al. (2015) for empirical application).
Table 4.8: Sensitivity Analysis of PSM estimates, Rosenbaum Bounds
Maths Language







4.5.4 Comparison of Estimates from the Different Estimation
Approaches
Finally, we bring together estimates based on different methods as shown in table 4.9.
For propensity score matching, we choose the 5-Nearest Neighbor Matching because this
matching algorithm performs best relative to others on the basis of the matching quality
indicators presented in table 4.6. Each of this method has its strengths and weakness.
It is for this reason that we try multiple methods to get a sense of the range of the
private school premium in Kenya. As it can be seen in table 4.9, we see that in maths,
the premium ranges from 0.13 to 0.20 score standard deviation, using the household and
village fixed effects model, respectively. In the case of language, it ranges from 0.20 to 0.29
score standard deviation, using the household and village fixed effects model, respectively.
Results from the Altonji et al. (2005) procedure show that the magnitude of bias,
as compared to the private school coefficient, is quite large in the OLS and village fixed
effects suggesting that these models may suffer from the problem of selection due to
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unobservables. The OLS and village fixed effects in fact overestimate the true private
school effect. The propensity score matching procedure is based on an assumption that
conditional on observables, private and public school students do not differ systematically
along unobservables. Sensitivity analysis based on Rosenbaum (2002) however shows that
the estimates based on propensity score matching, especially for language, are not free
from the hidden bias and therefore do not entirely meet this assumption. Perhaps this
explains why the estimates based on propensity score matching are quite close to those
in OLS.
Table 4.9: Effect of Private School on Student Test Scores: Different Estimation Ap-
proaches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Village Fixed Household Fixed PSM 5-Nearest
Model Effects Model Effects Model Neighbor
Maths 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.020)
Language 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.021)
Observations 27,970 27,970 27,970 29,209
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, ***1% significance level, **5% significance level and
*10% significance level.
Since private school choice takes place at the household level, it is likely that a sub-
stantial part of the unobservables are accounted for by the household fixed effects model.
It is for this reason that the household fixed effects model yields smaller coefficients of
the private school effect. Also, the estimated bias based on the household fixed effects
models are negative and also smaller in magnitude, indicating that unlike the other mod-
els, household fixed effects models yield coefficients that are an underestimate of the true
effect of private school. Put together, true private schools effects lie within the range
we provide above. However, the household fixed effects regressions are more reliable and
closely capture the true effect of private schooling on student learning.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we use a rich household survey data to quantify the relative contribution of
private schools on cognitive achievement of lower primary (grade 2 to 4) school children
in Kenya. We are not aware of any study that focuses on the importance of private
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schools on cognitive development of lower primary children in Kenya. We investigate
private school effect by carefully accounting for the endogenous selection into schools
through different estimation methods including OLS, fixed effects and propensity score
matching. We find that the private school premium lies within the range of 0.13 to 0.20
score standard deviation in maths and 0.21 to 0.29 score standard deviation in language.
Our results should be interpreted in the context of the limitations of estimation methods
used.
One of the challenges facing any study that estimates the effect of private schools is
the extent to which the researcher is able to account for the endogenous nature of school
choice. The extent to which the researcher is able to deal with such challenge depends
on the quality and nature of data at his or her disposal. In this study, we are fortunate
to use the Uwezo household survey that is quite rich in terms of variables related to
children, their households and the communities where households are located. With this
survey, we have been able to use a number of estimation techniques that account for the
endogeneity of school choice. Results from Altonji et al. (2005) shows that the size of
the bias on the estimated coefficient of the private school variable due to unobservable
selectivity, especially based on the household fixed effects model, is quite small. This
therefore makes one confident that the range of the size of the private school premium we
present could be close to the true effect.
Our work points to the relative contribution of private schools on literacy (language)
and numeracy (maths) skill acquisition among children mainly in lower primary grades in
Kenya. It underscores the need to integrate, into public schools, pedagogical techniques
and organizational structures of private schools. However, in a country like Kenya that
is experiencing dramatic increases in private school provision, confirming the relative
importance of private schools is just one step. The next step involves investigating why
private schools do better than public schools even with no discernible differences in the
quality of infrastructure relative to public schools. This question is beyond the scope
of this dissertation mainly due to lack of data to address it. In the concluding chapter
however, we draw on some previous work in Kenya and argue that factors related to
teachers effort and behavior, which we find important in explaining student variation in
chapter 3, are perhaps potential candidates explaining the private-public performance
differences. Our arguments remain largely anecdotal and call for further inquiry into this
issue subject to data availability.
Given the resource constrains facing households and that attending a private school
in Kenya is associated with some costs, the next chapter investigates which child within
the household get the chance to be admitted to private schools.
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Chapter 5




In chapter 4, we found that private schools are associated with better learning achieve-
ments. Interestingly, private schools, including not-for-profit-private schools, unlike public
schools, are not free of charge. In Kenya, there is evidence that within households, some
children may be sent to private schools while other in public schools. In the Uwezo survey,
15 percent of the households exhibit such within-household variation in school type choice
(see table 5.1). This raises the question of whether in a household for which resources
are scarce, parents are likely to send some of their children to private schools and oth-
ers in public schools. This question relates to the literature on the role of the family in
promoting the human capital formation of children (Cunha et al., 2006). According to
this literature, most schooling decisions are made within the family. However, research
on family characteristics that influence children’s education outcomes is still inconclusive
and has not been fully explored (Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; Black et al., 2005).
A number of family characteristics have been found to influence children’s education
outcomes. These include sibling features such as birth order (De Haan et al., 2014; Price,
2008; Booth and Kee, 2009; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010,
2007; Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2007; Harkonen, 2014; Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004), birth
spacing (De Haan, 2010; Black et al., 2005), family size (Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010)
and gender of the child (Sahoo, 2016; Maitra et al., 2016). In particular, the role that birth
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order plays in influencing child outcomes has dominated the economic literature. This
stems from interesting findings in the psychology and sociology literature (Zajonc, 1976;
Zajonc and Markus, 1976; Zajonc, 1983) which shows that child outcomes are higher for
first born children. This finding is attributed to different factors including the intellectual
environment within the household (Zajonc, 1976; Zajonc and Markus, 1976) and family
resources (Blake, 1981; Downey, 2001) both of which are hypothesized to diminish with
each additional child in the family.
Unlike literature in psychology and sociology, economic literature, both theoretical
and empirical, does not demonstrate a universal first-born advantage. While literature
in developed countries points to a first-born advantage in terms of education outcomes
(Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010), evidence from developing countries generally finds
a first-born disadvantage, that is, birth order effects are positively related to education
outcomes (De Haan et al., 2014; Basu and Van, 1998; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2007, 2010;
Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004). Birth order effects on child outcomes are therefore still the
subject of further research. Another family characteristic that has received a fair amount
of theoretical attention is the gender of the child. Generally, most studies in developing
countries document the existence of a gender bias in favor of boys in terms of education
and other social outcomes (Maitra et al., 2014, 2016; Sahoo, 2016).
This chapter contributes to this literature by investigating the effect of two important
family characteristics, gender and birth order, on intra-household investments in, and ed-
ucational outcomes of, children in Kenya. Following Caceres-Delpiano (2006), we measure
intra-household education investments in children by household decisions to enrol children
in private schools.1 We define educational outcomes by two variables: completed years of
education and relative grade progression. In Kenya, we are only aware of the study by
Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) that empirically examined the effect of birth order on
educational attainments in twelve countries in sub-Sahara Africa, Kenya included. This
study does not however explicitly make a distinction between variables that measure child
investments (such as, enrolment of children in private schools) and those that measure
child outcomes (completed years of education and relative grade attainment) in examining
birth order effects.
An obvious obstacle here is the endogeneity of gender, birth order and even family size,
Following Tenikue and Verheyden (2010), Moshoeshoe (2016), Maitra et al. (2016), Black
et al. (2005), Sahoo (2016) and De Haan et al. (2014), we apply the family fixed effects
1Recall that private schools in Kenya are not free. As we noted in the Chapter 4, even in low cost
private schools, parents pay tuition fees at an average of less than 10 US Dollars per month against (Piper
et al., 2014; Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Piper et al., 2015). This compares with an avarage household
income/consumption of 34 US Dollars per adult equivalent per month nationally (GoK, 2013).
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model which allows us to remove all sources of such common household level unobserved
heterogeneity.
Here is the summary of our results. Although we do not find an intra-household gender
preference in terms of investments in children’s education, as measured by household
enrolment of children in private schools, there is a female advantage in terms of completed
years of education and relative grade progression. Relative to their male siblings, female
siblings complete 0.138 more years of education. Female siblings also progress through
school faster, accumulating 0.025 more years of education relative to their male siblings.
Regarding birth order, our results show significant negative effects of birth order on private
school enrolment, completed years of education and relative grade progression. Our results
are robust to different robustness checks including correction of selectivity bias due to non-
enrolment of children and further attempts to measure birth order effects more accurately.
Lastly, we find that household wealth plays a significant role in propagating the birth order
but not the gender effects we observe.
The rest of the chapter is organized follows. In section 5.2, we review the theoretical
and empirical evidence of gender and birth order effects. Next, we lay out our empirical
model which will be used to test for the theoretical predictions. We then provide a
descriptive summary of our data (in section 5.4) after which we present the empirical
results and finally conclude.
5.2 Who is the Most Favoured Child? Theoretical
and Empirical Evidence
One of the earliest theories originating from the psychology literature is the confluence
model. According to this model, a child’s intellectual ability is determined by the sum
of the intellectual level in his or her family. As more children are born in the household,
the average intellectual environment declines(Zajonc, 1976; Zajonc and Markus, 1976).
As a result, first-born children are advantaged since they are born in a household with a
higher average intellectual environment. Last-borns enter the household when the average
intellectual level is at its lowest. The model therefore predicts a negative correlation
between birth order and outcomes such as educational attainments.
The confluence model further predicts that first-borns also develop skills by tutoring
younger siblings, thus earning skills that help them excel in academic related outcomes.
Such tutoring effect explains the model’s predictions that only children are likely to do
worse in outcomes (such as academic achievements) than first-borns in large families
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because the former do not have anyone to tutor (Zajonc and Markus, 1976). The model
further posits that being born in a household with long, rather than short, spacing between
siblings reduces the first-born advantage (Zajonc, 1983).
Away from psychology and closer to economic literature is the resource dilution hy-
pothesis. According to this theory, all forms of parental resources, such as time and
finances, are generally limited (Jaeger, 2009; Downey, 2001). In particular, as the size of
the family enlarges, per capita family economic and material resources which cannot be
shared by siblings decline (Downey, 2001). Like the confluence model, this model pre-
dicts that an increase in family size leads to poorer child outcomes. Closely related to the
resource dilution hypothesis is the quantity-quality theory by Becker (1960) whose key
feature is the interaction of child quality and quantity in the household budget constraint.
According to this model, when there are capital market imperfections and parents have
many children (like in developing countries), they can, for a given income, invest less in
each child than if they have fewer children. The model predicts a negative relationship
between sibling size and child outcomes.
There exists a number of studies that have looked at the empirical evidence of the
above theoretical predictions. We start with empirical evidence from developed countries.
Much of the evidence in developed countries is generally in line with the theoretical pre-
dictions that birth order negatively affects schooling outcomes (Price, 2008; Black et al.,
2005; Booth and Kee, 2009; De Haan, 2010; Harkonen, 2014; Kristensen and Bjerkedal,
2007). A study by Black et al. (2005) makes use of survey data from Norway to estimate
the effects of birth order on children’s education attainments. They estimate a house-
hold fixed-effects model and find that birth order is negatively and significantly related
to child education. They do not find evidence that the results are driven by parental
resources (measured by mother’s level of education) and household residential location
(rural/urban). They also show that birth order effects do not significantly differ by gen-
der.
Booth and Kee (2009) use the 13th wave of the British Household Panel Survey to
estimate the effects of family size and birth order on children’s educational attainment.
They control for parental household income, parental age at birth and a number of house-
hold level attributes. They find that children from larger households have lower levels
of education. In line with Black et al. (2005), they find negative birth order effects on
children’s educational attainment. Using data from the American Time Use Survey in the
US, Price (2008) estimates the relationship between birth order and parental time use.
He finds that first born children receive significantly more quality time from their parents
relative to later-born children.
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De Haan (2010) estimates the effect of birth order on education attainments of chil-
dren in USA and Norway using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study data and the Brabant
Survey data, respectively. To address the potential endogeneity resulting from the possi-
ble correlation between birth order and number of sibling, they follow Black et al. (2005)
by estimating birth order by household size. Like Black et al. (2005), their results reveal a
negative and significant effect of birth order on child education. The authors further find
that the age gap between children does not affect the effect of birth order. In addition,
the negative effect does not differ between children from higher or lower educated parents.
Other studies based in developed countries that find similar negative birth order effects on
educational attainment include Harkonen (2014) for Germany and Conley and Glauber
(2006)and Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) for USA.
Unlike developed countries, much of the evidence in developing countries finds a first-
born disadvantage in terms of education outcomes, mainly due to high poverty and low
education levels in developing countries (De Haan et al., 2014). High poverty levels in
developing countries force households to invest less in the human capital of first-born
children (Ejrnaes and Portner, 2004; Basu and Van, 1998; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010,
2007), for example. The income from older children contributes to family resources,
allowing young children to go to school thus explaining the positive birth order effects on
child schooling.
Empirical evidence seems to support the above resource constraint hypothesis. Tenikue
and Verheyden (2010) estimate a household fixed effects model to examine the impact of
birth order on educational attainment using the demographic and health survey data for
12 sub-Saharan Africa countries including Kenya. Educational attainment is measured
by the number of completed years of education (for the children in their sample as at
the time of the survey). In line with the resource constraint hypothesis, they find posi-
tive birth order effects (for example, a first-born disadvantage) in poor households while
the opposite holds for richer households. An earlier study by Tenikue and Verheyden
(2007) also applied a family fixed effects model to examine the impact of birth order on
educational attainment using the Cameroon Household Survey of 2001. This study finds
a first-born disadvantage among poor households which however disappears in wealthier
households indicating that wealth has the potential to reverse the first-born advantage.
Empirical evidence further points to other factors for the positive birth order effects
in developing countries apart from resource constraints. De Haan et al. (2014) estimate
the causal effect of birth order on the probability of school enrolment and child labor
using nationally representative data from Ecuador. Their estimates, based on family
fixed effects, show that earlier born (early order) children are less likely to enrol in school
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but more likely to participate in child labor relative to later born (later order) children.
Analyzing the mechanisms driving their results, De Haan et al. (2014) find that earlier
born children receive less quality time from their mothers and more so, are breast feed for
a shorter time. The evidence presented in their paper also shows that birth order effects
are particularly large among poor households.
Another sibling characteristic that has received theoretical attention is the gender
of the child. Generally, most studies in developing countries document the existence of
gender bias in favor of boys. For instance, in Ghana, a study by Garg and Morduch
(1998) found that children are better off in terms of measured health indicators if they
have sisters and no brothers. Another study, by Gupta (1987) based in rural, India
shows that although there is a preference for boys in terms of food allocation, clothing,
and education and medical expenses, parents also discriminate selectively against some
of their daughters. In particular, in households where there is more than one daughter,
younger daughters are worse off relative to their older sisters.
In another study from India, Sahoo (2016) explores the role of gender on intra-
household schooling choices between private and government schools. He estimates a
household fixed effects model on a three-period longitudinal data set based on rural house-
holds from Uttar Pradesh and finds that girls are less likely to be enrolled in private schools
by 6 percentage points. Similarly, Maitra et al. (2016) examines the role of gender in pri-
vate school choice using two nationally representative data sets from household surveys
conducted in India in 2005 and 2012. They find that female siblings are significantly
disadvantaged in both survey years. They find a significant female disadvantage in both
surveys (4 percentage points in 2005 and 6 percentage point in 2012) which varies across
sub-samples and years.
This paper uses the case study of Kenya to contribute to this literature by empirically
testing the prediction of the theoretical models we have reviewed with regard to gender
and birth order. Apart from Tenikue and Verheyden (2007), we are not aware of any other
study that has explored the gender and birth order effects on intra-household schooling
choices and education attainment in Kenya.
5.3 The Theoretical and Empirical Model
In terms of the theoretical framework, our study is grounded in the theories we reviewed
in the last section, namely the Confluence Model (CM) and Resource Dilution Hypothesis
(RDH) as well as other economic models including quantity-quality theory by Becker
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(1960) and the liquidity model by Tenikue and Verheyden (2010). We particularly seek to
test the prediction of these models in the context of Kenya.
In terms of the empirical model, we are interested in estimating the effect of gender
(being female) and birth order on three variables related to children in the households,
namely, private school enrolment, completed years of education and relative grade pro-
gression. Following Maitra et al. (2016), Tenikue and Verheyden (2010), Sahoo (2016),
De Haan et al. (2014) and Black et al. (2005), we estimate the following household fixed
effects model by OLS as outlined in 5.1:
yij = β0 + β1GIRLij + β2secondij + β3thirdij + β4fourthij + β5fifthij + β6X
′
ij +ψj + εij
(5.1)
where yij represents the three outcomes of interest: (a) type of school (equals to one
if private) that child i from household j is currently enrolled; (b) child i’s completed years
of education; and lastly (c) child i’s relative grade progression (which we defined and
discussed in Chapter 2). Each of the measures of yij depends on: (a) the child’s gender,
where GIRLij is a dummy variable for gender being a girl; (b) child’s order of birth, where
secondij, thirdij, fourthij and fifthij denote the second-born, third-born, fourth-born
and fifth-born child, respectively (first-born being the base category); and (c) a vector of
other child characteristics Xij (age, a dummy variable for whether the child goes for paid
up tuition and a dummy variable for whether a child has some form of disability).
As mentioned, an estimation bias may arise from the potential endogeneity of the
child’s gender and family size. We are able to deal with such endogeneity and remove
all sources of unobserved heterogeneity common to all children in the family through the
family fixed effects, denoted ψj. Finally, εij is the error term.
We interpret the estimated coefficients on the dummies secondij, thirdij, fourthij and
fifthij as the effect of being the second, third, fourth and fifth child relative to the first
child (the first child being the reference category). Our birth order variable is likely to be
correlated (positively) with the age of the child since children in our sample were observed
when they were still in school. Others like De Haan et al. (2014), Moshoeshoe (2016) and
Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) have solved this challenge by including dummies for child’s
age in the regressions. We apply this same strategy. We also include two additional child
level variables: a variable indicating whether a child goes for paid tuition and whether
the child has some form of disability. Many studies focusing on developing countries do
not account for these variables which may be correlated with our measured outcomes
variables.
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Each household in our data is considered a cluster since there are individual children
within the household who are genetically linked. We cluster standard errors within the
household fixed effects in order to derive homoscedastic idiosyncratic error given such
clustering (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007; Maitra et al., 2016).
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
The Uwezo survey does not allow us to distinguish between biological and non-biological
children of the household. We thus treat all children as though they are biological children
of the family. We are of the opinion that this assumption will not have a huge implication
on our estimates because as explained in chapter 2, information was collected from children
who regularly live in the household. These children, whether biological or not, by virtue
of being regular inhabitants of the household, directly influence intra-household decisions
including those related to schooling.2
Like Caceres-Delpiano (2006), our sample is limited to children in the household aged
6 to 16 years who are the target group in the Uwezo household assessments. First, we
exclude younger children (less than 6 years) because compulsory primary schooling in
Kenya begins at age 6. The upper age limit is right-censored since Uwezo targets children
of maximum age of 16. Focusing on children aged between 6 to 16 years has an advantage.
For instance, the incidence of children below 16 years moving out of the household (to
look for a job or otherwise) is low, an aspect that minimizes potential measurement errors
in our birth order measures.
Since are exploiting within-family variations in the fixed effects models, it is a re-
quirement that we restrict the sample to include only families with a minimum of two
children (Black et al., 2005; Sahoo, 2016; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; Maitra et al.,
2016; De Haan et al., 2014).3 We further limit the sample size to households with a
maximum of five children. This restriction ensures we have included families that are not
likely to have more children. Limiting the sample to households with five children does
not have a huge implication on our estimates since fewer than 1.5 percent of households
in our sample have more than five children aged 6-16 years. Following De Haan et al.
(2014), we drop households with multiple births (twins) because it is not clear how birth
2In India, a very recent study by Maitra et al. (2016) examined the effect of gender and birth order
on intra-household private school choice. The authors compare estimates based on a sample of only
biological children and estimates based on a sample extended to all children who were in the household
at the time of the survey. The results between the two samples are similar.
3By imposing this restriction, we lose about 39.2 percent of the 72,216 households in the sample.
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order can be assigned in such cases.4 We also exclude households and/or children with
missing data on key variables such as age.
After imposing all these restrictions, we are left with 96,920 children and 31,568
households. We construct indicators of birth order for the children based on their reported
year of birth. In this case, birth order equals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the first, second, third,
fourth and fifth born children aged 6 to 16 years, respectively. According to De Haan
(2010), the most accurate measure of birth order is one based on households where all
children of the mother are still alive and live at home at the moment of the survey.
Although our data does not allow us to know if there are children staying away from
the household at the time of the survey and if some of the children were not alive, we
provide some evidence in the robustness test section to allay fears about the accuracy of
our measure of birth order.
We are interested in three dependent variables. The first is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the child attends a private school and 0 if the child attends a public school.
Following Tenikue and Verheyden (2010), we define our second dependent variable as the
child’s highest number of completed years of education as at the time of the survey. The
third dependent variable is the relative grade progression, which as explained in chapter
2, is the number of years of schooling a child had completed as at the time of the survey,
divided by the child’s potential years of schooling (see also Mani et al. (2013)). Relative
grade progression is defined accounting for the fact that official primary school starting
age in Kenya is 6.5 In this case, all children of age 6 and below are assumed to have
accumulated zero years of education. As a result, this dependent variable has a small
sample size.
Since private schooling is not free in Kenya, we consider private school enrolment as
a measure of parental investment in children’s education allowing us to accurately test
economic theories such as the resource dilution hypothesis (Caceres-Delpiano, 2006). We
associate the next two dependent variables (completed years of education and relative
grade progression) as measures of child well-being (education outcomes), that result from
inputs such as parental resource allocation (Caceres-Delpiano, 2006).
Table 5.1 shows selected descriptive statistics for the whole sample, for households
that send their children to public schools and for households that send their children to
private schools. A few variables in the table were already presented in chapter 2. The
mean statistics for these variables will however differ slightly from those presented in
chapter 2 because the analytical sample in this chapter excludes households with: (i) one
4Uwezo did not directly ask if the household had twins or not. If two or more children in the household
have the same age, we assume that such children are twins. We lose about 5.3 percent of the 72,216
households in the sample.
5Relative grade progression is calculated as [Completed years of education(Age−6) ]. The number 6 in the denom-
inator denotes the official age of starting school in Kenya.
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child, (ii) more than five children and (ii) with twins.
Table 5.1: Mean Statistics for Children and Households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Public Private Public-Private
Sample School School diff
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Never enrolled 0.12 – – –
Dropped out 0.01 – – –
Enrolled 0.87 – – –
Enrolled in private school 0.14 – – –
Completed years of education 3.43 3.50 2.95 0.56***
Relative grade progression 0.64 0.64 0.65 -0.01***
Panel B: Child Characteristics
Age of the child (in years) 10.87 11.24 10.29 0.95***
Child is female 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.00
Child attends tuition classes 0.39 0.44 0.61 -0.18***
Child has some form of disability 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01***
Child is first-born 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.05***
Child is second-born 0.36 0.36 0.40 -0.04***
Child is third-born 0.18 0.17 0.18 -0.01***
Child is fourth-born 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.00
Child is fifth-born 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Panel C: Household Characteristics
Household is in a rural area 0.78 0.79 0.60 0.18***
Household wealth index (normalized to 0-1 range) 0.40 0.41 0.52 -0.11***
Household belongs to the upper wealth index 0.26 0.25 0.51 -0.27***
Age of mother (in years) 36.77 37.09 35.58 1.51***
Years of education of the mother 5.53 5.74 6.88 -1.13***
Number of children aged 6 to 16 years in the family 2.76 2.77 2.61 0.16***
Within household variation in school choice 0.15 – – –
Number of children 96,920 74,245 9,407
Number of households 31,568 22, 423 3,330
Source: Own calculations based on Uwezo 2012. Notes: (1) Our sample is restricted to households with 2-5 children aged
6-16; (2) Private school enrolment is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0
if a child was enrolled in a public school; (2) Completed years of education is number of years of education the child had
completed as at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the
school starting age in Kenya; (5) The household wealth index is constructed using the principal component analysis (PCA)
based on household ownership of durable and livestock assets, type of material used to construct the wall of the dwelling
unit, type of lighting regularly used by the household, number of meals taken per day and household sanitation status (for
details of specific variables included in the index please refer to chapter 2 ); (6) We normalize the family wealth index to
the range of 0 to 1 and classified household whose index lies 0.5 and above as rich while the rest were classified as poor.
Refer to chapter 2 for more details and; (7) By mother being a teen at birth of the oldest child (in years) means the mother
gave birth her first born child when she was 18 years or less.
Panel A (column 1) shows the results for our three dependent variables for the children.
As can be seen from the table, about 12 percent of children have never been enrolled while
about 1 percent have dropped out of school.6 The majority of children, 87 percent are
enrolled and of these 14 percent are enrolled in private schools. The average completed
years of education of those who are enrolled is 3.43. If children in our sample enter schools
on time (at age 6) and accumulate every year without repeating, we expect the relative
6Later, we address concerns that such non-enrolment might be a source of selection bias through the
Heckman-type selection model since a decision to enroll in a private or a public school is only observed
after a decision either to enrol in school or not to enrol has been taken.
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grade progression to be equal to 1, showing an efficient education system. As can be seen
from table 5.1, our average relative grade is 0.64 (less than 1 by 37 percentage points),
meaning that children in our sample accumulate 0.64 grades per year of schooling. This
reinforces one of our concerns in chapter 1 and 2 about the late entry and/or relatively
high rate of repetition among Kenyan children.
Column 2 and 3 show that children in public schools have slightly more years of
education (probably because they are older). However, children in public schools have
slightly lower relative grade progression level meaning that they are more likely to start
school late and/or repeat classes relative to their counterparts in private schools.
Looking at child demographic characteristics in panel B (column 1), we find that
children are on average 10.87 years old and just below half of them, 48 percent, are
female. Less than half of the children, 39 percent, reported that they attend paid tuition
classes. A relatively small proportion of children, about 3 percent, were reported to have
some form of physical disability. Column 2 and 3 show that relative to their counterparts
in public schools, private school students are more likely to be young, female and with
no disability. The share of first and second born in the sample is 38 and 36 percent,
respectively. The share of third and fourth born children is, respectively, 18 percent and
7 percent. The fifth born are least represented at 2 percent.
In terms of household characteristics, shown in panel C (column 1), we find that the
majority of households, 78 percent, are in rural areas. The average wealth index (0-1
range) is 0.40, meaning that the majority of households belong to the lower part of the
wealth index and can therefore be classified as poor. Only 26 percent of households can
be classified as rich, that is, those whose household wealth index is is 0.5 and above
(see discussion in Chapter 2). The mean age of the mother is 36.77 years. On average,
mothers of children in our sample have 5.53 years of education. There are, on average,
3 children, aged 6-16 years. Lastly, 15 percent of the households exhibit such within-
household variation in school type choice where some children attend public schools while
others attend private schools even when they are from the same household.
Panel C (column 1 and 2) further shows that households that send children to private
schools are more likely to be: smaller in size, based in urban areas, wealthier and with
more young and more educated mothers. Thus, it seems, as we pointed out in previous
chapters, that children who attend private schools already have disproportionately higher
academic potential and access to complementary educational resources. They are more
likely to attend private schools, accumulate more years of education and progress faster
through schooling. We use family fixed effects models to address such potential source of
endogeneity.
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5.5 Results and Discussion
5.5.1 Gender and Birth Order Effects
The dependent variables completed years of education and relative grade progression are
continuous variables and therefore the estimation strategy used is the standard OLS with
fixed effects. For private enrolment, the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether
the child is enrolled in private (equals to 1) or not (equals to 0). Ideally, we should use the
conventional probit or logit that bound the maximum likelihood estimated probabilities
on the unit interval (Horrace and Oaxaca, 2006). However, results estimated by probit or
logit can be inconsistent when fixed effects are included (Baltagi, 2008; Wooldridge, 2003).
We therefore use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) which is generally acceptable when
using fixed effects in the context of a dummy dependent variable (Horrace and Oaxaca,
2006).
The LPM, however, comes with two potential challenges. First, its predicted proba-
bilities are not bounded on the unit interval (for example, they can lie outside the 0 to 1
range) and second is the challenge of heteroscedasticity. To deal with heteroscedasticity,
we use the robust standard errors, which are clustered at the household level. Regard-
ing the first challenge, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) show that this bias increases with an
increase in the relative share of predicted probabilities falling outside the unit interval.
They argue that if no predicted probabilities, or just a few predicted probabilities, lie
outside the unit interval, then the LPM is expected to be unbiased and consistent. In our
case, the proportion of LPM predicted probabilities that lie outside the unit interval is,
in fact, zero.
In table 5.2, we present the OLS and household fixed effects regression results for
the effects of gender and birth order on the three dependent variables.7 Throughout
this chapter, we refer to the results in table 5.2 as our headline results/regression. Since
parents of first-born children are more likely to be younger than those of fourth or fifth
born children, we include in the OLS regression the mother’s age to control for such cohort
effects for the parents (Black et al., 2005). In addition, we include mother’s education,
and a full set of dummies for the number of children in the family, which control for the
correlation between birth order and family size.
7In the interest of brevity we only report estimates of our variables of interest (gender and birth order)
throughout this paper.
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Table 5.2: Effects of Gender and Birth Order on Private School Enrolment, Completed
Years of Education and Relative Grade Progression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private School Completed Years Relative Grade
enrolment of Education Progression
OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
Female -0.002 0.001 0.146*** 0.138*** 0.028*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
Second born -0.009*** -0.008** -0.087*** -0.205*** -0.019*** -0.061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004)
Third born -0.020*** -0.013** -0.165*** -0.403*** -0.048*** -0.124***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.026) (0.004) (0.006)
Fourth child -0.028*** -0.017** -0.188*** -0.541*** -0.079*** -0.183***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.038) (0.007) (0.010)
Fifth born -0.050*** -0.032*** -0.120*** -0.594*** -0.138*** -0.271***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.055) (0.018) (0.019)
Family Size
Three children -0.016*** -0.028** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.013) (0.003)
Four children -0.022*** -0.020 0.004
(0.004) (0.019) (0.003)
Five children -0.018*** -0.076** 0.008
(0.007) (0.030) (0.005)
Constant 0.322*** 0.328*** -5.510*** -3.979*** -0.412*** -0.020
(0.028) (0.017) (0.093) (0.085) (0.030) (0.026)
Observations 83,652 83,652 84,622 84,622 80,389 80,389
R-squared 0.035 0.039 0.747 0.823 0.128 0.119
No. of households 37,282 37,432 36,272
Notes: (1) The OLS and fixed effects regressions include the following control variables: age of the child (in years), whether
the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or not. In addition, the OLS
regression includes mother’s level of education and mother’s age (to control for parental cohort effects), dummies for the
family size; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school
enrolment is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled
in a public school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education the
child had completed as at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where
6 is the school starting age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6)
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Looking at the results in table 5.2, the OLS estimates in column 1 shows that being
a female child does not have an effect on the probability of being enrolled in a private
school. Results in columns 3 and 5 show that relative to their male siblings, female siblings
are more likely to complete more years of education and progress faster through school.
With regards to birth order, the results reveal a clear pattern of a negative and significant
effects of birth order on all the dependent variables which increases in absolute terms with
birth order. In figure 5.1, we show the effects of birth on all the measured outcomes based
on the household fixed effects model (based on columns 2, 4 and 6 of table 5.2).
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Figure 5.1: Effects of Gender and Birth Order on Private School Enrolment, Completed
Years of Education and Relative Grade Progression based on Household fixed effects
model
We refrain from giving OLS estimates a causal interpretation because of the possible
bias that may arise from unobserved household characteristics. We therefore turn to the
household fixed effects estimates that address these identification problems (columns 2, 4
and 6). The results generally show a similar pattern as those in OLS. There is no gender
effect on our measure of intra-household investment in education (private enrolment).
However, relative to their male siblings, female siblings complete 0.138 more years of ed-
ucation. In addition, they are more likely to progress through school faster, accumulating
0.025 more years of education per year of schooling relative to their male counterparts.
The female advantage we observe in terms of completed years of education and rel-
ative grade progression is in contrast with literature generally reported from developing
countries (Garg and Morduch, 1998; Gupta, 1987; Maitra et al., 2016; Sahoo, 2016). It
is, however, in line with global trends which show that more girls are getting educated
and the gender gap in education has narrowed considerably (King and Winthrop, 2015).
In Kenya, for example, the Uwezo surveys have consistently shown that over time, more
girls than boys are enroling and progressing faster through school (Uwezo, 2012, 2014).
Turning to birth order effects in the fixed effects model, we find a significant negative
association between birth order and the three dependent variables. Relative to the first-
born, all other later-born children are less likely to be enrolled in private schools and are
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likely to complete less years of education. First-born children also make more progress
than all later all other later-born children. For example, the second and fifth-born children
are less likely to be enrolled in a private school by 0.8 percentage points and 3.2 percentage
points, respectively, relative to their first-born sibling. Similarly, the second and fifth-born
children are likely to complete 0.205 and 0.594 less years of education, respectively, relative
to their first-born sibling. Furthermore, we find that first-born children progress through
school much faster than their younger siblings. Our results show that the second-born is
likely to accumulate 0.061 less years of education per year of schooling relative to his/her
first-born counterpart and this disadvantage increases to 0.271 less years of education in
the case of the fifth-born.
Surprisingly, the first-born advantage we find in terms of private school attendance
advantage, completed years of education and relative grade progression are generally
in contrast with the findings in developing countries (as for instance Black et al. (2005);
De Haan (2010); Tenikue and Verheyden (2010); Ejrnaes and Portner (2004)). The results
are however in agreement with evidence in developed countries, for instance USA (Price,
2008; Black et al., 2005; Booth and Kee, 2009; De Haan, 2010; Harkonen, 2014; Kristensen
and Bjerkedal, 2007; Conley and Glauber, 2006), Norway (Black et al., 2005; De Haan,
2010), UK (Booth and Kee, 2009) and Germany (Harkonen, 2014). Our results on private
school enrolment are however consistent with Sahoo (2016) who documents a negative
birth order effect on private school choice in India.
There are a number of reasons for the potential negative birth order effects we find.
The first-borns, as posited by the confluence model, enjoy a higher intellectual environ-
ment which declines with entry of additional children (Zajonc and Markus, 1976; Zajonc,
1976). First-born children are also born into a family when limitations on the available
parental resources such as finances and time are not thinly spread among many children
(Blake, 1981; Downey, 2001; Becker, 1960). Their cognitive ability and development is
therefore more likely to be malleable at childhood, leading to better future outcomes
(Cunha and Heckman, 2007). In a developing country context like Kenya, parents can
also favor the eldest child because these children are more likely to start earning income
earlier, thus supplementing the family income. Although limited by data, we try to in-
vestigate if some of these factors are driving our results in section 5.6.
5.5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, we carry out a number of robustness checks to determine the validity of
our results presented in the headline regressions in table 5.2. Our robustness checks are
based on the household fixed effects estimates.
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School choice, whether to go to private school or not, is only observed if the child
is enrolled in school. As we show in table 5.1, about 11 percent of children are not
enrolled in school.8 Non-enrolment can be a potential source of selectivity bias. Next,
we check whether our estimates in table 5.1 compares with those based on a model with
selection correction. As observed by Maitra et al. (2016), the standard Heckman-type
selection model is not suitable for a household fixed-effects. In this regard, we closely
follow Maitra et al. (2016) by estimating a selection equation defined in terms of the
decision to enrol a child in school or not as shown in equation (5.2).
enrol∗ijk = β0 + β1GIRLijk + β2secondijk + β3thirdijk + β4forthijk + β5fifthijk
+β6X
′
ijk + βψijk + β8φijk + µijk (5.2)
where enrol∗ijk is the propensity to attend school (enrol) for student i in household
j located in village k. Since this propensity is not observable, we only observe enrolij
when the child is enrolled e.g. enrolij = 1 if enrolij > 0 otherwise if the child is not
enrolled then, enrolij = 0 if enrolij ≤ 0. We let the propensity to enrol depend on: (a)
the child’s gender, where GIRLij is a dummy for female child, (b) child’s order of birth
where as before, secondij, thirdij, fourthij and fifthij denote the second-born, third-
born, fourth-born and fifth-born child, respectively (first-born being the base category),
(c) a vector of other child characteristics, Xij (age, a dummy variable for whether the
child goes for paid up tuition or not, and a dummy variable for whether a child has some
form of disability or not), (d) family characteristics, ψijk, (e) village characteristics, φijk.
µijk is a random error.
Like Maitra et al. (2016), we estimate the selection equation equation (5.2) using a
probit model after which we compute the inverse Mill’s ratio, denoted as λij for each sam-
ple child.9 At the second stage, we include the inverse Mill’s ratio λij in equation (5.1) and
estimate a household fixed effects selectivity corrected model as shown in Equation (5.3):




8 We do not know the underlining factors leading to their decision not to enrol.
9Recall that in equation (5.2) we are estimating a probit model and so we do not account for household
fixed effects for reasons we have already explained.
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Like Maitra et al. (2016), we knowlegde that this process of correction for selection
may not be ideal, we simply want to test the robustness of our results. Table D5.1
in appendix D shows the results of the selection equation for child enrolment based on
equation (5.2).10 In table 5.3, we present the selectivity corrected gender and birth order
effects estimated from the household fixed effects model (equation (5.3)). The estimates
do not differ from those presented in our headline regressions in table 5.2. We find no
significant differences between female and male children in terms of private enrolment.
However, there is a female advantage in terms of completed years of education and relative
grade progression. Similarly, we find a significant negative association between birth order
and the three dependent variables.
Table 5.3: Effects of Gender and Birth Order using Household Fixed Effects Selectivity
Corrected Model
(1) (2) (3)
Private School Completed Years Relative Grade
enrolment of Education Progression
Female 0.001 0.156*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Second born -0.011*** -0.317*** -0.060***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.005)
Third born -0.021*** -0.620*** -0.122***
(0.006) (0.034) (0.008)
Fourth child -0.023** -0.907*** -0.185***
(0.009) (0.050) (0.013)
Fifth born -0.042*** -1.198*** -0.278***
(0.014) (0.071) (0.024)
Mills Ratio (λij) -0.100*** 0.938*** -0.014
(0.015) (0.068) (0.036)
Constant 0.533*** -6.899*** 0.002
(0.037) (0.172) (0.063)
Observations 55,943 56,510 48,418
R-squared 0.041 0.803 0.121
Number of households 22,221 22,289 21,588
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Our sample is based on children aged 6 to16 years. The upper age is right censored
10As can be seen from the table, the child, household and community/village characteristics we control
for exert a significant influence on enrolment probability.
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since Uwezo targets children of the maximum age of 16. One of the assumptions we make
is that all children are biologically born by the parents in the household.11 It is possible
that our observed oldest child might not be the actual oldest living child of the household.
Our next robustness check addresses these concerns. According to a report by Kenya
National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) based on 2009 Kenya Demographic Health Survey
(DHS), almost one-third of women (32%) in Kenya are married by age 18. The survey
further reveals that the median age at first marriage is 20 for women in the age bracket
25–49, and that age at marriage greatly increases with education where women with no
education are likely to marry at age 17.5 while those with secondary school education are
likely to marry at age 22.4 (KNBS, 2014).
Based on this, we check the robustness of our results by estimating the gender and
birth order effects on two samples. The first sample comprise households whose mothers
had their first-born child when they were teenagers, for example at 18 years of age. In
this sample, the mother’s age ranges from 17 years to 34 years while the mean age is 28
years. The second sample constitutes households where mothers were 34 years or younger
as at the time of the survey. We think that in these two samples, the first child was more
likely to be less than 16 years in 2012 (the year when the survey was conducted), thus
allowing us to estimate birth order effects in a more accurate manner. Results based on
these two restricted sample are shown in table 5.4. In both cases, our estimates of gender
and birth order do not deviate from those in the headline regression.
One might be concerned that family size is likely to be correlated with birth order and
that this might confound our birth order estimates. Although the use of household fixed
effects model helps to deal with such biases, we follow Black et al. (2005) and De Haan
(2010) by estimating the effects of birth order effects by household size that controls for
potential endogeneity induced by household size. Results are shown in table 5.5. The
results for gender are consistent with our headline findings: irrespective of the family
size, there is no female advantage in terms private school enrolment but we find a female
advantage in terms of completed years of education and relative grade progression. Sim-
ilarly, there is no gender preference in terms of private school enrolment. We still find
negative birth order effects on all the three dependent variables. However, the relationship
is insignificant in the case of private school enrolment especially among large families.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects of Gender and Birth Order
We are using a large, nationally representative survey with data collected from almost
all regions of Kenya. Kenya reflects large inter-regional variation in human development.
This is reflected in cultural and social practices as well as geography, and economics of
the different regions. In this section, we test to see if the results in our headline regression
reflect this heterogeneity. The regressions will be based on the household fixed effects
models.
5.5.3.1 Gender and Birth Order Effects by Family Size
We begin by exploring differences in the effects of gender and birth order by household
size. Table 5.5 has already been explored as part of the robustness tests. We use it once
more to show if there are heterogeneous effects in gender and birth order effects by family
size. The results on gender are consistent with our headline results: in all the different
family sizes, there is no significant differences between female and male children in terms
of private enrolment. However, there is a female advantage in terms of completed years
of education and relative grade progression.
It is more revealing to analyze birth order effects in table 5.5 by column (within
families) and by row (across families). Column 1 to 4 shows the effects of gender and
birth order on years of schooling completed. Reading results by column, we see significant
negative birth order effects irrespective of the family size. Reading results by row, we
also find that birth order effects increase across the family sizes as we move from a family
of two to five children. Put differently, the disadvantage of being the second, third and
fourth-born increases with an increase in the family size. For example, the second-born in
a family of two children completes 0.166 fewer years of education relative to the first-born
sibling while the counterpart second born in a family of five completes 0.268 fewer years
of education relative to the first-born sibling (row 2). These results generally support
the theoretical predictions of the confluence (Zajonc and Markus, 1976; Zajonc, 1976),
resource hypothesis (Downey, 2001) and quantity-quality (Becker, 1960) models which
predict a negative relationship between child outcomes and family size.
Similarly, results in column 5 to 8 (read by column) shows significant negative birth
order effects on relative grade progression irrespective of the family size in line with the-
oretical predictions. However, results (read by row) shows birth order effects on relative
grade progression reduce across family sizes. The disadvantage (gap) of being the second,
third and fourth-born, relative to the first-born, reduces with an increase in the family
sizes (see column 5 to 8). For example, relative to the first-born, a second-born child in a
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family of two children accumulates 0.074 fewer years of education while the same second-
born in a five-child family accumulates 0.054 fewer years of education. This result seems
to be in line with the tutoring effect of the confluence model (Zajonc and Markus, 1976;
Zajonc, 1976) which posits that large families can narrow latter-born disadvantage in
child outcomes. We think that latter-born siblings in large families are likely to progress
faster through school for two potential reasons: they are likely to start school on time by
accompanying their older siblings who are already in school and are also likely to develop
skills by tutoring their younger siblings or being tutored by older siblings.
Next, we test for the equality of the gender and birth order coefficients across family
sizes. To do so, we follow De Haan et al. (2014) and Moshoeshoe (2016) by estimating
a fully interacted model where every variable in the family fixed effects model, not just
gender and birth order, is interacted with family size. In the next sub-section, we briefly
explain the intuition behind fully interacted models. Results are reported in table 5.6.
The coefficient of the interaction between gender and family size is insignificant in all the
outcomes variables. This means that an increase in family size is not associated with a
female advantage in terms of private school enrollment, completed years of education and
relative grade progression.
The interaction term between birth order and private school enrolment variable is
insignificant showing the absence of significant differences in the effects of birth order
on private school enrolments across family sizes. The interaction terms between birth
order and family size are negative and significant in the completed years of education
regression confirming results in table 5.6 that the effects of birth order on completed
years of education get larger as the size of the family increases. However, birth order
interaction terms with relative grade progression are generally positive and significant
again confirming results in table 5.5 that birth order effects on relative grade progression
get smaller as the size of the family increases.
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enrolment of Education Progression
Female -0.004 0.147*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.031) (0.008)
Second born -0.018* -0.092* -0.071***
(0.011) (0.052) (0.013)
Third born -0.017 -0.303*** -0.222***
(0.021) (0.101) (0.024)
Fourth child -0.011 -0.511*** -0.461***
(0.043) (0.196) (0.056)
Fifth born 0.043* -1.614*** -0.360***
(0.023) (0.111) (0.029)
Female* family Size 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
Second-born* family Size 0.004 -0.038** 0.003
(0.003) (0.017) (0.004)
Third-born* family Size 0.005 -0.083*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.031) (0.007)
Forth-born* family Size 0.008 -0.137*** 0.052***
(0.011) (0.051) (0.014)
Fifth-born* family Size – – –
– – –
Constant 0.275*** -3.279*** 0.113***
(0.020) (0.097) (0.029)
Observations 83,652 84,622 80,389
R-squared 0.040 0.824 0.123
Number of households 36,329 36,501 36,272
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
5.5.3.2 Gender and Birth Order Effects by Location
Family size may matter more or less depending on whether the family is located in a rural
or urban area. In a country like Kenya, a large household may be a source of labour on
the farm, hence more beneficial in rural than urban areas. Also, urban areas in Kenya
have a more education opportunities, especially high concentration of private schools than
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rural areas (Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Piper et al., 2014). For these reasons, we check
for heterogeneity in gender and birth order effects by location (rural versus urban) and
further test if our results in the main regression are an artefact of household location.
We estimate our household fixed effects model by location whose results are shown in
table 5.7. The results on gender, in both rural and urban areas, are consistent with
our headline regressions table 5.2: we do not find significant differences between female
and male children in terms of private enrolment in both rural and urban locations but
there is a female advantage in terms of completed years of education and relative grade
progression.
Interestingly, we find significant negative birth order effects on private school enrol-
ment in the rural sample but none in the urban sample (column 1 and 4). As pointed
out in the previous chapter, private schools are the main source of education in urban ar-
eas. For some families in urban informal settlements (especially in Nairobi), the choice is
sometimes not between a government primary school and a non-formal private school, but
between the non-formal private school and no school at all (Piper et al., 2014). With such
near universal access to private schools in urban areas, there are no incentives for intra-
household discrimination among siblings thus explaining the lack of significant birth order
effects on private school enrolment in urban areas. On the other hand, private schools
are not as prevalent in rural areas as they are in urban areas. The few private schools in
rural areas are likely to charge higher fees thus inducing intra-household discrimination
among children in favor of older siblings in terms of their access.
Table 5.7 further shows that birth order effects are different between rural and urban
areas in terms of completed years of education (column 2 and 5) and relative grade
progression (column 3 and 6). In particular, there is strong latter-sibling disadvantage
in terms of completed years of education in rural households. For instance, a fifth-born
child in a rural household is likely to complete 0.721 fewer years of education relative to
their first-born sibling while a fifth-born child in an urban household is likely to complete
0.327 fewer years of education relative to their first-born sibling. Here, the disadvantage
facing the fifth-born, relative to her first-born counterpart, in a rural household, is higher
than that of a fifth-born in an urban household.
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Table 5.7: Effects of Gender and Birth Order by Rural and Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rural Areas Urban Areas
Private Completed Relative Private Completed Relative
Variables School Years Grade School Years Grade
enrolment of Education Progression enrolment of Education Progression
Female -0.001 0.164*** 0.031*** 0.004 0.074*** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005)
Second born -0.008** -0.216*** -0.060*** -0.007 -0.174*** -0.060***
(0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) (0.033) (0.008)
Third born -0.015*** -0.441*** -0.126*** -0.002 -0.314*** -0.119***
(0.006) (0.031) (0.008) (0.014) (0.057) (0.014)
Fourth child -0.019** -0.620*** -0.185*** -0.015 -0.335*** -0.182***
(0.009) (0.045) (0.011) (0.021) (0.083) (0.021)
Fifth born -0.036*** -0.721*** -0.280*** -0.016 -0.327*** -0.295***
(0.013) (0.063) (0.022) (0.032) (0.126) (0.043)
Constant 0.301*** -3.796*** 0.025 0.459*** -4.401*** -0.073
(0.019) (0.100) (0.031) (0.046) (0.177) (0.057)
Observations 60,841 61,563 58,535 17,020 17,172 16,280
R-squared 0.041 0.820 0.115 0.035 0.839 0.132
No. of households 26,178 26,305 26,131 7,574 7,599 7,559
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Similarly, to formally test for the equality of the effects of gender and birth order
between rural and urban areas, we estimate a fully interacted model by interacting every
variable with the rural location dummy.12 Results are shown in table 5.8. Since this
is a fully interacted family fixed effects model with a rural dummy, the coefficients on
gender (female) and birth order dummies in table 5.8 are for urban areas. Notice that
the coefficients in the table are identical to those for urban areas presented in table 5.7
(columns 4, 5 and 6). Second, the interaction terms in table 5.8 capture the difference
between rural and urban location on each of the model parameters (Gordon, 2015). A
significant interaction term on the variable means that the effect of the variable on the
measured dependent variable is significant between rural and urban. The interaction terms
therefore provide a formal test of equality of gender and birth order effects between rural
and urban areas (see Gordon (2015), Gujarati (1970a) and Gujarati (1970b) for theoretical
foundations of fully interacted models and De Haan et al. (2014) and Moshoeshoe (2016)
for empirical application).
12By a fully interacted model, the rural location dummy is interacted with our variables of interest
(gender and birth order dummies) as well as all other variables (e.g. age, disability and tuition attendance
status) in the family fixed effects model. In doing so, we allow all the parameters of the model including
the intercept to vary by location (Gujarati, 1970b,a; Gordon, 2015). Two most recent studies that have
investigated heterogeneity in birth order effects using fully interacted family fixed effects models are
De Haan et al. (2014) and Moshoeshoe (2016).
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enrolment of Education Progression
Female 0.004 0.074*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.027) (0.006)
Second born -0.007 -0.174*** -0.060***
(0.010) (0.043) (0.011)
Third born -0.002 -0.314*** -0.119***
(0.019) (0.075) (0.019)
Fourth child -0.015 -0.335*** -0.182***
(0.028) (0.110) (0.029)
Fifth born -0.016 -0.327* -0.295***
(0.043) (0.167) (0.058)
Female*rural -0.005 0.090*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.030) (0.007)
Second-born*rural -0.001 -0.042 0.000
(0.011) (0.049) (0.012)
Third-born*rural -0.013* -0.127* -0.007
(0.007) (0.086) (0.021)
Forth-born*rural -0.005** -0.285** -0.003
(0.002) (0.125) (0.033)
Fifth-born*rural -0.020** -0.394** 0.015
(0.010) (0.187) (0.065)
Constant 0.336*** -3.928*** 0.004
(0.018) (0.087) (0.027)
Observations 77,861 78,735 74,815
R-squared 0.791 0.909 0.676
No. of households 36,329 36,501 36,272
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
As can be seen in table 5.8, the interaction term between female dummy and rural
dummy is significant only in the completed years of education regression ((column 2). This
means that there is a strong female advantage in terms of completed years of education in
rural than urban areas. However, there is no evidence of significant female advantage in
terms of private school enrolment and relative grade progression between rural and urban
areas. The interaction terms between birth order and rural dummy are negative and
statistically significant in the private school enrolment and completed years of education
regression. This means there are stronger negative birth order effects in terms of private
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school enrolment and completed years of education in rural than urban areas.
5.6 Possible Explanation for the Gender and Birth
Order Effects
We now examine the possible explanation for the gender and birth order effects observed.
In particular, our data allows us to test if the effects are propagated through the resource
hypothesis or birth-spacing (or child-spacing) channel. All the estimates in this section
are based on the family fixed effects model.
5.6.1 Gender, Birth Order Effects and Household Wealth
We begin by testing to see if the effects of gender and birth order are propagated through
household wealth. In order to do this, we use the family wealth index constructed in
chapter 2.13 A number of studies have used a similar index to test the mechanisms
through which birth order effects are propagated. A study by Tenikue and Verheyden
(2010) uses a similar wealth index based on the Demographic and Health Survey data to
examine birth order effects between siblings in rich and poor families in terms of schooling
and child labor in 12 sub-Saharan Africa countries. They find that the education levels of
earlier born children are lower than their later born siblings in poor households, whereas
earlier-born children are more educated in richer ones.
There are a number of reasons why latter-born children do worse. The resource
hypothesis (Downey, 2001) and quantity-quality (Becker, 1960) models argue that invest-
ment in children increases at higher levels of economic status. They argue that as the
size of the family increases, per capita familial resources reduce thus reducing investment
in children. If constraints on household resources are to some extent responsible for the
negative effect of birth order as predicted by theoretical models, we might expect the
negative effect of birth order to be attenuated or even reversed among rich households.
Evidence in developing countries further shows that girls are likely to suffer more in re-
source constrained households (Garg and Morduch, 1998; Gupta, 1987). Therefore, we
might expect a girl preference in rich households.
13Recall that in the previous chapter, we used this same family wealth index to assess the effect of
private schools among poor and rich households.
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Table 5.9: Effects of Gender and Birth Order by Household Wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Households Classified as Poor Households Classified as Rich
Private Completed Relative Private Completed Relative
School Years Grade School Years Grade
enrolment of Education Progression enrolment of Education Progression
Female -0.001 0.141*** 0.026*** 0.003 0.123*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006)
Second-born -0.001 -0.239*** -0.065*** -0.023** -0.137*** -0.048***
(0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.010) (0.038) (0.010)
Third-born 0.000 -0.512*** -0.132*** -0.038** -0.219*** -0.096***
(0.007) (0.040) (0.010) (0.018) (0.067) (0.017)
Fourth-born -0.001 -0.719*** -0.193*** -0.034 -0.307*** -0.153***
(0.011) (0.058) (0.015) (0.027) (0.098) (0.027)
Fifth-born -0.001 -0.859*** -0.282*** -0.088** -0.208 -0.237***
(0.017) (0.083) (0.030) (0.039) (0.143) (0.057)
Constant 0.241*** -3.314*** -0.025 0.519*** -5.238*** -0.022
(0.023) (0.130) (0.042) (0.057) (0.213) (0.069)
Observations 62,055 62,843 59,798 21,597 21,779 20,591
R-squared 0.772 0.903 0.671 0.800 0.923 0.634
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
In table 5.9, we present the gender and birth order estimates for poor and rich house-
holds.14 As can be seen from table 5.9, the results on the effect of gender on measured
outcomes is similar to those in the headline regression- whether in poor or rich house-
holds, we find no presence of female advantage in terms of private school enrolments but
there is a female advantage in terms of completed years of education and relative grade
progression.
However, we see that among poor households (column 1), there are no significant birth
order effects on private school enrolment. However, in rich households (column 4), young
siblings are significantly less likely to attend private schools. For instance, a fifth-born
child in a poor family has equal chance of attending a private school (relative to her eldest
sibling) (column 1) while her counterpart in a rich family is 8.8 percentage point less likely
to attend a private school (relative to her eldest sibling) (column 4). The results suggest
that family wealth intensifies rather than attenuates the negative effect of birth order on
private enrolment. This is surprising result that is contrary to our expectation. This is
because attending a private school in Kenya involves some costs and if our measure of
14Following De Haan et al. (2014), we normalized the family wealth index to the range of 0 and 1 and
classified households with a wealth index of 0.5 and above as rich and vice versa. We have confirmed
that the results do not significantly change even when we use the family wealth index in its original form
without normalization.
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household wealth is accurate, we expect family wealth to lessen (or even reverse) rather
than worsen the latter-born disadvantage in terms of private school access. We return to
explain this peculiar result shortly.
In line with our theoretical predictions, table 5.9 shows that higher family wealth
attenuates the negative effect of birth order on completed years of education and relative
grade progression. The effects of birth order on the number of completed years of schooling
are two times larger among poor households relative to rich households (columns 2 and
5). Similarly, birth order effects on relative grade progression are relatively higher among
poor households relative to rich households (columns 3 and 6).
In table 5.10, we show results from a fully interacted family fixed effects model with a
dummy variable indicating that the family is rich. The interaction terms between female
dummy and a dummy variable for the rich household are insignificant in all the regres-
sions. This means that family wealth does not have a gender effect (female advantage)
in terms of private school enrolment, completed years of schooling and relative grade
progression. The interaction of birth order effects and a dummy variable for the rich
household are largely significant in all the dependent variables. The interaction terms
with private school enrolments are negative (column 1) confirming results in table 5.9
that family wealth indeed intensifies rather than attenuates the negative effect of birth
order on private enrolment. The interaction terms with completed years of education
and relative grade progression (column 2 and 3) are positive showing that family wealth
attenuates the negative effect of birth order on completed years of education and relative
grade progression.
One might be concerned that our results are an artifact of our classification of poor
and rich households. For instance, we normalized the family wealth to a range of 0 to
1 and classified households whose index was 0.5 and above as rich. Our results might
be an artifact of such a cut-off point. To allay such fears, following De Haan et al.
(2014), we allow the wealth index, in its continuous form, to be fully interacted with
the gender, birth order dummies and all control variables. Results are shown in table
D 5.2 in appendix D. Generally, the results do not deviate from those in table 5.9. As
can be seen in table D 5.2, the interaction terms between female dummy and family
wealth are largely insignificant.15 On the other hand, the interaction term with birth
order dummies are largely significant and further show that wealth amplifies the effects
of birth order on private school enrolment and attenuates birth order effects on completed
years of education and relative grade progression.
15Nonetheless, the interaction term between female dummy and family wealth is significant but only
at 5 percent in the completed years of education regression showing that family wealth increases female
advantage in terms of completed years of education.
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enrolment of Education Progression
Female -0.001 0.141*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.003)
Second-born -0.001 -0.239*** -0.065***
(0.004) (0.023) (0.006)
Third-born 0.000 -0.512*** -0.132***
(0.007) (0.041) (0.010)
Fourth-born -0.001 -0.719*** -0.193***
(0.011) (0.059) (0.015)
Fifth-born -0.001 -0.859*** -0.282***
(0.017) (0.084) (0.030)
Female*Rich household 0.003 -0.018 -0.004
(0.007) (0.027) (0.007)
Second born*Rich household -0.022** 0.101** 0.017
(0.011) (0.044) (0.011)
Third born*Rich household -0.039** 0.293*** 0.036*
(0.019) (0.078) (0.019)
Fourth child*Rich household -0.033 0.412*** 0.040*
(0.028) (0.113) (0.020)
Fifth born*Rich household -0.087** 0.651*** 0.044
(0.042) (0.164) (0.063)
Constant 0.313*** -3.809*** -0.024
(0.017) (0.084) (0.026)
Observations 83,652 84,622 80,389
R-squared 0.045 0.827 0.119
No. of Households 36,329 36,501 36,272
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
As promised, we return to the results in column 1 and 2 of table 5.9. Contrary to our
expectation, there are no birth order effects among poor households and negative birth
order effects among rich households. We maintain that attending a private school involves
some costs and therefore family wealth should lessen rather than worsen the latter-born
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disadvantage in terms of private school access. To disentangle these results, we show
the effects of birth order on private school enrolment by region (rural and urban) and
household wealth (poor and rich) as shown in table 5.11. Recall that we attributed the
lack of birth order effects in urban areas in table 5.7 (column 4) to the near universal access
to private schools in urban areas. We further argued that the scarcity of private schools
in rural areas could be driving up their prices thus inducing households to discriminate
against some children in terms of private school access (see Table 5.7 column 1).
Table 5.11: Effects of Gender and Birth Order by Region and Household Wealth
Private School enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Areas Rural Areas
Rich Poor Rich Poor
Household Household Household Household
Female -0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Second born -0.004 -0.007 -0.037*** 0.000
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Third born 0.011 -0.004 -0.069*** 0.002
(0.034) (0.022) (0.021) (0.008)
Fourth child 0.017 -0.020 -0.071** 0.001
(0.050) (0.031) (0.032) (0.012)
Fifth born 0.033 -0.030 -0.163*** 0.002
(0.075) (0.050) (0.045) (0.018)
Constant 0.542*** 0.350*** 0.501*** 0.235***
(0.104) (0.069) (0.070) (0.026)
Observations 8,022 8,998 12,436 48,405
R-squared 0.804 0.784 0.790 0.769
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and
(6) ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Looking in column 1 and 2 of table 5.11, we see no birth order effects among both
rich and poor houses in urban areas, consistent with results in table 5.7 (column 4). This
is also consistent with our hypothesis that the near universal access to private schools in
urban areas could have indeed eroded incentives for households to discriminate against
some children in terms of their access. It therefore follows that the negative birth order
effects we see in column 4 of table 5.9 among rich households is mainly driven by rural
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rich households. Column 3 of table 5.11 confirms this assertion: we see a significant
negative association between birth order and private enrolment among children from rich
households in rural areas. In column 4 of table 5.11, we do not see evidence of birth order
effects among rural poor. This lack of birth order effects among rural poor combined
with the lack of birth order effects among the urban poor in columns 2 of the same table
means that the general lack of birth order effects on private school enrolments in table 5.9
(column 1) is being driven by both rural and urban poor households.
We can now speculate what is driving the peculiar results in column 1 and 4 of
table 5.9. The near universal access of private schools in urban areas means that all
children, from both rich and poor households, have a higher chance of accessing them.
On the other hand, we think that the few private schools in rural areas seem to be
accessible only by rich households. However, these households seem to be constrained
due to the relatively high fees charged by these private schools and as a result, it is the
first-borns who are favored. For the rural poor households, we think that these rural
private schools/academies are almost non-accessible to them mainly due to affordability.
Put differently, for the rural poor, it is not a question of intra-household discriminating
against some children in terms of access to private schools but rather a general lack of
access to private schools in rural areas due to costs.
The general lack of access to private schools by children from poor rural household
can be seen in table D 5.3 in appendix D. In this table, we estimate the probability of
private school enrolment (using a probit model) while accounting for among others, the
interaction between a rural dummy and a dummy denoting whether a child is from a poor
household. As it can be seen from the table, results show that children from rural poor
households are indeed less likely to be enrolled in private schools.
In summary, private schools are highly concentrated in urban areas and as a result,
they are accessible to all children, regardless of economic status. In rural areas, private
schools are scarce and hence charging high fees. The high cost of attending private
schools in rural areas seems to have, locked out the poor households and induced an
intra-household child-discrimination among the rural households working in favour of
first-born children.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine the effect of gender and birth order on intra-household ed-
ucation investment in children and the resultant educational outcomes in Kenya. We
measure intra-household education investment in children by the household’s decision to
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enrol children in private schools and educational outcomes by two variables: completed
years of education and relative grade progression. We use the Uwezo survey and imple-
ment the household fixed effects models that control for potential endogeneity of gender,
birth order, family size and the household level unobserved heterogeneity. We find no
intra-household gender preference in terms of whether or not to enrol a child in private
school. However, there is a consistent female advantage in terms of completed years of
education and relative school progression. Regarding birth order effects, the results reveal
a clear pattern of significant negative effects of birth order on private school enrolment,
completed years of education and relative school progression.
The female advantage we find (in terms of completed years of education and relative
grade progression) is generally not in consistent with literature reported from developing
countries but in line with global trends which show that more girls are getting educated
and the gender gap in education has narrowed considerably. Similarly, the first-born
advantage we find seems to be in line with the findings in developed countries but not
developing countries. Nevertheless, these results generally support the theoretical predic-
tions of the confluence, resource hypothesis and quantity-quality models which predict a
first-born advantage. Our results are robust to different robustness checks including cor-
rection of selectivity bias originating from non-enrolment of children and further attempts
to measure birth order effects more accurately. We check the heterogeneity of the gender
and birth order effects and find that these effects significantly differ by family size and by
location of the family (rural or urban).
We end the discussion by testing for the drivers of our observed gender and birth order
effects. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that our birth order effects (but not
gender effects) are driven household wealth. Following De Haan (2010) and Moshoeshoe
(2016), we also check if the gender and birth order effects are driven by child spacing.
However, we do not report these results since the coefficients for the interaction of gender




6.1 Summary of Findings
The government of Kenya (like that of several sub-Saharan countries) has done well to
make primary education free. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to the quality
of that education which has suffered. This thesis takes a deeper look at the available
data and analyzes children’s learning in Kenya. It then looks at the role teachers, private
schools and the family in promoting children learning, each presented in a distinct essay.
Building on the literature which emphasizes on the importance of the teacher input in
student learning, the first essay explores the influence of teacher subject and pedagogical
knowledge and teacher effort (in terms of teacher effective instruction time and classroom
practices) on grade 4 language and maths test scores.
Regression results indicate that teacher subject knowledge and pedagogical skill mat-
ter for student achievements. A one standard deviation increase in the teacher’s knowledge
in language (maths) increases student test scores by 0.075 (0.126) score standard devia-
tions in language (maths). Teachers who spend more time on instruction and can keep
students engaged during the lesson are associated with higher student test scores. For
instance, an additional hour of teacher effective instruction time increases student achieve-
ment by 0.051 and 0.059 score standard deviations in language and maths, respectively.
There is evidence that a number of classroom teaching practices have an effect on student
test scores although the effect differs between language and maths. For instance, the
practice of reviewing and assigning homework increases student test scores in language
by 0.383 standard deviations while it reduces test scores in maths by 0.377 standard de-
viations. While the practice of using local language to illustrate learning reduces student
achievement in language by 0.161 standard deviations, it has no effect on maths.
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The second essay examines the effect of private schools on literacy (language) and
numeracy (maths) skill acquisition among children mainly drawn from lower primary
grades in Kenya. We use the Uwezo survey, which, unlike the SDI survey, allows us to
apply a number of approaches that deal with the endogenous nature of private school
choice. We find a large effect of private schooling on test scores across all estimation
techniques. In maths, we find a private school premium ranging from 0.13 to 0.20 score
standard deviations, based on the household and village fixed effects models, respectively.
In the case of language, the premium ranges from 0.20 to 0.29 score standard deviations,
based on the household and village fixed effects models, respectively.
In the third essay, we shift our focus to analyze the role of the family in promoting hu-
man capital development of children in Kenya. Specifically, we investigate the effect of two
important family characteristics - gender and birth order - on intra-household investments
in, and educational outcomes of, children in Kenya aged. Our measure of intra-household
education investment in children is the household’s decision to enrol children in private
schools. Educational outcomes by two variables: completed years of education and rel-
ative grade progression. We do not find a female advantage in terms of private school
enrolment. However, we find a consistent female advantage in terms of completed years
of education and relative grade progression. Our results show a significant negative birth
order effects on the three dependent variables. We find that first-born children are more
likely to be enrolled in private schools and complete more years of education. Further-
more, first-born children also progress through school much faster than their younger
siblings. There is evidence to suggest that household wealth is driving the birth order
(and not gender) effects we observe.
6.2 Limitations of the Study and Potential Areas for
further Research
There are important limitations in this study that are unavoidable to mention. We present
them by essay (chapter). In the first essay (chapter 3), we show that student scores in
maths and language are driven by teacher human capital and teacher effort. However, the
estimates we present are not causal. We could not apply some techniques known in the
literature that deal with selection issues due to data limitations. For instance, we could
not estimate a school fixed effects model (and by extension current techniques trending
in the literature such as within-teacher within-student variation) primarily because there
is no within school variation in the variables capturing teacher human capital and effort
as only one teacher, in our sample of 222 school was observed in class and assessed in
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the teacher tests. Our results however do not deviate from those found in other studies
that use these methods that deal with selections into schools. Nevertheless, establishing
the causality of teacher knowledge and effort on student test scores to facilitate proper
policy interventions remains a potential area for further research, but highly dependent
on credible data.
There are a number of options for the next round of the SDI survey. For instance, the
team should consider observing and testing at least two or more teachers from different
streams (e.g 4A and 4B) and/or from different grades (e.g grade 3 and grade 4) within a
given school. This will create a variation in the measures of teacher human capital and
effort and allow estimation of a school fixed effects model. Efforts to undertake classroom
observations and teacher tests from schools where students are taught by the same teacher
in both subjects will particularly allow the application of within-teacher within-student
variation approaches. This will allow a causal interpretation of the teacher knowledge
and effort within a cross-sectional set-up (see studies by Metzler and Woessmann (2012);
Shepherd (2013); Shepherd et al. (2015)).
All our measures of classroom practices are binary indicators. They simply indicate
whether or not the teacher observed in the classroom engaged in the specific practice. For
instance, in analyzing the effect of the practice of challenging students intellectually by
asking them questions, we just know that the teacher simply posed questions to students.
We have no knowledge about the nature of questions that teachers posed and the type
of learners questions were directed to. Similarly, we simply know that the teacher had a
lesson plan and a scheme of work (judged by the surveyors to be well prepared) but we are
not entirely sure about the quality of these teaching tools. This certainly constrains the
credibility of our estimates. Taking this work forward, we recommend that the next round
of SDI survey should collect more details on these important pedagogical indicators. We
know from past studies that classroom environments in Kenya are mainly characterized by
teacher initiated questions and that boys are more likely to be asked questions than girls
(Hardman et al., 2009; MoEHRD, 1999). The SDI classroom observation module should
build on this previous work by collecting details information such as: type of questions
asked, the initiators of the questions (between teachers and students), the gender of the
students the questions are targeted to, among others.
In the second essay, we find that private schools are positively associated with stu-
dent test score achievements. Analyzing the effectiveness of private schools in Kenya
comes with a number challenges. For instance, private schools are quite heterogeneous.
They mainly comprise highly fragmented non-formal schools (mainly located in infor-
mal settlements) and formal private academies (in middle and high-income urban areas).
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Heterogeneity is also reflected in the mode of funding. We have government supported
private and self-reliant private schools. As noted by Ashley et al. (2014), empirical work
that does not account for these heterogeneities risks misrepresenting the private school
effect. For example, in India, a study by Chakrabarti and Peterson (2008) finds that
the effects of private aided schools are different from those of private unaided schools.
Unfortunately, the manner in which our data was collected does not allow us to account
for this heterogeneity. Our estimates should therefore be interpreted in the context of
these limitation. Going forward, it would be useful to estimate the separate effects for
aided and unaided private schools as well as formal and non-formal private schools. All
this is however dependent on the availability of data.
An equally important question is why private schools perform better than public
schools. We do not address this question because it is beyond the scope of our work
and secondly, we do not have adequate data to answer it. However, researchers in Kenya
argue that this public-private performance gap has little to do with resources. There is
an overwhelming evidence which shows that most of the recent well performing private
schools1 are characterized by poor school infrastructure and learning facilities and lack well
trained teachers (Tooley et al., 2008; Heyneman and Stern, 2014; Tooley and Longfield,
2015; Edwards Jr. et al., 2015; Piper and Mugenda, 2010; Oketch et al., 2010, 2012; Piper
et al., 2015).2 Not only are public school teachers more qualified (in terms of experience
and level of training), they are also paid better than those in low-cost primary schools.
A study carried out by Tooley and Dixon (2005) reported that public school teachers
in Nairobi earn an average monthly salary that is almost three times more that that of
private school counterparts. Bold et al. (2012) reported that average salaries for civil
service teachers in 2009 were roughly 261 US dollars relative to 56 US dollars paid to
teachers hired informally by local school management committees.
However, we know that the Kenyan public education school system faces a number of
challenges mainly related to teacher effort. Many public schools are characterized by high
rates of teacher absenteeism and even worse, teachers who do report to classes even when
in school. Table 3.3 in chapter 3 shows that a public school teacher is almost 14 percent
points more likely to be absent from class relative to his/her counterpart in a private
school. A survey by Gideon (2014) based on two Coastal Counties of Kenya (Kilifi and
Kwale) finds that public school teachers in these Counties do not show up for nearly a
quarter of their weekly lessons, leaving the learners on their own. According to the the
1That is the non-formal schools in urban informal settlements as well as the formal private academies
located in medium income urban locations.
2Table 2.2 (b) in Chapter 2 shows no discernible differences in the quality of infrastructure between
private and the public schools in the SDI survey.
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Global Monitoring Report (Education for All 2000-2015), on a typical day, more than
40,000 of the 200,000 public primary school teachers stay out of classes (UNESCO, 2015).
It is therefore possible that factors related to teacher effort could be potential candidates
that can explain the public-private performance gap in Kenya. We identify this as a
potential area for future research which of course hinges on availability of data.
In the third essay (Chapter 3), we analyze the gender and birth order effects on
children outcomes but make several assumptions, purely because of data limitations. To
mention a few, we assume that all children are biological children of the family with
whom they live at the time of the survey since there was no question in Uwezo survey
distinguishing between biological and non-biological household children. We construct
indicators of birth order and average child spacing based on their reported year of birth.
Unfortunately, Uwezo does not allow us to know if there are children who were staying
outside the household at the time of the survey and if some of the children were not
alive. In addition, Uwezo did not directly ask if the household had twins or not. If two
or more children in the household have the same age, we assume that such children are
twins. Efforts by the Uwezo team to include questions that clarify children’s biological
relationship with parents and among other information related to siblings will provide an
avenue to improve on this work.
We test for the mechanisms through which the gender and birth order effects we
observe are propagated. The results show that the observed negative birth order effects
are driven by household wealth. As it is a common practice in the literature, we construct
family wealth based on a wide range of household socioeconomic characteristics. We do
not rule out possible measurement errors in our measure of family wealth which may have
implications on our results. Efforts to collect data on household income or expenditure,
two conventional measures of household living standards will provide an avenue to further
investigate the role of family wealth in the gender and birth order effects we present. In
addition, the extent to which we examine the drivers for the our observed gender and
birth order effects are transmitted is constrained by data. More generally, subject to data
availability, research is needed to test many other possible drivers for the gender and birth
order effects.
6.3 Policy Implications
Our finding that student scores are driven by teacher knowlegde, pedagogy, effective
instruction time and teacher classroom practices suggest that intervention at the level
of teacher knowledge and effort as policy instruments may improve tests scores. First,
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there is need to institute innovative policies and strategies, including at the school level,
to encourage teacher attendance both in school and in class. Schools should also find
ways to substitute for absent teachers. There is need for re-fresher courses for teachers
on courses related to their subject content to increase their subject knowlegde as well as
courses aimed at enhancing the teacher’s capacity in classroom management including
how to effectively use classroom instructional time.
The finding that private schools are associated with better student achievements has
clear implications for policymakers. Expanding access to private schools provides an op-
portunity to deal with the challenge of declining quality of education in Kenya. Following
Bold et al. (2013b), we foresee two policy approaches. The first policy option includes
implementing the school voucher system, a strategy that combines private provision of
education with public finance, a common practice in the USA and Latin America. The
school voucher system involves the government giving parents funds to pay for their chil-
dren education in private schools (see Angrist et al. (2002)). The second policy option
involves integrating, into the current public education school system, pedagogical tech-
niques and organizational structures of private schools (see Bold et al. (2013b)).
There are also implications for policymakers from the finding that latter-born children,
especially in poor and large households, lag behind in terms of education outcomes. This
call for efforts to sensitize the population on the importance of family planning. There is
also need to institute interventions such as cash transfer and other financial assistance to
large and poor families. Given that its is latter-born children who are most disadvantaged,
such support systems should be designed to improve the conditions of latter-born children.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 2
We would like to provide a short note on the SDI survey sample. The SDI survey
team aimed to observe a grade 4 language or maths lesson in all the sampled schools.
Classroom observation for language and maths however took place in only 276 schools. In
2 schools, a science and creative arts subjects were observed respectively. In the remaining
28 schools, classroom observation did not take place because teachers were absent from
class. We include them in the absence from class indicator. Of the 276 teachers who were
observed, 222 teachers participated in the teacher test assessment while 54 did not. In
this section, we investigate whether these dynamics introduce any systematic patterns or
biases in the data. Table A2.1 shows the means for selected school, class and student
characteristics for the following samples: (a) full sample of 306 schools (b) sample of
222 schools where teachers were observed and assessed, (c) sample of 54 schools where
teachers were observed and not assessed and (d) 28 schools where classroom observation
did not take place. A comparison of these means reveals no evidence of large differences
among the different samples.
Second, we investigate whether there is evidence of systematic patterns with respect
to the 54 teachers who participated in the observation and not teachers tests. One way
is to compare them with their 222 counterparts who participated in both. For these
two samples, we have information regarding teachers classroom practices as well as other
characteristics except for teacher scores. Table A2.2 shows among others, descriptive
statistics for the measures of how teachers spend their time in class and their classroom
practices for the 222 and 54 samples (details about these characteristics are provided in
the next Chapter). In general, we do not find any significant differences between the two
samples. Of interest to us is that both teachers seem to be identical in terms of how they
spent their time in class.
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Table A2.1: SDI Survey Summary Statistics for different Samples
Full Observed Observed & not Not Observed
Sample Sample Tested Sample Sample
(N=306) (N=222) (N=54) (N=28)
School Characteristics
Rural 0.68 0.68 0.61 0.79
Public 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.86
Class size 33.67 32.28 36.63 38.39
Pupil per teacher 31.27 31.13 31.28 31.85
School located near tarmac road 0.34 0.32 0.46 0.21
Minimum Teaching Resources
Classroom has a blackboard (percent) 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.96
Classroom has a piece of chalk (percent) 0.92 0.97 1.00 0.43
Share of pupil with a pencil (percent) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Share of pupil with an exercise book 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97
Average number of students per textbook (maths) 2.62 2.61 2.58 2.72
Average number of students per textbook (English) 3.64 3.64 3.07 4.73
Infrastructure Availability (percent)
School has toilets 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00
School toilets are designated for boys and girls 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96
School toilets are private (have doors) 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.89
School toilets are accessible 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93
School toilets are clean 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.79
Sufficient light for reading from the back
of the classroom 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.82
Students Characteristics
Number of students 2,953 2,142 520 271
Female 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.51
Age 10.43 10.45 10.22 10.64
Had breakfast 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.89
English 79.74 79.03 83.10 79.60
Maths 60.28 60.28 59.90 61.36
Non verbal reasoning 58.88 58.87 60.38 56.27










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 3
Table B3.1: Indicators for Constructing Village level Wealth Index
No. Individual or household characteristic
1 Average number of years of education per adult (person aged 18 years and above).
2 Percent of people in the village aged 6 years & above who got a service from the following














4 Percent of households in the village whose main water source is:
(a) Pond, dam, lake, rain, jabia and water vendor
(b) Unprotected well, unprotected spring, stream/river and borehole
(c) Protected well and protected spring
(d) Piped into dwelling place
(e) Piped outside the dwelling place






(f) Corrugated iron sheets
(g) Other materials (grass and tin)
6 Percent of households in the village whose main source of lighting is:
(a) Electricity and solar
(b) Pressure and gas lamp
(c) Lantern and
(d) Fuel wood







Table B3.2: Teacher Human Capital, Teacher Effort and Student Language Test Scores
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Teacher subject knowledge 0.053* 0.079** 0.103*** 0.080** 0.075**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031)
Teacher pedagogical knowledge 0.001 -0.038 -0.033 -0.011 -0.007
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048) (0.053)
Effective instruction time (in hours) 0.051* 0.045* 0.071*** 0.056** 0.051**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Percent of student off-task (average) -0.005 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Teacher Classroom Practices
Teacher reviews and assigns homework 0.181* 0.353*** 0.451*** 0.383***
(0.097) (0.094) (0.113) (0.135)
Teacher uses local language to illustrate learning -0.243*** -0.177** -0.171* -0.161**
(0.089) (0.084) (0.094) (0.081)
Teacher challenges students by asking questions -0.121 -0.189*** -0.225*** -0.190**
(0.079) (0.062) (0.073) (0.074)
Teacher keeps a lesson plan and scheme of work -0.251* -0.296** -0.242* -0.263*
(0.139) (0.126) (0.132) (0.112)
Teacher instills discipline in students -0.392*** -0.329*** -0.365*** -0.298***
(0.113) (0.108) (0.100) (0.101)
Teacher Controls
Teacher is female 0.201** 0.136 0.078
(0.084) (0.099) (0.097)
Teacher experience (in years) 0.035** 0.035** 0.035**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Teacher experience squared (in years) -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Teacher is on contract (Ref: government) -0.457*** -0.220 -0.250
(0.137) (0.162) (0.172)
Teacher’s highest education level is a diploma or a degree (Ref: Secondary) 0.054 0.055 0.105
(0.094) (0.093) (0.088)
Teacher has ECD or primary certificate in teaching (Ref: Diploma or degree) -0.075 -0.183 -0.175
(0.087) (0.121) (0.137)
School and Classroom Controls
School is public -0.311* -0.334**
(0.156) (0.117)
School is rural -0.166 -0.186
(0.146) (0.179)
School is located next to tarmac road 0.046 0.157
(0.138) (0.140)
Number of pupils per teacher 0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.005)
Index of school infrastructure 0.026 0.026
(0.024) (0.022)
Class size -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Index of classroom instructional inputs 0.031 0.070
(0.070) (0.072)
Student Controls
Student age (in years) -0.171
(0.226)
Student age squared (in years) 0.001
(0.011)
Student is female 0.090**
(0.042)
Student had breakfast 0.055
(0.079)
Student score in maths 0.016***
(0.003)
Student non-verbal reasoning score 0.004***
(0.001)
Village Controls (Village level wealth index) 0.027 0.019 -0.036 -0.033 -0.032
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Constant -0.123 0.491*** 0.257 0.538** 0.783
(0.111) (0.176) (0.208) (0.224) (1.239)
Division Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
R-squared 0.376 0.396 0.407 0.413 0.495
Notes: (1) The estimates are based on 113 schools; (2) The measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort are
based on the single teacher who was observed (teaching a language class) and assessed in the teacher tests; (3) The index
of school infrastructure is based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) toilets that were judged as designated for
boys and girls, accessible, private and clean, (b) electricity and (c) sufficient light for reading from the back of the class;
(4) Index of classroom instructional inputs is based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) proportion of students
with pens and exercise books, (b) number of students per text book (language), (c) whether the classroom had the
following: piece of chalk, a black board, a corner library, children’s work displayed on the walls and other materials (other
than children’s work such as flips charts) displayed on the walls; (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered
at the class level and (6) ***1 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level and *10 percent significance level.
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Table B3.3: Teacher Human Capital, Teacher Effort and Student Maths Test Scores
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Teacher subject knowledge 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.166*** 0.126***
(0.055) (0.051) (0.057) (0.046) (0.045)
Teacher pedagogical knowledge 0.039 0.005 -0.023 0.111*** 0.112***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.045) (0.038) (0.035)
Effective instruction time (in hours) 0.150*** 0.137*** 0.199*** 0.087** 0.059*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.030)
Percent of student off-task (average) -0.018** -0.020*** -0.010 -0.005 -0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Teacher Classroom Practices
Teacher reviews and assigns homework -0.208* -0.217* -0.463*** -0.377***
(0.113) (0.114) (0.087) (0.084)
Teacher uses local language to illustrate learning -0.262** -0.162 -0.106 -0.073
(0.129) (0.135) (0.089) (0.096)
Teacher challenges students by asking questions 0.211 0.219 0.348*** 0.273***
(0.150) (0.134) (0.114) (0.102)
Teacher keeps a lesson plan and scheme of work 0.012 -0.038 -0.243* -0.248*
(0.152) (0.163) (0.120) (0.115)
Teacher instills discipline in students 0.037 0.111 0.338** 0.217
(0.178) (0.174) (0.156) (0.156)
Teacher Controls
Teacher is female -0.267** -0.091 -0.165*
(0.134) (0.091) (0.085)
Teacher experience (in years) -0.065*** -0.078*** -0.082***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Teacher experience squared (in years) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Teacher is on contract (Ref: government) 0.019 0.243* 0.247*
(0.185) (0.133) (0.131)
Teacher’s highest education level is a diploma or a degree (Ref: Secondary) 0.284* -0.041 -0.008
(0.155) (0.132) (0.129)
Teacher has ECD or primary certificate in teaching (Ref: Diploma or degree) -0.096 0.080 0.090
(0.160) (0.118) (0.103)
School and Classroom Controls
School is public -0.692*** -0.696***
(0.191) (0.182)
School is rural 0.077 0.058
(0.117) (0.111)
School is located next to tarmac road 0.152 0.150
(0.182) (0.178)
Number of pupils per teacher -0.003 0.000
(0.007) (0.006)
Index of school infrastructure -0.175*** -0.159***
(0.035) (0.034)
Class size -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Index of classroom instructional inputs 0.121*** 0.062*
(0.039) (0.036)
Student Controls
Student age (in years) -0.229
(0.140)
Student age squared (in years) 0.011*
(0.006)
Student is female -0.114*
(0.060)
Student had breakfast 0.136*
(0.080)
Student score in language 0.273***
(0.043)
Student non-verbal reasoning score 0.004***
(0.002)
Village Controls (Village level wealth index) 0.142*** 0.152*** 0.129*** 0.025 0.019
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant -0.139 -0.023 -0.104 1.112*** 1.783**
(0.133) (0.182) (0.215) (0.362) (0.811)
Division Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034
R-squared 0.302 0.313 0.332 0.370 0.430
Notes: (1) The estimates are based on 109 schools. (2) The measures of teacher human capital and teacher effort are
based on the single teacher who was observed (teaching a language class) and assessed in the teacher tests; (3) The index
of school infrastructure is based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) toilets that were judged as designated for
boys and girls, accessible, private and clean, (b) electricity and (c) sufficient light for reading from the back of the class;
(4) Index of classroom instructional inputs is based on the following items, given equal weight: (a) proportion of students
with pens and exercise books, (b) number of students per text book (maths), (c) whether the classroom had the following:
piece of chalk, a black board, a corner library, children’s work displayed on the walls and other materials (other than
children’s work such as flips charts) displayed on the walls; (5) Standard errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
class level and (6) ***1 percent significance level, **5 percent significance level and *10 percent significance level.
173
Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 4




Age squared 0.01** (0.00)
Is female -0.01 (0.02)
Has some disability -0.11 (0.07)
Goes for paid tuition 0.74*** (0.02)
Current grade -0.06*** (0.02)
Household Characteristics
Mother’s age -0.03*** (0.01)
Mother’s age squared 0.00** (0.00)
Mother’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.05 (0.04)
Has secondary education level 0.12*** (0.05)
Has post secondary education level 0.33*** (0.10)
Father’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.05 (0.05)
Has secondary education level 0.11** (0.05)
Has post secondary education level 0.24*** (0.07)
Household has less than 10 members -0.02*** (0.00)
Household has source of water at home 0.13*** (0.03)
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.04 (0.04)
Distance to school is less than 30 minutes 0.08*** (0.02)
Household assets
Household has a TV 0.21*** (0.03)
Household has a radio 0.03 (0.03)
Household has a computer 0.31*** (0.07)
Household has a phone 0.13*** (0.03)
Household has a car 0.29*** (0.05)
Household has a cattle 0.09*** (0.02)
Household has a donkey 0.05 (0.04)
Household has a camel -0.04 (0.08)
Household has a goat -0.09*** (0.02)
Household has a bicycle -0.07*** (0.02)
Household has a motorbike 0.09** (0.04)
Household has a cart 0.01 (0.06)
Number of Meals taken per day(ref: Three)
One meals 0.07 (0.07)
Two meals -0.13*** (0.03)
Wall material for dwelling place (ref: Bricks stone )
Polythene and iron 0.01 (0.04)
Timber -0.08** (0.04)
Mud -0.14*** (0.03)




Village has chief’s office -0.00 (0.02)
Village has shopping center 0.15*** (0.03)
Village has electricity 0.03 (0.03)
Village has tarmac road 0.08*** (0.03)
Village has all-weather road -0.04 (0.03)
Village has an education committee -0.11*** (0.02)
Village has all protected water point -0.01 (0.02)
Village is rural -0.14*** (0.03)
Constant 0.16 (0.25)
Observations 30,299
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the household level and; (2) ***1% significance level, **5%
significance level and *10% significance level.
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Figure C4.1: Propensity Score of Observations in and off Common Support Region
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Table C4.2: Testing of Balance between Private and Public Students after PSM
Estimation
Unmatched Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Treated Control %bias t-test p>|t| Treated Control %bias t-test p>|t| %reduct
Student Characteristics
Student’s Age 8.54 9.41 -45.2 -23.72 0.00 8.74 8.74 0.7 0.30 0.76 98.3
Student’s Age squared 76.12 92.78 -44.5 -22.9 0.00 93.41 79.40 0.9 0.36 0.72 98.0
Student is female 0.49 0.47 3.8 2.10 0.04 0.49 0.48 1.3 0.49 0.63 65.4
Student has some disability 0.02 0.03 -5.8 -3.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 1.8 0.73 0.47 68.9
Students goes for paid tuition 0.72 0.34 83.6 45.28 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.1 0.05 0.96 99.8
Student grade 2.90 2.99 -11.5 -6.32 0.00 2.93 2.93 -0.9 -0.33 0.74 92.2
Mother age 33.11 35.61 -18.6 -9.91 0.00 34.29 34.34 -0.8 -0.31 0.76 95.5
Family Characteristics
Mother’s Education level
Has no education 0.10 0.25 -38.9 -19.12 0.00 0.12 0.12 -1.0 -0.41 0.68 97.5
Has primary education 0.50 0.59 -18.4 -10.26 0.00 0.54 0.53 2.5 0.92 0.36 86.4
Has secondary education 0.36 0.16 47.5 29.40 0.00 0.32 0.33 -1.4 -0.47 0.64 97.1
Has post secondary education 0.04 0.01 22.9 19.40 0.00 0.01 0.02 -2.0 -0.88 0.38 91.3
Father’s Education level
Has no education 0.08 0.20 -36.7 -17.80 0.00 0.09 0.09 -0.9 -0.39 0.70 97.5
Has primary education level 0.39 0.52 -26.9 -14.75 0.00 0.44 0.43 0.4 0.15 0.88 98.5
Has secondary education level 0.46 0.26 42.4 24.72 0.00 0.43 0.42 2.0 0.69 0.49 95.4
Has post secondary education level 0.08 0.02 28.0 21.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 -3.8 -1.42 0.15 86.3
Household size 6.2 6.9 -27.1 -14.8 0.00 6.36 6.4 -0.5 -0.02 0.84 98.1
Household has source of water at home 0.32 0.15 41.4 25.7 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.2 0.06 0.96 99.6
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.90 0.75 40.8 19.98 0.00 0.89 0.88 0.2 0.09 0.93 99.5
Distance to school is less than 30 min. 0.47 0.56 -12.2 -6.44 0.00 0.50 0.51 -0.5 -0.19 0.85 96.0
Household Assets
Household has a TV 0.44 0.15 66.8 42.40 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.4 0.12 0.90 99.5
Household has a radio 0.83 0.71 28.4 14.69 0.00 0.80 0.81 -1.2 -0.47 0.64 95.8
Household has a computer 0.06 0.01 28.1 22.79 0.00 0.03 0.02 2.1 0.90 0.37 92.5
Household has a phone 0.82 0.64 42.2 21.56 0.00 0.79 0.80 -1.5 -0.61 0.55 96.4
Household has a car 0.10 0.02 31.8 24.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 1.8 0.69 0.49 94.4
Household has a cattle 0.54 0.56 -3.7 -2.06 0.00 0.56 0.58 -2.8 -1.03 0.30 25.7
Household has a donkey 0.10 0.16 -18.8 -9.65 0.00 0.11 0.11 -0.4 -0.14 0.89 98.1
Household has a camel 0.01 0.04 -16.7 -7.86 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.5 0.23 0.82 97.2
Household has a goat 0.38 0.49 -23.4 -12.77 0.00 0.40 0.40 -0.1 -0.03 0.97 99.6
Household has a bicycle 0.32 0.31 3.1 1.71 0.00 0.33 0.31 1.8 0.65 0.52 42.1
Household has a motorbike 0.11 0.05 22.2 14.25 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.9 0.32 0.75 95.8
Household has a cart 0.04 0.04 -1.9 -1.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.6 0.24 0.81 69.0
Number of Meals taken per day
One meal 0.02 0.04 -8.6 -4.35 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.5 -0.20 0.84 94.3
Two meals 0.12 0.23 -29.2 -14.74 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.3 -0.14 0.89 98.8
Three meals 0.86 0.74 31.2 15.84 0.00 0.84 0.84 0.5 0.21 0.83 98.3
Wall material for dwelling place
Mud 0.40 0.66 -55.4 -31.06 0.00 0.47 0.47 -0.7 -0.25 0.80 98.7
Polythene and iron 0.08 0.07 5.5 3.21 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.5 0.18 0.85 90.5
Timber 0.12 0.09 12.1 7.10 0.00 0.13 0.13 -1.7 -0.59 0.56 85.6
Bricks stone 0.39 0.17 49.0 29.97 0.00 0.32 0.31 1.7 0.58 0.56 96.6
Regular source of lighting
Electricity 0.37 0.10 66.4 45.16 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.1 0.02 0.98 99.9
Paraffin 0.61 0.82 -50.0 -30.71 0.00 0.71 0.71 -1.2 -0.41 0.68 97.7
Other 0.02 0.07 -22.5 -10.66 0.00 0.03 0.02 2.2 1.10 0.27 90.1
Village Characteristics
Village has chief’s office 0.70 0.62 18.2 9.83 0.00 0.68 0.69 -1.0 -039 0.69 94.3
Village has shopping center 0.35 0.24 24.0 13.88 0.00 0.32 0.31 0.6 0.20 0.84 97.6
Village has police post 0.35 0.24 24.0 13.88 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.6 0.20 0.84 97.6
Village has electricity 0.59 0.38 42.5 23.61 0.00 0.54 0.53 2.1 0.75 0.46 95.2
Village has tarmac road 0.29 0.15 33.9 20.68 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.09 0.93 99.2
Village has all-weather road 0.81 0.78 6.4 3.46 0.00 0.80 0.80 -1.5 -0.57 0.57 76.2
Village has an education committee 0.27 0.32 -11.4 -6.91 0.00 0.27 0.28 -1.9 -0.73 0.47 83.1
Village has all protected water point 0.42 0.40 2.1 1.19 0.23 0.41 0.40 3.4 1.26 0.21 -57.6
Village is rural 0.69 0.83 -36.4 -22.12 0.00 0.74 0.74 -0.6 -0.23 0.82 98.2
Village is urban 0.32 0.17 36.4 22.12 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.6 0.23 0.82 98.2
176
Figure C4.2: Visual Inspection of Standardized Differences
Figure C4.3: Visual Inspection of Standardized Differences
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Table D 5.1: Probit Results for Children Enrolment
Coefficient Standard Error
Student Characteristics
Birth order (ref: First child)
Second child -0.066** (0.026)
Third child -0.203*** (0.031)
Fourth child -0.285*** (0.038)
Fifth child -0.408*** (0.054)
Age 1.182*** (0.020)
Age squared -0.050*** (0.001)
Child is female 0.008 (0.016)
Child has some disability -0.491*** (0.041)
Child goes for paid tuition
Household Characteristics
Mother’s age 0.029*** (0.006)
Mother’s age squared -0.000*** (0.000)
Mother’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level 0.196*** (0.026)
Has secondary education level 0.246*** (0.037)
Has post secondary education level 0.264* (0.135)
Father’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level 0.246*** (0.027)
Has secondary education level 0.375*** (0.034)
Has post secondary education level 0.381*** (0.084)
Household size 0.005 (0.004)
Household has source of water at home 0.077*** (0.028)
Household has toilet/latrine at home 0.332*** (0.021)
Distance to school -0.191*** (0.033)
Index of household Assets 0.055*** (0.008)
Meals taken per day(ref: Less than three meals)
Three meals 0.102*** (0.018)
Wall material for dwelling place (ref: Mud)
Polythene and iron 0.220*** (0.035)
Timber 0.240*** (0.037)
Bricks stone 0.150*** (0.027)




Village has chief’s office 0.066*** (0.018)
Village has shopping center 0.030 (0.021)
Village has electricity -0.010 (0.021)
Village has tarmac road -0.014 (0.026)
Village has all-weather road 0.031 (0.019)
Village has an education committee 0.033* (0.018)
Village has all protected water point -0.002 (0.017)
Village is rural -0.018 (0.024)
Constant -6.311*** (0.158)
Observations 57,631
Notes: (1) We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets. The index
is based on household ownership of the following assets: durable assets (TV, radio, car, computer, mobile phone, bicycle,
motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat); (2) Standard errors are in parenthesis; (3)
***1% significance level, **5% significance level and *10% significance level.
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Table D 5.2: Effects of Gender and Birth Order: Fully Interacted with Family Wealth,




enrolment of Education Progression
Female -0.007 0.076** 0.016*
(0.007) (0.033) (0.008)
Second born 0.015 -0.388*** -0.095***
(0.011) (0.056) (0.014)
Third born 0.032 -0.854*** -0.187***
(0.020) (0.099) (0.024)
Fourth child 0.024 -1.265*** -0.270***
(0.029) (0.142) (0.037)
Fifth born 0.080* -1.685*** -0.361***
(0.044) (0.200) (0.072)
Female*Family wealth 0.018 0.142* 0.024
(0.018) (0.074) (0.018)
Second born*Family wealth -0.057* 0.425*** 0.084***
(0.029) (0.123) (0.031)
Third born*Family wealth -0.099* 0.989*** 0.153***
(0.050) (0.219) (0.053)
Forth child*Family wealth -0.078 1.530*** 0.212**
(0.075) (0.316) (0.082)
Fifth born*Family wealth -0.246** 2.329*** 0.216
(0.110) (0.455) (0.169)
Constant 0.308*** -3.741*** -0.022
(0.022) (0.110) (0.036)
Observations 83,652 84,622 80,389
0.792 0.911 0.677
36,329 36,501 36,272
Notes: (1) All regressions are based on the household fixed effects model and include the following control variables: age of
the child (in years), whether the child has some form of disability or not and whether the child goes for paid up tuition or
not; (2) We only show estimates for gender and birth order dummies (our variables of interest); (3) Private school enrolment
is defined as a dummy which equals 1 if the child was enrolled in a private school or 0 if a child was enrolled in a public
school and this is estimated using LPM; (4) Completed years of education is number of years of education completed as
at the time of the survey; (4) Relative grade progression equals Completed years of education
(Age−6) where 6 is the school starting
age in Kenya; (5) We clustered the standard errors (in parenthesis) at the household level; and (6) ***significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Birth order (ref: First child)
Second child -0.087*** (0.021)
Third child -0.177*** (0.028)
Fourth child -0.218*** (0.040)
Fifth child -0.351*** (0.078)
Age -0.105*** (0.022)
Age squared 0.001 (0.001)
Child is female 0.017 (0.016)
Child has some disability -0.087* (0.052)
Child attends paid tuition -0..433*** (0.018)
Household Characteristics
Mother’s age 0.006 (0.007)
Mother’s age squared -0.000** (0.000)
Mother’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.252*** (0.028)
Has secondary education level -0.035 (0.033)
Has post secondary education level 0.136* (0.074)
Father’s Education level(ref: None)
Has primary education level -0.259*** (0.030)
Has secondary education level -0.098*** (0.033)
Has post secondary education level -0.028 (0.055)
Household size 0.005 (0.004)
Household has source of water at home 0.118*** (0.021)
Household has toilet/latrine at home -0.032 (0.024)
Distance to school -0.040 (0.037)
Index of household Assets 0.053*** (0.008)
Meals taken per day(ref: Less than three meals)
Three meals 0.152*** (0.021)
Wall material for dwelling place (ref: Mud)
Polythene and iron 0.105*** (0.030)
Timber -0.043 (0.031)
Bricks stone 0.040 (0.025)




Village has chief’s office 0.003 (0.018)
Village has shopping center 0.160*** (0.019)
Village has electricity 0.001 (0.019)
Village has tarmac road 0.088*** (0.021)
Village has all-weather road -0.092*** (0.019)
Village has an education committee -0.059*** (0.017)
Village has all protected water point 0.027* (0.016)
Constant 0.063 (0.178)
Observations 50,558
Notes: (1) We use the ordinary principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the index of household assets. The index
is based on household ownership of the following assets: durable assets (TV, radio, car, computer, mobile phone, bicycle,
motorbike and cart) and livestock assets (cattle, donkey, camel, sheep/goat); (2) Standard errors are in parenthesis; (3)
***1% significance level, **5% significance level and *10% significance level.
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